



Article

From "Silent Protest" to Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Libya.

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Abstract

The 'Arab Spring' phenomenon is undeniably the most significant event that has changed the political landscape of Middle East and North African region. It combined the economic and political elements of revolution with the power of social media tools such as Twitter and Facebook. The uniqueness of this revolution lies in three important components: the absence of highly organized political groups that challenged central governments; the 'virtual' or 'online' essence of these revolutions; and the persistent demand to remove de-facto leaders and institute political and economic reforms. This article focuses on the nature of Libyan revolution and evaluates contending interests of powerful global community members in response to the call for intervention, as well as their response to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. It will analyze whether unanswered domestic demand for political and economic reforms led the Libyan people to revolt or whether revolution in Libya was itself a natural, spontaneous reaction to the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. This paper follows qualitative analysis on the basis of exiting reports on newspapers, internet sources, government policies and library materials.

Keywords: Arab Popular Uprising, Responsibility to Protect, Relative Depravity, Democratization, Superpower Interest

1. Introduction: Theoretical background

In the history of many nation-states, scholars such as Charles Tilly, Daron Acemoglu, James Robinson (Charles Tilly 2004-53; Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson 2006) have observed that government leaders face political challenges from their populations when social dissatisfaction spreads due to limited economic opportunities and lack of political reform. Even when reforms are being carried out, people's demands and expectations can continue to sour. If these expectations are not met with a positive response, or if the current political establishment is unable to neutralize them, a political crisis can emerge. Such a crisis can either be instituted by an opposition group or by the people themselves, and the common call is for a replacement of the status quo. In most cases, people were called to participate in the election

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process to ensure that newly elected leaders were generally accepted by the people. An example of this was the post-Mubarak parliamentary election last November 2011 in Egypt (Joshua Herst: 2006).

When members or groups rise up against government policies and civil unrest ensues, other countries cannot intervene just by virtue of sovereign rights. Sometimes the reasons behind civil unrest are the people's economic and political grievances against their government. Ted Gurr argues that frustration is the "primary source of the human capacity for violence" (Tedd Gurr 1970:36). For instance, demonstrators in recent Arab uprisings across Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Yemen, Syria, and Libya made a resounding call for reform and security. They claimed they had been deprived by their leaders of the right to exercise political freedom and that their country had failed to achieve economic growth. Women demanded more participation in the decision-making process and political contestation - an idea that has been shared by many of those who rose against their government.

In his study about the concept of "relative deprivation," Walter Jones argues that "political rebellion and insurrection are most likely when people believe that they are receiving less than their due" (Walter Jones 1999:399). When studying the 2011 Arab uprising, one may observe that expectations rose as these countries attempted to liberalize their economies and institute political reforms. This condition is explained well by Jones when he argues that in the study of rebellion and revolutions, violence emerges when "conditions are beginning to improve rather than when they are at their worst point" (Walter Jones 1990:399). The challenges these governments faced were: 1) how to hold on to political power while economic and political situations improved and at the same time people's expectations increased; and 2) how to sustain these developments. Once rising expectations passed through the aspiration gap and toward the level of economic and political satisfaction, the revolution started to wane.

The Arab Spring illustrates similarities in the origins of several countries' frustrations, strategies pursued by their regimes, and their challengers. In the past ten years, political reforms were instituted in many Arab countries, for example (Gerd Nonneman 2008: 3-36). In Egypt, the Mubarak regime in 2005 allowed opposition groups to contest in the parliament and allowed greater independence within the judicial system. These trends were also observed in Bahrain and Yemen, where the government of President Saleh after 2001 agreed to introduce a political reform package. In 2000, Syrian President Bashar Assad had initiated similar reforms after the death of his father. Even in Libya, there were promises of greater freedom for media outlets and civil society. These changes, however, were halted as regimes seemed unwilling to cope with criticism from their opponents (http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2240/the-arab-spring_common-roots-common-challenges). Another similarity was the introduction of economic reform in some Arab countries. Authoritarian rulers continued to apply free market policies without considering their negative impact on large segments of the population (http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2240/the-arab-spring_common-roots-common-challenges). Privatization schemes did not result in private capital accumulation; instead, they encouraged more corrupt activities within the ruling circle.

Lastly, the Arab uprisings shared a common root in repression and brutality by security forces. Activists across the region used social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter to spread calls for protests in public spheres. Governments brutally cracked down on the demonstrations; demonstrators were apprehended and jailed and many were tortured and killed.

(a) Humanitarian Intervention

By definition, 'humanitarian intervention' is a "forcible intervention by one state in another state's territory for the purpose of protecting individuals from threats to their lives, inhuman and cruel treatments, or persecution" (Robert L. Bledsoe and Bolesaw A. Boczek 1987:330). There is however an issue of priority, i.e., as to whether an "intervening country would protect its own nationals or the foreign nationals including citizens of the intervened country" (Robert L. Bledsoe and Bolesaw A. Boczek 1987:330). The idea of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s was in response to massive rights abuses such as genocide and torture. Unfortunately, the cases of Somalia and Rwanda illustrate a failure of this doctrine. There are records of success when speaking of U.S. interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and to some degree in Haiti. Other records of successful intervention come from Australia, who received U.S. support in East Timor in 1999, and Britain in Sierra Leone in 2000 ([http://www. fpri.org /orbis/5001/kurth.humanitarianinterventionafteriraq.pdf](http://www.fpri.org/orbis/5001/kurth.humanitarianinterventionafteriraq.pdf)).

In 2005 a document titled "the responsibility to protect" (R2P)² was adopted by UN Member States, as part of a commitment by the international community to undertake military intervention against national governments practicing human right abuses against their own citizens.³ This doctrine stresses that if a state commits "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity" against its own citizens, the international community is mandated to protect them .The doctrine was used to justify intervention in Libya. "Responsibility to protect" in the case of Libya was backed up by regional actors such as the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to legitimize the intervention (<http://www.vav.cfr.org/libya/libya-responsibility-protect/p24480>). The decision was based on Gaddafi's track record as a brutal dictator and his capacity to commit atrocities against his own people ([www.clipsandcomment.com/2011/03/19/transcript-president-obama-on-libya-no-fly-zone-march-18-2011 /](http://www.clipsandcomment.com/2011/03/19/transcript-president-obama-on-libya-no-fly-zone-march-18-2011/)).

(b) Libya Prior to the Revolution: Internal Factors

Libya has an extensive history of colonial subjugation by the Vandals, the Byzantine Empire, the Arabs, Turks, and Romans, prior to achieving independence in 1951 (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/819291.stm). Libya was a constitutional and hereditary monarchy under King Idres before Muammar Gaddafi came to power. When oil was discovered in 1959, Libya was transformed from one of the poorest countries in Africa to one of the continent's wealthiest. Much of this wealth, however, was controlled by a few Libyans and dissatisfaction in the population widened. As a result, a group of army officers headed by Gaddafi launched a coup against King Idres in 1969. After a successful revolution, Gaddafi became president and ruled the country for more than 40 years. Gaddafi's government was guided by his political philosophy, laid out in the so-called "Green Book," which was published in 1975. The political system was run by 'people's committees that managed local units (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/libya>).

In 2008, Gaddafi assumed the title of "king of kings of Africa" as he campaigned for a 'United States of Africa' (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7588033.st). Gaddafi envisioned Africa to be economically and politically strong on the world stage (<http://www.politonomist.com/gaddafi-named-leader-of-african-union-00940/>). This vision was never achieved, and his motto of "freedom, socialism and unity" only managed to bring minimal success. The Libyan economy under the Gaddafi family was at best a "kleptocracy," and close political allies controlled everything from "buying, selling, and owning"

(New York Times March 24 2011). During 42 years of power, Gaddafi amassed a vast fortune (<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/world/africa/10qaddafi.html>) and placed relatives and loyal members of his tribe in central military and government positions (Craig Whitlock 2011). Libya's economy depends mainly on oil revenues. Despite massive investment in other sectors such as agriculture, housing and non-petroleum, the share of oil revenue in Libyan economy still remains high. Gaddafi's diversification plan to decrease Libya's dependence on oil yielded little results (<http://countrystudies.us/libya/57.htm>).

In the early years of Gaddafi rule, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) initiated programs directing funds toward education, healthcare, and housing for all. The government was successful in providing free education and free medical services to all Libyans but it was not successful with its housing programs (http://www.photius.com/countries/libya/society/libya_society_housing.html).

The government also pursued a number of large-scale infrastructure development projects such as highways, railways, air and seaports, telecommunication, water works, medical centers, shopping centers and hotels. Efforts to diversify the economy and encourage private sectoral participation failed to produce results, while extensive controls on prices, credit, trade, and foreign exchange constrained growth and unemployment continued to surge (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/819291.stm). Corruption, the purchase of conventional weapons, attempts to develop nuclear weapons, and aid or donations given to pro-Gaddafi countries in the developing world all made the Libyan economy unproductive and reduced the standard of living from the 1990s through early 2003 (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm>). Transparency International reported in 2010 that Libya's corruption perception index was 2.2, giving them a rank of 165 out of 178 countries, worse than Egypt (ranked 98th) and Tunisia (ranked 59th) (Transparency International Report 2010).

As economic reforms were introduced in the agriculture and housing sectors, Libyans' expectations that massive corruption in the government would be curbed also increased. Sami Zaptia, a Libyan economist, argued in 2008 that despite thousands of housing units, fabulous hotels, and shopping centers, there was still so much to be done (Sami Zaptia 2008) to make the Libyan economy productive. The unemployment rate was estimated at 20.74 percent of the entire population. Only about 43.3 percent of Libyans received a stable income, while 16 percent of the entire population lived below the poverty line (Reuters 2009). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Country Report in 2005 cited that the 'unemployment problem was also due to high rate of population growth while at the same time low rate of job creation (www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=18109.0). Many Libyans relied on the oil sector, as it provided 95 percent of export earnings and 80 percent of government revenues (http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/libya/libya_economy.html). Foreign investors also faced obstacles such as insufficient legal protection and an unfriendly environment against foreign workers. This means that economic liberalization before 2011 had not yet provided tangible progress to satisfy Libyans' expectations (Ronald Bruce St. John 2008:81). Libya's problems are not only founded around economic corruption; they are also linked to political turmoil and human rights violations:

"The 1972 Penal Code and Law 71 criminalized Libyans who opposed the government. This law also discouraged the forming of associations and assemblies whose activities were to critique the government. The Law includes severe penalties such as the death sentence and imprisonment. The media was largely a government apparatus and catered to government's wishes" (Amnesty International Annual Report 2011).

Furthermore, in 1996, security forces, in a failed revolt in Abu Salem prison, killed an estimated 1,200 prisoners. It was only in 2001 that the Gaddafi's government informed the families of the victims (Human Rights Watch 2011).

The promises offered by Gaddafi's "Green Book" on "dictatorship" of big party interests, or "the establishment of people's committees to run all aspects of existence," as Martin Asser observes, was based on an "ultra-hierarchical pyramid positioning Gaddafi's family and close allies at the top wielding power unchecked, protected by a brutal security apparatus." This system is called "Jumhuriyya," implying "rule by the masses" (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7588033.st). One may also observe that although people were attending national congresses and committees, they had actually no real power to vote, react or criticize government policies and laws. What happened was that protesters/people in opposition were put to jail without fair trial, some of them made to face the death penalty. Gaddafi supported the assassination of Libyan dissidents living abroad (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7588033.st) women were also marginalized.

Finally, Libya's image abroad was associated with Gaddafi's brutal government. Gaddafi was viewed as a supporter of international terrorism. He was also widely criticized/condemned for developing weapons of mass destruction. In an interview with ABC News, a former UN weapons inspector Charles Duelfer, said that 'although Libya agreed to give up its WMD ambition in 2003, it still 'has some mustard gas left' (Jim Meyer March 21, 2011). In 1986, US President Ronald Reagan ordered an air strike against Tripoli and Benghazi in retaliation for Americans killed and wounded in a night club attack in Berlin, Germany (<http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/libya/trouble.html>). In 1989, Gaddafi was again charged for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over the Scottish town of Lockerbie which killed all 243 passengers and 16 crew members (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/apr/05/appointmentwithfarce>). In 1992-1993, the United Nations through a UN Security Council Resolution urged Gaddafi to "fulfill requirements related to the Pan Am 103 bombing before the sanctions could be lifted." As a result, Gaddafi surrendered two Libyan bomb suspects who were then sent to trial before a Scottish court in the Netherlands in 1999. President George W. Bush signed an Executive Order in 2004 ending economic sanctions that prohibited Americans to work and do business in Libya (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm>).

(c) Call for international intervention: Conflict of values and Interests

On February 26, 2011, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1970, which called upon Libya's "responsibility to protect," also known as the R2P Doctrine (<http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/issl9/hamilton.shtml>). The resolution called for the imposition of financial sanctions and an arms embargo on Libya. On March 17, 2011, UNSC Resolution 1973 was signed and called for the imposition of a "no-fly zone" on Libya to avoid the commission of crimes against Libyan citizens by the government -as UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon said, a "swift and decisive action by the

international community" (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/libya/...>). Prior to the approval of this resolution, some countries expressed reservation about the alleged extent of air bombardment by the Libyan government forces. Their hesitation was primarily based on claims that other countries such as Yemen and Bahrain had also experienced uprisings, yet the "no-fly zone" had not been applied. They were also concerned that people on the ground would be misconstrued as combatants and thus civilian casualties could result. Despite these objections, the R2P doctrine emerged as a practical tool, protecting civilian populations from war and from their brutal governments. Tim Dunne observes that "intervention for reasons of protection has been unchallenged in relations to co-nationals and more widely in the name of universal morality" (Tim Dunne 2011). The intervention in Libya shows collective action in response to possible humanitarian crisis. Organizations such as the League of Arab States (LAS), The Gulf Cooperating Council (GCC), and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) were "enablers" of intervention (Tim Dunne 2011).

(d) Contending/competing interests of the intervening powers

5.1 U.S. interests

Agreeing to intervene in Libya was difficult for the United Nations Security Council, especially when its members maintained geopolitical and resource interests in Libya, and permanent members could use veto rights to protect their interests. The United States role in the intervention was articulated by President Obama, who announced that three important criteria would be guiding principles for U.S. involvement in Libya: 1) protection of civilians from large scale violence; 2) violence must not forfeit the move to democratization in Arab countries; and 3) involvement must be done within the framework of an international coalition sanctioned by the United Nations (Bob Burnett 2011). While American leadership was essential, it would not act alone since it preferred to act as part of the international coalition (<http://www.clipsandcomment.com/2011/03/19/transcript-president-obama-on-libya-no-fly-zone-march-18-2011/>).

The United States also declared that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would "assume the day-to-day military command of the No-Fly Zone, using the alliance's military structures" (Nicholas Watt, Nick Hopkins, Ian Tranor 2011). The Associated Press reported that the estimated operation cost in less than a week of intervention was about US\$1 billion, an amount vastly criticized by some members of both U.S. Republican and Democratic parties (Slobodan Lekic 2011). In addition, UNSC Resolution 1973 was also criticized by many American taxpayers, as it had not guaranteed removal of President Gaddafi, although after a few months in hiding Gaddafi was eventually killed. The Resolution stipulated for the protection of the Libyan population, but it lacked a timeframe for the return home of the American forces. U.S. Speaker of the House of Representatives John Boehner, in a letter sent to the White House, demanded answers about the cost of war and the exit strategy (Elisabeth K. Bumiller, and David D. Kirkpatrick, 2011).

In her Pulitzer Prize-winning book, *A Problem from Hell*, Samantha Power cites several reasons for limited U.S. involvement in Libya. She argued the U.S. "lack of knowledge" about the country. Despite intelligence gathering on Libya, there was no sufficient data to confirm the number of deaths and active refugees that could justify the act of intervention. "Genocide is usually veiled under the cover of war" and "some US officials had difficulty distinguishing deliberate atrocities against civilians from conventional conflicts" (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/16/1_1_iby_a_is_a_problem_from_hell).

Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, argued in *The Wall Street Journal* that U.S. interests in Libya were "less than vital." He believed that the UNSC Resolution 1973 did not convince Gaddafi forces into complying. Meanwhile, General Wesley Clark also argued that "violence in Libya was not significantly comparable to the crises in Darfur" (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/libya/libya-110329-voa05.htm?_m=3n.002a.157.d10ao00q5v.53j).

The issue of U.S. involvement in Libya centered on American interests: What were their interests in Libya compared to regional countries that were also experiencing popular uprisings? Would the United States also intervene in Syria and in Bahrain? Obama's decision on Libya can be termed as forceful yet careful, with a limited commitment of U.S. troops. In essence, the U.S. has a "different approach to different countries in the region" (<http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/arab-uprisings-and-us-policy>). Shibley Telhami, a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy says that U.S. interests in Libya "extend far beyond Libya's border." There are "broad regional interests" (http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0328_libya_telhami.aspx) which the Obama Administration would have to consider. First is that the Obama Administration would have to accept the possibility that al-Qaeda terrorist members could find new opportunities to replace the toppled regimes; thus, the demand for peace, economic development, and freedom by demonstrators in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya could fall in vain. Islamic fundamentalists in these countries would not allow a Western-style democracy to exist and were more likely to intervene. Second is the assumption that the "Great Arab Awakening is creating new prisms through which Arabs view the world, and it is important that the new prisms improve their view of U.S. policy," and that this would not run counter to the idea of freedom that the U.S. has been advocating (http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0328_libya_telhami.aspx).

The third possibility is not the situation of US oil importation from Libya per se, but the opportunity posed by American industry to control Libyan crude oil, so that they could dominate the setting of prices and gain leverage as to where the supply is delivered. This would be synonymous to controlling the world's other giant economies in China, Japan and Europe (Conn Hallinan). Furthermore, American domestic politics helped determine the Obama administration's calculated decision to lead the coalition but with limited engagement.

It must be understood that the next presidential election is fast approaching and that the current administration has partially solved the economic woes the country is currently facing. In order to boost the Democrat position in the next presidential elections, achievements at least on the foreign policy front should be demonstrable. The killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan by the American forces and the application of UNSC Resolution 1973, with by which the US led the coalition, could be read as foreign policy achievements for Obama. This is aided by the fact that Gaddafi was killed by Libyan opposition forces in his own town in Sirti on 20 October 2011.

5.2 European Interests

Libya was under a European power in 1911, following the outbreak of hostilities between Turkey and Italy, in which the latter occupied Libya (<http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107722.html>). The presence of oil is an important aspect of European interests in Libya, in addition to Libya's proximity to Europe. Humanitarian crisis, asylum seekers from Libya, and possible terrorist attacks in Europe are all part of the grand interest countries in the European Union have on Libya, more so than the United States.

Obama's former National Security Adviser Jim Jones in an interview with Christiane Amanpour said that military intervention "was more of the vital interests of Europeans" rather than the United States (Joshua Miller and Jim Jones 2011).

France and Britain's decision to spearhead military intervention was primarily in line with the risk of humanitarian crisis and the disruption of oil supply to Europe. Domestic politics have also driven these countries to intervene. French resident Nicolas Sarkozy attempted to divert attention from his party's poor performance at the polls with his efforts on foreign policy. In David Cameron's case is similar, as he was "eager to deflect attention from tough austerity measures and score some foreign policy points" (<http://www.usforacle.com/europe-not-us-pushed-military-intervention-in-libya-1.2517631#.TqZ3dFvMvIU>). In addition, there is also a "grand ideological imperative" that Europeans can be proud of - that is, the Libyan's desire for freedom that the Europeans have always wanted to uphold (<http://www.usforacle.com/europe-not-us-pushed-military-intervention-in-libya-1.2517631#.TqZ3dFvMvIU>). These interests are manifested in the freezing of Gaddafi's family assets and withdrawal of their diplomatic immunity in Britain. The European Community also called for an arms embargo against Libya and expelled Libya from international organizations (<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12598674>).

Despite successful intervention, not all European countries were satisfied with the declaration of UNSC Resolution 1973. Germany abstained from voting on the resolution and pulled its troops from NATO to avoid taking part in Libya operations (Hadeel al- shalchi and Snipers Lucas, Ryan Shells 2011) . Richard Rousseau argues that the reason behind German's abstention on UNSCR 1973 stemmed from "uncertainty about how political crisis would proceed and Berlin's refusal to intervene in a civil war" (Richard Rousseau 2011). Most Germans "agreed with the decision not to intervene directly on Libya." At the same time, Germany also had to think of the "long term strategic ramifications of an intervention," which entailed maintenance of balanced relations with countries such as India, China, Russia and Brazil, while at the same time "maintaining a privileged position in the region, especially in trade and energy security terms" (Richard Rousseau 2011).

The Russian Federation also abstained from the resolution, saying that it was in their best interest to "protect the Libyan population and prevent the conflict from escalating" (<http://russianreport.wordpress.com/2011/03/22/russias-view-on-libya/>). Russia's state-owned television station reported that such an intervention were acts of "aggression by the great world powers against a sovereign country" (Hannah Van Hoose 2011). Russia's decision to abstain could be based on three reasons: 1) Russia's oil, gas and construction interests in Libya; 2) the possible impact of Russia's decision on the North Caucasus region, specifically in areas such as Chechnya; and 3) UNSC Resolution 1973's simple "lack (s of) clarity about the West's reasons for military action in Libya" (http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/russia_libya_response.html).

5.3 League of Arab Nations

Not all members of the Arab League shared the same level of willingness to intervene in Libya. This is simply because some of these countries were also experiencing similar political protests. The decision, however, by member states of the Arab League to join the international coalition could be viewed in two dimensions: one is that Arab League countries may have wanted to prove that they are responsible partners in the international community; second is that they supported and followed the majority's call

for the imposition of UNSC Resolution 1973 on humanitarian reasons. Key phrases such as 'humanitarian intervention' and the 'responsibility to protect' civilians were basis for their support. On another level, this support may have been an attempt to divert public opinion in Middle Eastern Arab countries by focusing their attention on Libya.

These reasons are plausible, given that the unrest in Libya could spread to other Arab North African and Middle Eastern countries and throw the region into political and economic chaos. The nature and power of the Arab Uprising and the role that social networks performed prior to, and during, the uprising should also be considered. Despite expressions of support for intervention, only Qatar (<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12801812>) sent jets at the beginning. Other members declined to offer military participation despite a strong campaign for active participation by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704461304576215853580848720.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTTopStories).

5.4 Iran, Turkey and China

Other states such as China and India also expressed doubt at the effectiveness of UNSC Resolution 1973 on the grounds that it could lead to a humanitarian crisis. Each country of course acted based on their national interests in Libya and did not want to see it thrown into political chaos.

The uprisings in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt may send signals to Iran and Turkey to re-evaluate their regional influence once new governments in these countries are installed. This assumption is based on the wider possibility that a post-Gaddafi Libya may acquire a new government more amenable to an Islamic system, although these countries also want to see Libya's economy diversify and liberalize.

Between Turkey and Iran, Turkey has more leverage as majority of the Libyan people are Sunni Muslims, like Turkey. Turkey also has a successful track record in terms of economic and political structure reform while retaining its Islamist identity. Iran, on the other hand, is a Shi's Muslim country and is currently facing heavy international pressure, especially from the West. Libya's new government would probably not want to emulate Iran's Islamic government.

At the time of the unrest, Turkey clearly understood that it would have a strategic role to perform once a new democratically elected government was formed in Libya. It was critical to the safety of the Libyan civilians during the "intervention" to remove Gaddafi. Turkey also understood that being a regional power was an advantage, but also entailed great moral and political responsibilities to protect civilians and bring peaceful transition in Libya through the "democratization that Turkey has been exemplifying for years." Turkish interests in Libya also matter. Before the war, there were an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 Turks working in Libya. Furthermore, Turkish companies had contracts worth over US\$10 billion in Libya" (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/22/libya-nato-us-france-uk>).

China is driven by its energy interests in Libya. It abstained from voting on the UNSC resolution and criticized Western-led military intervention as "an abusive use of force and unnecessary use of violence." It also questioned the Western notion of humanitarian intervention as "primarily calculated self-supporting strategies aimed to achieve private political and economic interests" (<http://www.zhong-fei.org/en/node/22>).

6. Conclusion

The case of Libya is but one illustration of how individual Middle East and North African (MENA) countries' socio-political and economic interests interact with the interests of the global community. In addition, it also shows how superpowers' material interests interplay with the responsibility to protect ordinary civilians in the act of intervention.

Gaddafi's authoritarian regime brought not only political isolation for Libya in the community of nations but economic hardship on the Libyan population. Libya may be one of the most oil rich countries in the region, but its national wealth is not equally shared among the Libyan population. Much of this wealth was historically concentrated among Gaddafi's family, friends, and business conglomerates while the expectations of the Libyan populace were continuously unmet by the government.

Although Gaddafi instituted reforms that improved literacy and health services, many Libyans remained skeptical about the motives behind these reforms. Ordinary Libyans did not believe these reforms transformed into greater economic opportunities for them vis-a-vis their rich and influential countrymen. In fact, the situation may have helped expose the country's widening socio-political and economic dissatisfactions against the Gaddafi government.

This dissatisfaction only resulted into a "silent protest" and not into an actual national political resistance, since the Gaddafi regime pre-empted or dismissed political pressures through arbitrary imprisonment or brutal military suppression. Ultimately, however, the fire of uprisings in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt created a spontaneous reaction • in Libya, leading to a humanitarian situation that eventually attracted intervention from members of the global community who for many decades had been waiting for this opportunity to see Libya without Gaddafi. Using the doctrine of "responsibility to protect" members of the United Nations Security Council under UNSC Resolution 1973 decided to impose a "no-fly zone" on Libya to protect Libyan civilians, eventually leading to the collapse of the Gaddafi regime.

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