



Article

External Involvement in the Syrian Civil Conflict and the Rise of Islamic State Movement

Nnamdi Azikiwe Journal of
Political Science (NAJOPS).
2023, Vol. 8(3)
ISSN: 2992-5924
©NAJOPS 2023
Reprints and permissions:
www.najops.org.ng

UKAEGBU, Chidi O.
Department of Political Science,
Nnamdi Azikiwe University,
Awka, Anambra State, Nigeria.

Abstract

Sovereign states especially those in the Middle East have over the last couple of years been enmeshed in high profile internal challenges that have flagrantly shown a more or less usual vindictive display of power and resources by those that own it and willing to deploy it in pursuit of some perceived objectives both overtly and covertly expressed. This study focuses on external involvement in the Syrian conflict and the rise of the Islamic State movement. Particularly, the study investigates the link between external political and logistics support to the opposition pro-democracy movement and the expansion of the Islamic State in Syria. The study used *ex post facto* research design and the qualitative method to generate data while qualitative descriptive analysis was used to assign descriptive explanation and analysis to the data in order to show the relationship between the variables. Anchored on the Marxist political economy paradigm, the study found that external support to the opposition pro-democracy movement in Syria gave rise to the expansion of the Islamic State resulting in the capture and control of territories in Syria. The study also found that the drive for regime change and the installation of democracy by the West is a matter of age-long foreign policy thrust and not a mere involvement rooted on humanitarian justifications. It therefore recommends the complete withdrawal of the corporate-financier support driven by foreign interests that fuel the conflict otherwise the Syrian civil conflict will persist and the Islamic State movement would remain a force that would not be easy to defeat.

Keywords

External involvement, civil conflict, Islamic state, Pro-democracy movement, Legitimization.

Introduction

It is a statement of fact that sovereign states especially those in the Middle East have over the last couple of years been enmeshed in high profile internal challenges that have fragrantly shown a more or less usual vindictive display of power and resources by those that own it and willing to deploy them in pursuit of some perceived objectives both overtly and covertly expressed. This view captures the experience of Syria; a state ruled by President Bashar al-Assad whose father had seized state power in the 1970 coup. From the poor Alawite family in Syria, Hafiz al-Assad ruled Syria unconstitutionally and was of course accused of being despotic with a bunch of human right abuses that ornamented his administration (Pipe, 2011, Ratney, 2019, Congress Research Service (CRS), 2022).

Following the death of his father, Bashar Al-Assad presented himself for election under the Bath party and was incidentally voted unopposed into power in 2000. In his hey-days, he was thought to be a sharp opposite of his father—a messiah of a sort in his style and perhaps goal of administration. But like an old wine in a new wine skin, the style, contents and interest sought by his reign abruptly led to ‘the evil days

Corresponding Author:

UKAEGBU, Chidi O., Department of Political Science, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Anambra State, Nigeria.
Email: co.ukaegbu@unizik.edu.ng

of the roughly 23, 227,014 million persons that make up the Syrian state and leaves Syria porously divided between the Assad regime in Damascus and a terrorist sanctuary in parts of the north and east.

As these movements garnered the attention of the international media, reports of excessive government violence were used to tarnish the image of national governments in the region. Media enterprises such as *Al-Jazeera* and *FOX News* did their part to condition public opinion in an effort to build support for Western-sanctioned opposition groups and justify external involvement in the civil unrest (Chosseudovsky, 2011). Thus, Chosseudovsky (2015) argued that external support to opposition pro-democracy movement and the expansion of the Islamic State can only be understood in the light of media manipulation by the West. Dissident forces openly received arms and material assistance from abroad, in order to wage insurrectionary warfare against the governing authority. Several Western satellite organizations like the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute were seen recruiting, training, and supporting the unrest in Syria in order to subvert and topple the government on behalf of Western States (Chosseudovsky, 2015).

Despite all the motives for intervention, there is evidence that Syria has remained a problem for the West and United States in particular. The arguments in favour of a more active western role there seem perfectly counterbalanced by the arguments against it especially in the aftermath of America's painful experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to Pollack (2014), and Ratney (2019), the cons begin with the simple, critical fact that the United States has no interests in Syria itself. Syria is not a major oil producer. It is not a major trading partner of the United States (or the West for that matter). It is not a democracy. It has never been a U.S. ally and has never even been a friend to America's other allies in the region.

As such, the conflict in Syria is seen as an inter-communal civil war like that of Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Congo, Somalia, Rwanda, and countless others. Historically, such conflicts tend to end in one of two ways: one side wins, typically accompanied by horrific slaughter and 'ethnic cleansing' of its adversaries; or a third party intervenes to halt the fighting and forge a power-sharing arrangement among the combatants, and helps to build a new political system. Peaceful, negotiated conclusions to such civil wars are rare and typically occur only after years and years of killing and other forms of destruction.

The central conflict between the Bashar al-Assad regime and its opponents, is largely seen as an existential power struggle that drew in multiple foreign powers and yielded nearly unimaginable destruction of Syrian property, infrastructure, and lives and displaced half of Syria's prewar population (UN Report, 2012, Ratney, 2019, CRS, 2022). This conflict, according to the report is strengthened by the external support received by groups involved especially the US-backed Kurdish forces known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The support ranged from formal recognition of Syrian opposition coalition as the official representatives of the Syrian people, the training of moderates rebel fighters, supply of arms, financial and logistics support among others.

Masterminded by five super powers: Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and the United States, the trouble in the Middle East today and its protracted posture in Syria and the attendant consequences on the citizenry throws a light to the lawlessness in Syria, the factions that sprung up in recent times, the sizeless radical groups and the wave of disaster in near states. This situation in a nut shell has produced a fertile seed bed for the expansion of the Islamic States in Syria as well as the capture, overthrow and control of territories in Syria. While some scholars have argued in favour of these supports, others like Ratney, (2019:1) claims that U.S. and Western policy regarding foreign intervention in conflict-ridden states, in many ways exacerbated problems for Syrian civilians, the Syrian opposition, and Syria's neighbors without yielding political concessions or reforms to the nature of Syrian governance. These arguments notwithstanding, this paper addresses itself to the link between external legitimization of the activities of

opposition movements in Syria and the expansion of the Islamic State. This is yet to be given adequate systematic treatment in extant literature. It is this gap in knowledge that the present study seeks to fill. In view of the foregoing, we set out two interrelated propositions to guide the study. First, that External legitimization of the activities of Anti-government Movements gave rise to the revival and expansion of Islamic State in Syria. Secondly, that external intervention remains the hall mark of western recolonization mission. Hence, its support to opposition groups offers them the means for political interference in the internal affairs of Syria and the proper establishment of its presence in the state in line with its identified interest.

Methodology

The findings of this research were based on data from a wide collection of existing works by experts and agencies interested in the subtleties of external intervention in the civil conflicts in a state and its effects on international politics and the dynamics of global power relations. As it is with most secondary research works, the study adopted qualitative method to generate data while qualitative descriptive analysis was used to assign descriptive explanation and analysis to the data in order to show the relationship between the variables. Thus, library materials, internet sources, journals, official reports and UN documentations on the civil conflict in Syria were used to generate relevant data. The generated data were subjected to analytic and textual analysis through examining the critical issues that have come to assume importance.

Theoretical framework

The study is anchored on the Marxist Political Economy theory. The use of this theoretical framework is mainly to cover such issues in International Relations that depart from mere description to such analysis that meet both philosophical and scientific standards.

The Marxian Political Economy theory as expanded by Karl Marx and Fredreich Engel (1959). In 1970, Marx wrote “*A contribution to the critique of political economy*” largely in Russia and the Soviet Union... The theory was however moved from its embryonic state to where it is today by other scholars who share the same or similar radical orientation like Lenin (1984), Andre (1967), Offiong (1976), Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1993), Wallerstein (1974), Chumpeter (1919), Ibeanu (1998), Eze (2002), Nnoli (2003). There are different political economy models of analysis but there are common grounds among them. These principal ones include: (1) there is a strong connection between the political and economic structures of society; (2) that the political and economic structures of society give shape to its general norms, values, culture, religion and pattern of governance; (3) that a more comprehensive analysis of society can only be made by understanding the linkages between the economy and polity as well as their dialectical connections to other structures and social institutions (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005, Bouchat, 2013, Eze and Onwo, 2002). The relationship between external involvement and the Islamic State movement evidenced in the Syrian conflict since 2011 is explained in the light of the Political Economy theory. The framework will not only facilitate our appreciation of the intricacies, dynamics and trajectory of external involvement in the Syrian conflict but will also assist in unraveling how Western and Gulf states through their support for Syrian anti-government movements provides the context for the revival and expansion of the Islamic State movement and the control of territories in Syria in the wake of the conflict in the state.

The application of this theory to the understanding of external involvement and the Islamic State movement in Syria suggests that the problem of political protest and extremism, order and disorder, law and lawlessness, conflict and peace are to be understood as reflections, perceptions or product of the way society organizes its economy, especially the dominant interest that drive it (Eze and Onwo, 2013:57). Since the state is thus seen as the most powerful coercive mechanism for the control of these dominant interests as well as the control of all things in Syria, the move to capture state power (Politics) would naturally take dominance over the economy itself so that politics became tantamount to good live and

wellbeing of the people of Syria. The above clearly paints the picture of the prerequisite for the revolt in Syria and the ultimate aim of the Syrian opposition movement. This is the major strand (Primacy of material condition (Ake, 1981:13), emphasized by the Political Economy theory that is adopted for this analysis.

In adopting and applying this theory for analysis, the imports of such concepts as ‘the state,’ the ‘economy’ (Production) and the ‘struggle of opposites’ are closely considered. The theory contends that the relationship and interplay between these variables result in conflict in states and explain why and how external interest and involvement in such conflict can be correctly gauged. The ‘dynamic character of social reality’ is another key strand of the theory. It points to the dynamic nature of social relations in a state. Thus, Ezeibe (2010:18) noted that “relations of production and of course distribution of the proceeds of the economy are more often than not characterized by antagonism amongst discontent factions”. This discontentment provides the initial grounds for revolt at the wake of any slightest provocation. The antagonism in discontent factions resulting from the relations of production explains why a large percentage of Syrians not connected to the unpopular Bashar’s Alawite lineage went up in arms at the slightest incitement from government forces in Syria. The permutation was simply that the grab of state power by the opposition group will ultimately translate to the grab of the means of production and distribution from which they had long been separated by the ruling household that was largely monarchical and autocratic- a major character of states within the Middle East region and its neighborhood.

The theory also assumes that where opposites exist, there must be struggles between contending parties leading to the negation of the existing system of governance and administration of the economy by states and elements within and outside the state. This again throws up two important issues worthy of close examination; they include:

- a. There is an obvious dislodgment of interests between the ruling party and the opposition movement and between the ruling Alawite household and the West- in terms of who runs the state and the economy and in whose interest. Since this conflict of interest exists as predicted by the theory in use, it was merely and only natural that the Syrian conflict will and has actually lingered to this point.
- b. Arguably, the central issue that gave rise to the protest and the civil conflict in Syria is the economy and the target of the political struggle by confrontational movements is still the capture of the economy of Syria. Thus, the struggle for the soul of the Syrian economy becomes paramount both to the opposition pro-democracy movement, external actors and the Islamic State. But the economy cannot be captured without an appropriate political context. This explains, the relationship between external involvements in the Syrian civil conflict and rise the Islamic State movement in Syrian.

Literature Review

External Legitimization of the Activities of Anti- government Movements and the Expansion of the Islamic State in Syria

In the fall of 2013, Syria dominated the headline in major international media. The Gulf States, the West and United States in particular had thought that the Syrian conflict and its spillover would destabilize its neighbors (Ratney, 2019, <https://en.m.wikipedia.org>, 2022). Sadly, those fears proved true. Sparks from Syria, in the form of the Salafi terrorist group calling itself the Islamic State (IS) helped reignite the Iraqi civil war and the implosion of Iraq has pulled the Syrian conflict into the spotlight of western foreign policy debate and that of U.S in particular. This debates have yielded the pattern of support offered by these states. We have summarized this pattern in the table below:

Table. 1. The Pattern of Support Offered by Western States to Pro-democracy Movement in the Syrian Civil Conflict.

United States	Russia	Turkey	Israel	Iran
Operates in close proximity with Russia in support of prodemocracy movement in northern Syria and maintains a non-conflict channel to avoid inadvertent clash with Russia	Operates in close proximity with U.S Russia in support of prodemocracy movement in northern Syria and maintains a non-conflict channel to avoid inadvertent clash with U.S	Turkey maintains forces in northern Syria, at times targeting Kurdish elements of SDF forces that the Turkish government views as terrorists	Israel reportedly conducts regular air strikes inside Syria on Iranian, Syrian, and Hezbollah targets that the Israeli government views as threats to its security.	It provides significant logistics, technical and financial support to the Syrian government and conducts threats against U.S forces in both Syria and Iraq.

Thus, the link between external legitimation of the activities of opposition movements and the revival and expansion of the Islamic State in the wake of the Syrian civil conflict has drawn the attention of scholars and a volume of scholarly works exists in this regard. In an influential analysis of prodemocracy movements, Hirschman (1970); Lyons & Lowery (1986) quoted by King, (2004) pointed out that opposition rebel activities are an obvious alternative to adopt when citizens feel dissatisfied with current services and system of governance within their jurisdiction. On loyalty to such movement, Hirschman (1970) suggests that loyalty to such movements is likely to emerge:-

1. When voices requires considerable effort but is, with some creativity, likely to exert a positive influence and
2. When the movement is feasible but threatened by significant costs. When these conditions exist, it is merely natural for loyalty to such opposition movements to emerge to bring about the much needed change through creative forms of protests and civil unrest. By this movement a feasible option is made possible for all citizens to ensure that no one is forced to live under inept and irresponsible government. From the foregoing, what seems to have been neglected is the role of external states. This of course has implications for our understanding of the Islamic state movement in Syria.

Extant literature on the relationship between regime type and the overall propensity for opposition conflicts were based on Immanuel Kant's Nomadic proposition and these studies showed little correlation between the two (Clark, 2005:51). The studies concludes that democracies do not fight other democracies. Implied in the above, are the following:

- a. Non democracies do not also fight non democracies
- b. Democracies fight non democracies
- c. Non democracies fight democracies should they be fought
- d. Democracies support democracies to fight non democracies
- e. Non democracies support non democracies to withstand the fight of democracies.

Ceteris paribus and especially so where there are interests at stake.

Clark (2005:53) therefore posited three theoretical explanations and perhaps justifications for opposition movements in a state.

- a. The first is that democratic states possess norms of peaceful conflict resolution as they are prone to settle domestic problems in non-violent fashion. This according to him extends to the international system where two democracies are likely to settle their differences peacefully.

b. Clark also theorized that the presence of checks and balances and the need for public debates which are the essential features of a democratic state makes democratic states unlikely to initiate conflict and internal opposition under any guise. Maoz & Russett (1993); Morgan & Campbell 1991 and Russett (1993) gave credence to this view

c. The third theory assumes that democratic leaders make policies with respect to size of the winning coalition they need to retain power; these leaders must be careful to implement successful policies.

These propositions fail to paint a clear picture of the Syrian situation. The first theory (Hirschman, 1970); for instance assumes that the problem that snowballed to Civil War in Syria was simply because Syria was not a democratic state, if it were; it would have comfortably handled the initial uproar. The reasoning in this literature is faulty as it merely provides us with a one-factor explanation of the Syrian case in terms of democracy/non democracy dynamics. Again, at the international scene, the theory supposes that if Syria were a democracy, the internal conflict that attracted external attention by its escalation would have been amicably resolved by other democracies.

By the same token, Clark (2005) brazenly shies away and completely ignores the effect of foreign interest in the domestic affairs of the Syrian state. In a nutshell, the propositions fail to demonstrate practically the link between external legitimization of the activities of opposition movements in Syria, the Civil war itself and the Islamic State movement in the state, it leaves us with a gap to cover.

Cartalucci & Bowie (2012) for instance carried out a study on the origin and character of the involvement of the west in the Syrian conflict. The scholars noted that the Syrian conflict and the involvement of the West were consequent on several months of political turmoil in Tunisia. According to the study, the local dissidents that took to the street to peacefully demonstrate received the support of foreign countries in form of training, funding and material assistance from foreign powers through organizations funded largely by the US State Department having successfully drawn the attention of the international media.

The writers revealed that one of the organizations involved in recruiting, training, and supporting youth activists ahead of the Syrian conflict was described in an April 2011 *New York Times* article (*Movements.org*, or Alliance of Youth Movements). The article admitted to US funding and involvement in the Syrian conflict. It implicates Freedom House, the National Endowment for Democracy, and two of its satellite organizations, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute, in recruiting, training, and supporting the unrest.

As with the case with Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gaddafi before the Syrian conflict, US Senators John McCain, Lindsay Graham, Joe Lieberman issued a statement declaring that “Bashar al-Assad had ‘lost the legitimacy to remain in power’ and rather than hedging their bets or making excuses for the Assad regime, it was time for the United States, together with their allies in Europe and around the world, to align themselves unequivocally with the Syrian people in their peaceful demand for a democratic government”. Apart from the loss of legitimacy by Assad’s regime, the study reveals that the West had already reached a consensus regarding the need for regime change in Syria even before the conflict. Thus, by 2011, the conflict in Syria provided a good platform to actualize this intention. As such, it became clear that they will employ their long-standing connections to Islamist networks such like the Muslim Brotherhood to bolster opposition forces. In sum, the study noted that the support of opposition movements in Syria by external actors was based on the fact that the regime of Assad had long become unpopular necessitating the need for immediate change. Since it cannot pull down the regime directly, it became more reasonable to support a regime change movement.

Pollack (2014:1) examined “the incidence of increased American involvement, and in particular, ramped up assistance to the Syrian opposition after several months that the issue was effectively off the table”. The study reveals that the Obama’s administration and most of its critics regularly scoffed at the idea of

support to the opposition movement but the belated recognition that spillover from Syria is an important element of the problems, what was once ridiculed was now policy thrust and a source of concern to the U.S, and other Western states. Thus, in his speech to the nation in September 2014, President Obama finally pledged to build a moderate Syrian opposition, one capable of taking on both the Assad regime and Sunni extremist groups like the Islamic State. Thus, Weeks later, the Congress passed bills appropriating \$500 million for that mission.

External involvement in the Syrian conflict can be classified into five identifiable phases. According to Adams (2015:8-10), “the first, roughly from March 2011 until the middle of the year, was characterized by asymmetrical violence in the form of deadly government repression of widespread demonstrations inspired by the “Arab Spring” revolutions elsewhere in the region starting with small student protests in Dera. A mass movement saw demonstrators coming from all of Syria’s diverse confessional communities”. At this time, the government relied upon its security forces to shoot down protestors and systematically detain political opponents. Approximately 850 Syrians were killed by mid-May as the death toll continued to rise. Here, external actors’ involvement was on humanitarian grounds (Pollack, 2014). This is evidenced by Western support to opposition movements led by the anti-government group rebels.

The second phase, which was apparent by the second half of 2011, saw growing numbers of civilians, as well as defectors from the security forces, joining the newly formed Free Syrian Army (FSA) or participating in armed self-defense. The period also saw France and U.S’ formal recognition of the opposition coalition as the sole representative of the Syrian people and Germany’s staunch support for greater involvement of United Nations Security Council. According to Adams, (2015), government control of the streets was contested and some outlying villages and towns slipped from its control as the loosely-organized FSA expelled its troops or Police. Pollack (2014) noted that western justification for intervention here was her regime change drive.

The early 2012 siege and assault on the city of Homs is broadly representative of the third phase of the conflict (Ratney, 2019, <https://en.m.wikipedia.org>, 2022). The government sought to militarily seize opposition centres of resistance. The opposition controlled much of Homs, a diverse city of over 600,000 people. During February, the government launched a major offensive that included the encirclement of the city, relentless artillery bombardment of the Baba Amr district, regarded a rebel stronghold, and the deployment of allied *shabiha* (“ghosts”) civilian militias (Adams, 2015, Ratney, 2019). The government hoped that unleashing such forces would terrorize the majority Sunni population, who were considered the opposition’s core constituency, into submission. As the International Committee of the Red Cross acknowledged in May, 2012, the country was now embroiled in a full-scale civil conflict. Thus, European Union’s supported U.S diplomatic stance on Syria with U.S Congress approving \$500m to Obama to arm and train moderate Syrian rebels (Pollack, 2014 and Adams, 2015).

However, as Adams (2015 and Ratney, 2019) noted, the conflict had entered a fourth phase as the civil war reached a military stalemate. Both sides controlled considerable territory, but neither could impose a comprehensive military defeat upon the other. Protagonists begged for additional external assistance to tip the balance of power on the battlefield. For the government, this meant increased military reliance upon Iran and Hezbollah as well as the continuance of crucial supplies from Russia. For the opposition, increased money and weapons from the west, the Gulf and wealthy private donors were essential. This was seen in United States’ expenditure of \$385m worth of aid items in Syria in 2012 and 2013, CIA’s military and logistics training to the rebel fighters at base in Qatar, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Israel’s provision of health care services to 750 Syrians in the Golan field heights, Supply of anti- aircraft and anti-tank weapons, increase of non- lethal aid among others in order to bring down Assad’s regime and install democracy in Syria.

These external involvements had since made Syria's civil conflict to cease being a political conflict. It has become a sectarian civil conflict conducted with the participation of some secular combatants championed by the growing Salafist (Islamic State) presence amongst the armed opposition. External involvement at this phase is justified on strategic, terrorism and spillover related grounds as expounded by Pollack (2014 and CRS, 2022). Thus, the civil conflict has fractured Syria along confessional lines and divided the country into an unstable patchwork of competing military zones seeking to control the relations of production and the political system in Syria as upheld by the theory in use.

Conclusions

From the analysis above, we conclude that external involvement, especially by the West and the rise of Islamic State movement in the Syrian conflict is mainly driven by the need for regime change in a bid to install western democracy that is justified by its supposed benefits and fostering of interdependence of nations. What proceeds from the review of the extant literature are the contentions that external legitimization of the activities of opposition movements is the direct fall-out of the desire for a regime change in Syria. Thus, being the hall mark of western recolonization, it can therefore be accepted that Western support to opposition groups offers them the means for political interference in the internal affairs of Syria and the proper establishment of its presence in the state. Its goal in Syria is the territorial defeat of the Islamic State in Syria, limiting the resurgence of the Islamic State, supporting SDF partner forces, securing Islamic State detainees, limiting Assad government finances and avoiding measures that could empower the Assad government. Where this desired goals appear unachievable, Syria will remain plunged in ethnic, religious and other forms of conflict with high profile support to opposition group that would aid the eventual crack down of the Assad regime. With the aid of western media, Syria will be considered a nuisance or a burden in the global march forward.

References

- Adams, S. (2015). *Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN Security Council*. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Occasional paper series No. 5.
- Adibe, C.R (2011). *Oil Dependence and Food Security in Nigeria, 1999 to 2009*. M.Sc. Project Report, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
- Ake, C. (1981). *A political economy of Africa*. Longman Nig. Plc,
- Azom, S.N (2013). *Rice Import Policy and the Growth of Rice Production in Nigeria, 1999 and 2012*. Ph.D Thesis Proposal, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
- Cartalucci, T and Bowie, N. (2012). *War on Syria: Gateway to wwIII*. www.Landdestroyers.blogspot.com/pdf. Retrieved 12/10/2015.
- Chosseudovsky, M (2011). *Who was Behind the Protest Movement? Fabricating a Pretext for a US-NATO "Humanitarian Intervention*. Global Research Centre.
- Clark, D. (2000). *Agreeing to Disagree: Domestic Institutional Congress and U.S Dispute Behaviour*. *Political Research Quarterly*, 53(2).375-401.
- Clark, D.H (2003). *A Unified Model of War Onset and Outcome*. 65(1) 69-89.
- Congress Research Service (CRS, 2022). *Informing the legislative debate. Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response*. <https://crsreports.congress.gov>.
- Echezona, N (1998). *International politics in the post-cold war era*. Meks Publishers, Awka.
- Egonu, N.G (2014). *Implementation of the National Security Policy on Food and Nutrition and Food Security in Nigeria, 2002 and 2013*. Second Ph.D Paper, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
- Eze & Onwo (2013). *Political Economy of Maintaining Law and Order by the Nigerian Police*. *UNN Journal of Political Economy*, Department of Political Science, 6, 1&2.
- Ezeibe, C.C (2010). *Political Leadership and Crisis of Development in Sub-saharan Africa 1960 to present*. M.Sc. Project Report, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
- Fiorina, M.P (1974). *Representation, roll call and Constituencies*. Lexington Books, U.S.A.
- Gulmohamad, Z.K (2014). *The Rise and Fall of the Islamic State*. *Global Security Studies*, 5, issue 2. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org-syrian-sttate.pdf>.
- Humud e'tal (2015). *Civil Conflict in Syria and U.S Policy Response*.www.Crs.gov.
- King, L.A (2004). *Democratic hopes in a Polycentric city*. *Journal of politics*. 51, 73-97.
- Lang, H, Awad, M, Sofer, K, Juul, P and Katulis, B (2014). *Supporting the Syrian Opposition: Lessons from the Field in the Fight against ISIS and Assad*. www.americanprogress.org.
- Lowery, D and Lyons, W.E (1989). *The Organization of Political Space and Citizen Responses to Dissatisfaction in Urban Communities: An Integrative Model*. *Journal of Politics*, 66 (1) 321-326.

- Lowery, D. (2014). *Collective Action and the Mobilization of Institutions*. *Journal of Politics*. 66(3) 684-703.
- Mcfate, J.L (2015). *The ISIS Defense and Iraq and Syria: Countering an adaptive enemy*: Middle East Security Report 27. Institute for the Study of War. www.understandingwar.org.
- Nnoli, O (2003). *Introduction to politics*. Snaap Press Ltd, Enugu
- Obasi, I. (2007). *Politics and Globe Dictionary* (New Ed.). Enugu: Keny and Brothers Enterprises.
- Oppenheim, I (2014). www.clarionproject.org.
- Osaghae, E and Suberu, R.T. (2005). *A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria*. Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.
- Philips, C. (2015). *Gulf Actors and the Syrian Crisis*. www.cjophilips.wordpress.com/2015/05/0.
- Pipe, D. (2011). *Alawi Capture of Power in Syria*. www.wikileaks.org/pdf.
- Pollack, K.M (2014). *Building a Better Syrian Army*. *Centre for Middle East Policy*. Brookings. Analysis paper 35.
- Ratney, M (2019). *Five Conundrums: The United States and the Conflict in Syria*. Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.
- Robinson, G.E (2012). *Current History of Syrian Long Civil War*. www.Joshualandi.com/pdf.
- Shear, *et al* (2015). *Obama Administration Ends Efforts to Train Syrians to Combat ISIS*. www.nytimes.com/world/middleeast/pentagon-prgramme-Islamic-state-syria.
- Stalin, J.V (1938). *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*. www.Marxistphilosophy.org/pdf.
- Lynch, M (2014). *Syria and the Islamic State*. Project on Middle East Political Science. POMEPS Briefing 25. www.Pomeps.org.
- Syrian Centre for Policy Research (2015). *Alienation and Violence: Impact of Syria Crisis Report 2014*. <https://scpr-syria.org>
- Timimi, N (2010). *What is Political Economy? Definition and Characteristics*. www.political-economy.com/pdf.
- United Nations Report (2012). *Report of the Secretary General on the UN supervision Mission in Syria* (UNM.18). <https://press.un.org/sc12008.doc.h...>

Author's Biography

Chidi O. Ukaegbu is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka. He was a two time best graduating student of the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Enugu State, Nigeria. He holds a Master's Degree in International Relations and measures in Political Theory and Methodology at the Doctoral level.