Party Organization in Federal States: Parties and Politics in Nigeria and Switzerland

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Abstract
This study examines how political parties organize in federal states, and based on Nigerian and Swiss experience, explains the conditions under which parties tend to integrate or separate their organizational structure. It argues that Nigerian and Swiss parties integrate their organizational structures in varying degrees, with Nigerian parties showing greater measure of integration than Swiss parties. The degree of integration of party organizations of Nigerian and Swiss parties were assessed based on several indicators including the involvement of state and national parties in each other's organization, involvement of state and national parties in the selection of party officials and candidates for elections at state and national levels as well as the method of amendment of party statutes and structure of the parties' financial system. Drawing from the experience of Nigerian and Swiss parties, a final section tries to flesh out the theoretical assumptions about why parties tend to integrate or bifurcate by underlining the institutional, historical and structural conditions that shape a party's inclination to integrate or separate.

Keywords
Party organization, political parties, federalism, electoral politics, Nigeria, Switzerland.

Introduction
Political parties in federal states tend to adapt to the state structure by creating organizational units that fit each tier of government where state officials are elected. This is in line with the expectations of students of comparative federalism who suggest that party organization would resemble the organization of the state (Fabre 2008). In this direction, sub-national branches of state-wide parties are expected to enjoy similar levels of autonomy to those exercised by sub-national governments. State-wide parties are also expected to integrate their organizational units as federal governments strive to do. However, in reality, state-wide parties do not always find it easy to behave as they are theoretically expected. Like federal governments, state-wide parties regularly face immense pressure between party unity, cohesion and centralization on the one hand, and diversity, autonomy and decentralization on the other hand. While scholars have studied how federal governments cope with pressures for integration and autonomy (Elazar 1962, Kincaid 1990, Zimmerman 2001, Watts 2008), only a scant attention has been devoted to understanding how state-wide parties in federal states deal with the tension between demands for cross-level integration and autonomy (Fabre 2011, Thorlakson 2009, Hopkin 2003).

The study of party organization is particularly inadequate in Nigeria and Switzerland. Despite the long years of existence of political parties in Switzerland, we do not sufficiently know how these parties organize and operate within the Swiss federation. The much that is known about the organizational aspects of Swiss political parties come from the general literature on left or right wing parties (Albertazzi 2007, 2006, Mazzoleni and Skenderovic 2007, Skenderovic 2006, McGann and Kitschelt 2005), Swiss government and politics (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008, Church 2004, Ladner 2007, 2001), studies of elections and voting behaviour in Switzerland (Lutz 2010, Steenbergen 2010, Kuhn 2009, Church and Vatter 2009, Dardanelli 2008, 2005, Selb 2006, Caluori and Hug 2005), and the works of specialists in

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comparative federalism (Hadley et al. 1989). Although this literature provide pertinent information about Swiss political parties, their contributions are largely inadequate - they lack detailed analysis and fail to bring out the dynamics of party organization in Switzerland. A useful recent study of party organization in Switzerland is the work by Patricia Rutimann (2011); however, its efforts were limited by its exclusive focus on the legal aspects of party organization and neglect of the patterns of cross-level interactions of party organizations.

In the case of Nigeria, the lack of interest in party organization reflects in the works of both federal scholars (Elaigwu 2002, Adejumobi 2004, Ademolekun 2005, Suberu 2008) and political party analysts (Obiyan 1999, Agbese 1999, Amadi 2000, Aina 2004, Agbaje et al. 2007, Omotola 2009, and Kendhammer 2010). Even detailed volumes on Nigerian federalism like (Basta and Ibrahim 1999, Suberu 2001) and a two-volume compendium edited by Aaron Gana and Sam Egwu (2003) made no attempt to undertake a systematic examination of parties and party organization in Nigeria. The lack of interest in Nigerian political parties by the existing literature is quite surprising bearing in mind that more than one decade has passed after Nigeria returned to party politics following several years of military rule, and considering the amount of academic literature inspired by political parties in the past (Sklar 2004, Dudley 1966, Dudley 1968, Labinjoh 1981, Joseph 1978, Joseph 1991, and Badejo 1997). Finally, one would expect that observers of elections and democratization in Nigeria would have taken note of the important role of political parties, but this turned out not to be so (Mustapha 1999, Obi 2000, Fawole 2005, Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006, Ibrahim 2007, Suberu 2007, Ibrahim and Ibeanu 2009, Obi 2011).

The study of political parties and party organization in Nigeria and Switzerland is crucial considering the role that parties are expected to play in federal democracies: 'political parties are the main means not only whereby provincial grievances are aired but also whereby centralist and decentralist trends are legitimized' (McKay 2001: 16). The study of political parties is therefore not just essential for understanding interest articulation in federal contexts, but is also useful for understanding the intergovernmental relations in federations. The need for this study is further justified by absence of comparative studies of political institutions in nascent and consolidated federal democracies. Most comparative federalism specialists confine their analyses to federal institutions and political parties in advanced federal democracies (Hadley et al. 1989, Renzsch 2001, Bolleyer 2006, Thorlakson 2009, Fabre 2008, 2011). The failure to extend the study of federalism and political parties beyond the advanced federal democracies limits our understanding of how political parties operate in diverse settings.

My prime goal in this study is two-fold. The first is to examine the ways state-wide parties in Nigeria and Switzerland organize and how they respond to integrative and autonomist pressures arising from the countries' state structure. The second aim of this study is to explain the reasons why political parties tend to integrate or bifurcate their organization based on the experiences of Nigerian and Swiss parties. The core question that will guide my analysis is as follows: what are the underlying factors that determine the organizational structure of political parties in Nigeria and Switzerland?

This study is organized into six sections. After this brief introduction, the second section will review the theoretical discourse around the issue of party organization in a federal context, highlighting the shifts in knowledge over time and distilling the theoretical propositions that will shape our investigation. The third section will compare federal institutions and practice in Nigeria and Switzerland in order to lay out the study's empirical analytical background. The fourth section will examine the way parties organize in Nigeria and Switzerland, focusing on the degree of integration and autonomy of state-wide parties in the two states. This will be based on a case study of the leading political parties in Nigeria and Switzerland: the People's Democratic Party (in Nigeria) and Socialist Party and the Swiss People's Party (in Switzerland). The fifth section will explain why parties tend to integrate or bifurcate their organization, drawing insights from the institutional, path dependent and structural perspectives. The final section will recap the main points of the study, highlight the implications of the study, and outline the lessons that can be learnt from the experiences of Nigeria and Switzerland.

Evolution of political parties in Nigeria and Switzerland

Nigeria and Switzerland have a long history of political party development, but unlike Switzerland, the evolution of political parties in Nigeria has been regularly punctuated by military intervention. The first political party in Nigeria – the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) was established in 1923 by a group of traditional elites, a few wealthy merchants, and some progressive professionals as a platform for seeking office after a limited number of Lagos residents were given the right of franchise[1] (Sklar 2004: 47). The key programme of the party was to secure a municipality status and local self-government for Lagos. In the course of its existence (between 1923 and 1944), the NNDP was virtually confined to Lagos and focused exclusively on local matters. Hence, for more than one decade the NNDP dominated Lagos politics. But in 1938, the dominance of the NNDP was challenged by the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM), which contested against the party in the Lagos Town Council election and won all the three elective seats in the Council (Sklar 2004: 52). The NYM was formed by a group of young progressives in 1934. It was originally known as the Lagos Youth Movement (LYM) before it was renamed the Nigerian Youth Movement in 1936. The NYM made attempts to become a national party by establishing branches in the urban areas throughout Nigeria. However, the movement soon lost its steam following internal crisis that erupted in 1941, leading to the exit of some sections of its membership. The defected members of the NYM joined with the remains of the defeated NNDP to form the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in August 1944[2].

No factor shaped the evolution of political parties in Nigeria after 1944 as the regionalization of the country in 1946 and the introduction of federalism in 1954. The decolonization process in Nigeria followed a bottom-top approach, and this meant that political power was gradually transferred to the Nigerian elites through the newly created regional governments. The regions first attained self-government in 1956, before the colonial authorities finally disengaged from the central government in 1960. As result of this, politicians from each of the three regions of Nigeria established political associations through which they could take over the helms of government in their respective regions. Consequently, between 1944 and 1966, three political parties dominated Nigeria's political landscape: the NCNC took control of Eastern Region; the Action Group (AG) took hold of the Western Region, while the Northern People's Congress (NPC) dominated the Northern Region. In terms of the political outlook of the parties: the NCNC stood for political democracy in its classical, individualistic form; the AG was inclined to federalist democracy to safeguard the rights of minority cultural groups, while the NPC represented the modernization of traditional political authority (Sklar 2004: xiii). Given the predominance of a major ethnic group in each of the regions controlled by a particular political party (Igbo in the East, Yoruba in the West, and Hausa-Fulani in the North), the three political parties were commonly associated with 'ethnic' group interests. This notion was further strengthened by the ethnic conflict which dominated party politics just before independence (Coleman 1958, Nnoli 1978). However, as we shall see in the discussion below, 'ethnicization' of party politics in Nigeria has tended to mask a more complex struggle between interests that are not necessarily ethnic in nature (Sklar 2004, Ake 1985, Ekekwe 1986).

The evolution of political parties in Nigeria has been defined by struggles between two groups of Nigerian political elite who can be described as traditionalists and libertarians. The traditionalists want 'regional security', i.e. the preservation of the political control of each particular region by a regional party while the federal government is controlled by a coalition of regional parties (Sklar 1965). But this vision is opposed by the libertarians who believe that political parties are free associations that are free to compete for votes/offices in any part of Nigeria, and that such trans-regional parties should be free to single-handedly form the government at the federal level, if they could (Sklar 2004: xiv). Among the

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[1] In 1922, about 3,000 male tax payers with an income of £100 were allowed to vote by the colonial authorities. This franchise could only be exercised in Lagos. Later, franchise was extended to Calabar and then throughout the colonial Nigeria.

[2] The party changed its name to National Council of Nigerian Citizens after Southern Cameroon voted to leave Nigeria in order to reunite with Northern Cameroon.

early parties in Nigeria, the NPC was the most avowed traditionalist party while the NCNC and AG represent the libertarians. However, NPC's successful use of the regionalist strategy soon forced the other parties to begin adopt a regionalist agenda, albeit in a modified form. While the NPC was contented with monopolizing power in the North, the NCNC and AG were not satisfied with the control of their regional enclaves - they also made incursions into the North, threatening NPC's support base[3]. To protect its power base, the NPC among other things fermented bitter sentiments including the widespread fear that the North would be dominated by the more educated Christian South; on the other hand the NCNC and AG inflamed the fear that the more populous Muslim North would dominate the South (Coleman 1958: 362). The explosion of the ethno-regional and religious tensions nurtured as a result of the ideological dispute between the regionalists and the trans-regionalists thrust Nigeria into the path of violence that began with a series of military coups in January and July 1966 and culminated in a civil war one year later.

In 1979, after the military returned power to civilians, the ethno-regional structure of the First Republic party system re-emerged, with some partial modifications[4]. All the five candidates representing the registered political parties in the presidential elections of 1979 were leaders or prominent members of the major parties in the 1960s[5] (Joseph 1991). However, it appeared that the crises that followed the fall of the First Republic tremendously transformed the character and orientation of the Northern political elite. In the first place, the core of Northern traditionalists lost their lives during the violence of 1966 - 1967. This led to the emergence of more modernist elite (made up of administrators, military officers, academics and entrepreneurs) in the Northern region. The emerging political class in the North was more willing to reach out to elite from the rest of the country than its predecessor. The shift in attitude of the Northern elite reflected in the strategy of the NPN, which though dominated by the Northern elite was able to build a more broad-based coalition of elites from different regions than other parties. Unlike the NPC, which was only willing to enter into coalition with other groups after elections, the NPN leadership succeeded in establishing a pre-election trans-regional elite coalition. NPN's multi-ethnic coalition was far more robust than the NPC-NCNC alliance or the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) which was a union of strange bedfellows. The avowedly socialist UPN and Marxian socialist PRP as well as the NPP and the GNPP were essentially sectional parties (Sklar 2004: xvii). The tendency of the NPN to transcend sectional divisions and to accommodate the interests of the elites from the various parts of Nigeria explains the party's success during the Second Republic.

Two other military coups in 1983 and 1993 interrupted civil rule in Nigeria. But the transitions to civil rule of 1989 and 1999 reveal that the party system established during the Second Republic (1979–1983) had taken roots. The transition programme of 1989 saw the election of local and state governments in 1990 and 1991, the federal parliament in 1992, and the president in June 1993. In attempt to widen the national coalition that began to emerge in the 1980s, the military government created two parties by fiat and compelled the political elite to operate within them (Oyediran and Agbaje 1991). The government argued that the two-party system will 'set the stage for the gradual clarification of our choice or locus in accordance with the two great historical systems of capitalism and socialism' instead of ethnicity and region (Akinola 1989: 109, fn 2). Besides throwing up chances for ideological politics, the adoption of a

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[3] The NPC was comfortable with the exclusive control of the Northern Region because the region makes up more than half of the constituencies in the federal parliament, giving it a permanent control of the federal government. On their part, the NCNC and AG knew that the only way they could control the federal government is to break the NPC's monopoly of the Northern region. This was the idea behind regionalist and trans-regionalist strategies of the early parties in Nigeria

[4] The term First Republic is used to represent initial period of civil rule after independence – 1 October 1960 to 15 January 1966. The terms second, third and fourth republics have also been used in a similar way – to represent periods of civil rule after each instance of military intervention.

[5] Nnamdi Azikiwe, presidential candidate of the Nigerian People's Party (NPP) in 1979 was the leader of NCNC, Obafemi Awolowo, presidential candidate of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) was the leader of the AG, Aminu Kano, presidential candidate of the People's Redemption Party (PRP) was the leader of NEPU, while both Shehu Shagari and Waziri Ibrahim, candidates of National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and Great Nigeria People's Party (GNPP) were prominent members of the NPC during the 1960s

two-party system was proposed as a move that will deal the final blow on sectional politics. It must be acknowledged that the two parties created by the government: the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC) indeed provided the basis for construction of multi-ethnic coalitions, however, their connection with the society was limited by the fact that they were products of military contraption rather than natural evolution.

The Nigerian political elite had a chance to freely fashion durable multi-ethnic coalitions during the 1999 democratic transition. This time, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) emerged as the new national elite coalition. To ensure that it accommodates the interests of the various elite groups across the country, the PDP deepened the zoning principle developed by the leaders of the NPN in 1979. Zoning involves the aggregation of states and ethnic groups into smaller number of regional blocs on the basis of which positions are allocated (Suberu 1988: 433). There are two important features of zoning - rotation of offices and 'power-shift'[6]. The practices of power-shift and rotation of offices validate a pattern whereby the ethno-regional origin of top political officeholders, including the president, alternates from one election or set of elections to another (Akinola 1996: 1). In response to the calls for a power-shift from the North to the South, the PDP nominated Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military head of state from Yoruba Southwest Nigeria as its presidential candidate. The All Peoples' Party (APP) based in the North and the Alliance for Democracy (AD) based in the Southwest also zoned their presidential tickets to the South (Ibrahim 1999). Having the broadest and most durable national elite coalition, the PDP did not find it hard to overwhelm a coalition of two sectional parties (APP and AD) in the 1999 presidential election. During the 2003 general elections, the AD imploded while the PDP took over the Southwest. However, yet another sectional party – the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA), led by former Biafran warlord Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, sprout up in the Southeast to challenge the PDP. Eventually, APGA failed to establish a political foothold except in Anambra and Imo states, where it dislodged the PDP from the governorship position. The greatest challenge to the PDP since its formation in 1999 eventually came during the 2011 general elections. PDP's pre-dominance was defied by two sectional parties: the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) mainly supported by Yoruba of the Southwest and the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) which appeals mostly to the Muslim North. In the 2011 presidential election, the PDP lost the entire Muslim North (12 states) to the CPC and one state in the Southwest to the ACN. This was the greatest defeat the PDP has suffered in its history. But irrespective of the 2011 election losses, the PDP would likely continue to maintain its grip on the federal government. To overturn PDP's dominance of the Nigerian party system, the opposition politicians need to come up with a distinctive national issue around which a competitive nationwide opposition could be built. In the absence of this, the PDP will continue to cover the Nigerian political landscape with its symbolic big tent, while the opposition (and their sectional dissent) would be continuously kept out of power.

While Nigerian parties have gone through a tumultuous development, political parties in Switzerland have had a relatively smooth evolution. The origin of political parties in Switzerland dates back to the first half of the 19th century. What later became political parties in Switzerland emerged from relatively unstructured political movements, many of which were groups collecting signatures required to initiate a referendum (Gruner 1977). These early parties sprout up in cantons such as St. Gall, Lucerne and Berne where there were early and intense struggles for democratization (Gruner 1964). The first party at the national level – the Social Democratic Party (SP) emerged in 1888. This inspired other groups to begin to organize at the national level, and so the Radical Party (FDP) established a national organization in 1894, the Christian Democratic Party in 1912, and the Farmer's Party (BGB) in 1936. A remarkable feature of political parties in Switzerland is therefore that they did not emerge at the national level, but began as political movements in the cantons and municipalities before evolving into national parties at a relatively later stage of their development. It is not surprising that Swiss parties grew from the cantons – national elections use cantons as electoral districts as such electoral campaigns are mostly fought over local issues.

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[6] The concept of power-shift emerged in the late 1990s as an expression of the South's opposition to Northern domination of executive power.

Another distinctive characteristic of Swiss political parties, which many analysts have emphasized, is the relative stability that exists in the process of power distribution among the parties their large number notwithstanding. The combination of large number of parties and political stability is interesting considering that theorists assume that multi-party systems tend to produce unstable polities compared to two party systems (Mair 1990). This has proved to be wrong in the case of Switzerland, where over 14 nationally active parties, 180 cantonal parties, and around 5000 local parties are competing for the support of about 4.7 million voters (Ladner 2007: 311). Scholars believe that the proliferation of parties in Switzerland is the product of the social and cultural cleavages in the country and the competitiveness encouraged by federalism and direct democracy (Ladner 2001). Despite its diversity and complexity, the Swiss party system is held together by 'the integrative force of consociationalism' at least at the federal level (Ladner 2001: 123). The Swiss political elite have devised a practice ('the magic formula') in which only the most important parties are continuously represented in government. Since 1959, the grand coalition government constitutes of four parties: the Radical's Free Democratic Party (FDP/PRD), the Christian Democrats (CVP/PDC), the Socialist Party (SP/PS), and the Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC)[7]. Before now, the FDP, CVP, and the SP have two members each in the seven-member Federal Council while one SVP member. However, in 1999, the SVP's fortunes changed after the party became the strongest party in Switzerland with a voter share of 22.5 per cent. As a result, the party was rewarded with an additional seat in the Federal Council in 2003 at the expense of the CVP.

The third major feature of the Swiss parties is that they emerged not from parliamentary factions or electoral committees as most early parties in Europe did, but grew directly from the electorate or popular organizations (Gruner 1977). The formation of Swiss parties was influenced by four lines of cleavages: the *centre/periphery conflict* as well as the *state/church conflict* brought the Catholic conservatives in opposition with the liberals, the *labour/capital conflict* led to the emergence of the SP, while the *country/city conflict* inspired the rise of the SVP (Ladner 2007). The ideological positions of the four government parties reflect these cleavage lines. The FDP advocates a liberal economic order with a business friendly agenda. The party prefers less state intervention in economic affairs. The CVP professes the Christian social doctrine and stands for the establishment of a social market economy, allowing for state interventions in order to protect workers, craftsmen and agriculture. It adopts conservative positions regarding ethical and moral issues such as family values. The SP advocates the protection of the socially weak and the environment. It supports subsidy programmes, active state intervention in the economy, and the creation of a strong safety net that treats the socially disadvantage with respect. Finally, the SVP advocates the protection of the interests of the rural farmers and merchants. In the 1990s, the SVP reoriented its programme following a decline in its traditional support base – farmers and merchants. The party now favours a free-market economy and a reduction in state expenditure except for the agricultural sector where it supports massive state intervention. The party also supports the maintenance of law and order, and development of strong anti-immigration policies. It opposes Switzerland's accession to supranational organizations (UN and EU).

Party organization in Nigeria and Switzerland
There are two ideal types of party organization. At one extreme is integrated party organization while bifurcated party organization is at the other end. Bifurcation of party organization implies that 'the federal and provincial party of the same name are 'divorced' (Renzsch 2001: 3). In contrast, an integrated party 'operate[s] at different levels of government having (or trying to have) "ranks closed"' (Renzsch 2001: 2). It is a party 'in which politicians at one level of government bear an organizational relationship to politicians at other levels (as well as to politicians within their level)' (Filippov et al. 2004: 190). Dyck (1991: 129) provides further details: 'if a political party functions more or less successfully at both levels of government and if the relations between the two levels are generally close, it can be called an integrated

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[7] There is a bit of confusion between the official names of Swiss parties in the cantons, the names of the party fractions in the parliament, and the popular names. For instance, the Socialist Party is also known as the Social Democratic Party, while the Free Democratic Party is equally known as the Radical Democratic Party.

party'. In reality no party operates a wholly integrated or entirely bifurcated party organization – integration or autonomy of party organization is a matter of degree. As we shall see from the experience of Nigeria's People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the Swiss People's Party (SVP) and the Socialist Party of Switzerland (SP), parties integrate or separate their organization to the extent that such organizational set up help them to achieve their main interest - which is to win elections as well as a respond to institutional, historical and structural forces.

PDP: portrait of an integrated party
The PDP is a typical example of an integrated party. Its organisational structure fit very closely to the description of an integrated party presented above. The PDP is organised at six levels: ward, local government area, senatorial district, state, zonal, and national levels[8]. Of these levels, the national, state and local levels appear to be the fulcrum of party organization. This is probably because they are the core levels where state officials are elected. The degree of integration of PDP's organization is demonstrated by the bidirectional relationship between the national, state and local party organizations. It is also expressed in the level of mutual involvement of local, state and national party organizations in the affairs of each other. Using the indicators developed by Elodie Fabre to measure the organization of the PDP provides a stark description of the degree of integration of the party. As I noted earlier, Fabre (2011: 348) suggests that integration and autonomy of party organizations can be measured by looking at the composition of national party executive, selection of party officers, selection of candidates for national elections, method of amendment of party constitution, the running of state party organization, as well as the selection of the state party officers and candidates, and financing of state party branches.

The state branches of the PDP have a guaranteed presence in the national executive committee of the party. The state party branches are represented in the national executive committee principally by chairpersons of the state branches and state governors. The guaranteed representation of the state party leaders in the national executive committee provides the state branches a sufficient safeguard in the party's decision making process. As a mark of the bidirectional relationship between federal and state party organizations, the national executive committee of the PDP is involved in the running of the state party organization. The Committee is empowered to supervise and direct the work of the state party organizations. In fact, one of the core functions of the state party executive, according to the PDP Constitution (Article 12.37 (b), is to implement 'directives of the national [executive] committee or the national convention'. In addition, the state party branches are expected to refer to the national party on all vital issues including finance, discipline, and programme development. In order to control the state party organizations, the national executive committee is also empowered to 'where necessary, suspend or dissolve a state executive committee' for a period not exceeding three months[9]. The integration of the PDP is further highlighted by the fact that the national, state and local party organizations jointly manage a number of organizational issues such as party membership. While member registration takes place at the ward level under the supervision of the local party, the national party is charged with the responsibility of producing, authenticating and distributing party membership cards; this they normally do through the state party branches. The interpenetration of PDP's state and national party organization is therefore the first mark of the party's integration.

The integration of PDP organization also reflects in the selection of party officials and candidates for national and state elections. The selection of PDP national officers and presidential candidates is carried out in two stages. In the first stage, a national selection panel set up by the national executive committee screens the candidates and establishes a list of qualified candidates. This stage is usually characterized by 'horse-trading' between national and state party leaders, manipulation, and controversy. This is because it is at this point that the party leaders prune the list of aspirants by weeding out the least favoured aspirants. In the second stage of the selection process, the PDP's national officers and presidential candidate are elected by the party's national convention dominated by the state party

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[8] See Articles 11-12 of the PDP's Constitution, 2006.
[9] See Article 12.72(e) of the PDP Constitution, 2006.

branches. The PDP national convention consists of three sections: 1) elected party officials at federal, state and local levels; 2) elected and appointed state officials at federal and state levels, 3) elected local council chairpersons and one elected national delegate from each local government area. The composition of the national convention favours the state and local party branches and gives them a strong leverage to influence the selection of national party officers and presidential candidate, especially since balloting is typically organized on state basis and state branches tend to vote en bloc. But the national party often employs the mechanism of 'screening of candidates' to eliminate less favoured candidates[10]. Nevertheless, if the national and state party leaders are able to reach a consensus at the 'screening' stage, the national convention usually end up more or less as mere formality – an endorsement of the anointed candidates.

The strong role that the state party branches play in the selection of national officers and presidential candidates is counterbalanced by the role assigned to the national executive committee in the selection of state party officers and candidates for state elections. The national executive committee is empowered to 'make party electoral regulations to govern the conduct of elections to all party offices at every level and regulate procedure for selecting the party candidates for elective offices'[11]. Based on this, the national executive committee normally sets up a national selection panel to screen the aspirants and to establish a list of qualified candidates. As in the case of national party officers and presidential candidate, this process is usually typically extremely controversial. In a recent case, the incumbent governor of Bayelsa State, Timipre Sylva was stopped from seeking re-election by the Screening Committee allegedly at the instance of President Goodluck Jonathan, who incidentally hails from Bayelsa State, and who is reportedly at loggerheads with Governor Sylva (Abidde 2012)[12]. The decision to disqualify Governor Sylva triggered serious tension in the PDP as many PDP governors are reportedly opposed to the decision (Chiahemen 2011, Akunna 2012)[13]. The case lodged by Governor Sylva at the Supreme Court did not halt his disqualification as the state party executive went ahead to organise a primary election for the 'qualified' candidates, insisting that the courts do not have jurisdiction over internal party affairs.

The integration of the PDP's organization can also be seen in the party's financial system and its method of constitutional amendment. The PDP operates an integrated financial system in which the core sources of funds are centralized:

> There shall be established and maintained for the party a fund into which shall be paid all: a) subscriptions, fees, and levies from the membership of the party; b) proceeds from investments made by the party; c) subventions and donations; d) gifts and grants by individuals or groups of individuals as authorized by law; e) loans approved by the National Executive Committee; and f) such other monies as may be lawfully received by the party[14].

State branches of the PDP are however allowed to generate their own revenue and operate a bank account where they could lodge their own finances – which are mostly subventions from the national party.

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[10] Other techniques used by the PDP leadership to eliminate less favoured aspirants from party primaries, include: 1) 'coercive consensus': a declaration by powerful party barons, state governors, godfathers that those entitled to vote must support one 'consensus' candidate and other aspirants must withdraw; 2) use of money to bribe officials and induce delegates to support particular candidates, 3) a technique Nigerians call 'results by declaration', whereby an aspirant wins a nomination or election, but polling officials simply disregard the results and declare the loser as the winner (Ibrahim et al. 2006: 7-8, Aziken 2012).

[11] See Article 12.72(j) of the PDP Constitution, 2006

[12] Sabella Abidde 2012. 'Jonathan: The Evil Genius of Bayelsa Politics' http://www.punchng.com/viewpoint/jonathan-the-evil-genius-of-bayelsa-politics/ (accessed on 05.03.12)

[13] Tom Chiahemen 2011. 'Bayelsa: PDP Govs meet today...Threaten to dump party en masse if...' http://www.nationalaccordnewspaper.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2647:bayelsa-pdp-govs-meet-todaythreaten-to-dump-party-enmasse-if&catid=35:national-news&Itemid=63 (accessed 05.03.12), see also Chuks Akunna 2012. PDP National Convention: Govs move against Jonathan...As ghost of Timipre Sylva haunts president http://www.sunnewsonline.com/webpages/news/national/2012/mar/05/national-05-03-2012-001.html (accessed 12.03.12).

[14] See Article 18.1 of the PDP Constitution, 2006

Regarding the method of amending PDP's Constitution, the responsibility for constitutional amendment rests squarely on the national convention, which as I mentioned earlier is dominated by the state and local party branches. The PDP Constitution states that 'no amendment of the constitution shall be valid unless by a motion passed by two-third majority of members present and voting at the National Convention'[15]. This is after the National Secretary of the party had circulated proposed amendments to the state branches for publication at least one month before the date of the national convention. The rigorous process of amending PDP's Constitution ensures that the national party cannot introduce constitutional changes without the consent of the state/local party branches.

Besides the consolidation of PDP's formal institutions, the cross-level integration of the party is demonstrated by the way it organizes its electoral campaigns. There is high level of inter-dependence between the different levels of party in the course of the party's preparations for elections. The mutual dependence of the different levels of party organization imposes a national focus on the party and compels politicians to eschew divisions in the party:

> [t]he notion of an integrated party is to define such a party as one in which, for national politicians, the long-term strategy of preserving the party's overall electoral coalition takes precedence over the short-term tactic of seeking immediate gains from challenging local and regional autonomy (Filippov et al. 2004: 194).

The tendency to integrate PDP's organization is largely driven by electoral considerations. The over thirty years of institutional engineering of Nigeria's electoral and party system has produced an electoral landscape which require cross-national appeal and broad-based national support to achieve electoral success (Jinadu 1985, Ayoade 1986, Kendhammer 2010). Since 1979, presidential candidates are required to garner at least 25 percent of the votes cast in two-thirds of the states in order to win an election, while gubernatorial candidates have to draw 25 percent of the vote in two-thirds of the local government areas to win governorship. This makes it extremely imperative for federal and state politicians to campaign locally and to depend on local elites to deliver their locality. The success of federal and state politicians therefore depends on the extent to which they are linked with the local elites. On their part, local elites depend on federal and state politicians to gain access to patronage at federal or state level. Again, a party's electoral success at the national level tends to facilitate the electoral success of its candidates at the state and local levels following a 'bandwagon effect'. In the context of the interdependence of local, state and federal politicians in their pursuit of electoral success, cross-level party integration appears a plausible option, since every level of party organization is vital to the overall success of the party/politicians.

To succeed in Nigeria's extremely demanding electoral terrain, the PDP employed the strategy of 'mutual delegation':

> If a party draws support from many units with diverse preferences, there will typically be a variety of issues on which it would want to tailor its electoral platform and policies to the particular demands of each unit, especially if those demands are noncontradictory. The best way to accomplish this and to monitor those demands is not only to allow regional and local party autonomy but also to motivate them to that end by letting subnational governments retain a substantial measure of sovereignty. Doing so, moreover, isolates the national party and its national campaigns from local and regional conflicts, the resolution of which provides few if any benefits at the national level (Filippov et al. 2004: 195).

The PDP has put the principle of mutual delegation to its most efficient use. Brandon Kendhammer (2010) was puzzled by PDP's ability to maintain its coalition and cope with the contradiction introduced

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[15] See Article 26 of the PDP Constitution, 2006

into its organization by the ethnic and religious crisis in Northern Nigeria, where both Christian and Muslim PDP candidates mobilise ethno-religious groups as part of their campaigns and incite their supporters to frequently engage in ethno-religious violence. After a rigorous analysis of PDP's electoral strategy, he came to a conclusion that PDP's ability to rise above the sectarian conflicts in Nigeria and the party's capacity to hold its ethnic coalition together can be traced to the fact that it has groomed the party elites to be 'two-faced' – 'cooperative at the federal centre, but ethnically antagonistic at home' (Ibid 51). Being Janus-faced provided the elites with the capacity to employ radically different tactics in their efforts to woo their constituents and colleagues. Again, local party branches are allowed autonomy to deal with contested local issues, thereby insulating the national party from local conflicts.

The PDP also applies the principle of mutual delegation in the organization of its electoral campaigns. Like the Canadian state-wide parties (Esselment 2010), PDP's local, state and federal organizations tend to share campaign resources including activists, fundraising, technology, publicity, campaign platform and infrastructure. The state and local party organizations are usually responsible for organizing presidential campaign rallies while it has now become a tradition for top figures in the party such as the president to co-campaign with gubernatorial candidates, whereas governors co-campaign with candidates for local council elections. In some cases, local politicians tend to make financial contributions to candidates vying for state and federal offices (Ichino 2008), while at other times, federal and state politicians do take up the sponsorship of candidates for local elections. These practices tend to deepen the integration of electoral campaigns at federal, state and local levels.

SP and SVP: loosely integrated parties

Unlike the PDP, the organizational structure of the leading parties in Switzerland can be located somewhere in between integration and bifurcation. One recent book on Swiss democracy described the country's federal system paradoxically in the following terms: 'non-centralization – not decentralization' (Linder 2010: 45). This description captures the model of party organization among Swiss parties: not-integrated, but non-bifurcated. The Swiss Socialist Party (SP) and the Swiss People's Party (SVP) are organized along the three levels of government in Switzerland – both parties have national, cantonal, and sectional (commune) branches[16]. Again, unlike the PDP, the sectional and cantonal branches of the parties have to be formally admitted by the cantonal and national parties, respectively, before they can operate as SP and SVP branches. The national and cantonal parties also have the powers to expel cantonal and sectional branches from the party. On their own, cantonal and sectional parties can equally resign their membership of the SP and SVP. In other words, sectional and cantonal parties organize as independent entities with their own statutes and leadership, and must be established before seeking admission into the SP or SVP. This contrasts with the case of PDP where the state and local branches are set up and supported by the national party. The method of admission and exclusion of party branches in SP and SVP points to the loose integration of cross-level organizations in the parties.

The integration of the SP and SVP organization is however underscored by the involvement of cantonal and sectional branches in the national party executive. Like the PDP, there is a guaranteed representation of the cantonal parties in the national executive of SP and SVP[17]. In the SP's Assembly of Delegates, cantonal parties are represented by the stewards (chairpersons) of the cantonal parties and at least four other cantonal delegates[18], while the cantonal parties are represented in the SVP's Central Committee by presidents of the cantonal parties and one representative per 20,000 votes secured by the party in the National Council election in each canton[19]. The national party executives of the SP and SVP

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[16] Generally, the scope of a sectional party coincides with the political territory of the commune, see for example Article 6: 2, Statutes of the Swiss Socialist Party, 2010. In the case of the SP, when a municipality has several sections, they are grouped in the Socialist Party of the town, with regard to local politics.

[17] The executive committee of the Swiss Socialist Party is known as the Assembly of Delegates, while that of the Swiss People's Party is called the Central Committee.

[18] See Articles 14 of the Statutes of the Swiss Socialist Party, 2010.

[19] See Article 17 & 18 of the Statutes of the Swiss People's Party, 2008.

have substantial control over the cantonal parties because of the role they play in admission of cantonal parties, handling of disciplinary cases, exclusion of erring cantonal parties, and consideration of appeals against decisions made by sectional and cantonal parties as well as other organs of the national party.

The selection of national party officials of SP and SVP is handled by the supreme decision making organs of the parties[20]. The cantonal and sectional parties are fully represented in the SP's Congress and the SVP's Assembly of Delegates. The SP's Congress is constituted by at least one delegate of the sectional parties and at least two delegates of each cantonal party, while the cantonal parties are represented in SVP's Assembly of Delegates by the entire members of the cantonal party executive and a minimum of eight delegates per cantonal party[21]. The selection of candidates for federal[22] and cantonal elections is controlled entirely by the cantonal parties. Normally, the procedure for candidate selection is set by cantonal parties and involves the cantonal parties' Steering Committee disseminating information about impending elections to members of the party within a maximum period of three months. Nomination of candidates for these elections is usually presented by the sectional parties of the aspirants. The candidates are then elected in a secret ballot election by an absolute majority in the first ballot and simple majority in the second round[23]. The national party organizations of SP and SVP are equally excluded from selecting candidates for the Swiss federal executive – the Federal Council. Candidates for the Swiss Federal Council are appointed by the SP's Socialist Group of the Federal Assembly and the SVP's Federal Assembly Fraction[24] following nomination by the parties' steering committees[25]. The Federal Assembly Group or Fraction is an independent organ of the SP and SVP composed of party members elected to the National Council, the Council of States and the Federal Council.

The methods of amending the statutes of SP and SVP as well as the structure of the parties' financial systems are also pointers to the relative autonomy of the cantonal parties. The cantonal parties are responsible for collecting their own revenue and disbursing it. They are however required to make contributions to the national party. The national party organization uses its financial resources to run its administration, support cantonal parties that require assistance, and sponsor national campaigns on strategic national issues. With regards to amendment of party statutes, the supreme decision making organs of both parties – SP's Congress and SVP's Assembly of Delegates – are responsible for any revision, and as I earlier noted, the cantonal parties are fully represented in these organs. Hence, the endorsement of the cantonal parties is required to amend the statutes of the parties.

One area where the national party organizations of the SP and SVP have had a major influence relates to the development of party manifesto and programmes. Compared with political parties in other parts of Europe, Swiss parties have a remarkably low number of professionals working especially at the sectional and cantonal levels (Ladner 2001). As a result, the national party which have fairly more number of professional staff than the cantonal and sectional levels has now taken the lead in formulating political issues and developing party programme. The national party produces a campaign model for all the cantons, including the strategy document for the campaigns, the corporate design for production of posters, and a coordinated media campaign.

Thus, although the Swiss model of party organization may appear 'not integrated' to many observers (Hadley et al. 1989, Ladner 2007); it is equally 'not bifurcated' as the above analysis demonstrates. A closer look at the organizational structure of the Swiss parties reveals that a functional division of labour have been established between the national and the cantonal parties, and this has been anchored on 'mutual delegation' of responsibilities among levels of party organization (Filippov et al.

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[20] These organs are known as the Congress by the SP and Assembly of Delegates by the SVP.

[21] See Article 11 of the Statutes of the Swiss Socialist Party, 2010; and Article 13 & 14 of the Statutes of the Swiss People's Party, 2008.

[22] Here I refer to elections of the members of the National Council.

[23] See for example, Article 11 & 12 of the Statutes of the Swiss Socialist Party of Geneva, 2011.

[24] See Article 21(4-5) of the Statutes of the Swiss Socialist Party, 2010; and Article 9(3) of the Statutes of the Swiss People's Party, 2008.

[25] See Article 16(2e) of the Statutes of the Swiss Socialist Party, 2010.

2004). In Swiss parties responsibilities are allocated in such a way that the national party is mostly responsible for formulating the ideological and programmatic positions of the parties, whereas the cantonal parties control personnel recruitment and campaign financing. Areas such as election of national party officials and amendment of the parties' statutes are jointly controlled by the national and cantonal parties. This structure informs my characterization of the organizational model of Swiss parties as 'loosely integrated'.

Two other factors bolster the relative integration of Swiss parties. Firstly, it is an acceptable practice in Switzerland for a particular individual to hold two or more party/government positions at the same time. For instance, the president and all the vice presidents of the SVP are members of the parliament and as such members of the powerful Federal Assembly Fraction. The advantage of this is that there is a strong interaction between different party organs on one hand, and cantonal and national politics at the other hand. Secondly, it is hard for Swiss politicians to be elected to federal positions without them first going through steps of career and grooming at commune and cantonal levels. This is particularly so because nomination of candidates for national and cantonal elections is controlled by cantonal and sectional parties, and the leaders of these parties would be inclined to favour activists who have served the party for a considerable length of time. The participation of politicians at the different levels of party organization helps build rapport among the politicians at each level and improve party integration. It is common to find politicians who have served at commune and cantonal levels meeting once again at the federal level. It is natural that they should feel they are colleagues and extend this sense of collegiality to officials at sectional and cantonal parties. The way in which local politics are connected with federal politics defines the degree of integration of Swiss parties.

Why parties tend to integrate or bifurcate
The tendency of political parties to integrate or separate their organizations can be explained drawing from institutional, path dependent and structural perspectives. The institutional explanation highlights issues such as the way governmental powers are shared – presidential vs. collegial executive, the effect of special institutions – direct democracy, electoral law especially timing of elections, and political party regulation. The path dependent explanation underscores the impact of a party's historical origin on the development of its organizational structure during the subsequent years. Finally, the structural explanation looks at how the division and relationship power within the society affects organizational structure of political parties.

Institutional explanations
In their definitive analysis of the federal designs, Filippov et al. (2004) observed that 'integrated [or bifurcated] parties are not born of nothing…They, as much as anything else, are the product of design – the design of institutions that compel politicians to erect parties of a particular sort because that sort, and not some other, serves their interest'. In Nigeria and Switzerland, a number of political institutions affect the degree of integration or autonomy of party organization. The most manifest institutional influence on party organization is the form of government, in this case: presidentialism vs. collegial executive. The practice of presidentialism in Nigeria has given rise to the emergence local, state and federal chief executives who control vast patronage, and who tend to use these resources to dictate state and party politics. Because of the potentials of the chief executives to attract huge amounts of resources to party activities, these state officials are mostly regarded as the party leaders; a position which confers on them the right to participate in the major organs of the parties. In the past, some of these chief executives have taken advantage their privileges to manipulate party politics (Awowede 2000, Ojewale 2001, Mohammed 2008). The effect of forms of government on integration or bifurcation of party organization is particularly clear with regards to the way national elections are organized. Presidential systems use the entire federation as electoral district for the election of the federal chief executive, and results to electoral

campaigns that address mostly national issues[26]. For a party to win the presidency, it needs to win a majority of the local and state constituencies that make up the national constituency. This requires strong cooperation between local, state and national party organizations/candidates. However, the situation is completely different in parliamentary or the Swiss collegial executive system where the position of the chief executive is either occupied by a parliamentarian or rotates among members of the college – the Federal Council. The collegial system does not create a national constituency, neither does the parliamentary system. The absence of a national constituency means that campaigns in 'non-presidential' systems are largely localized, and the need for cross-level cooperation among party organizations is substantially reduced. Consequently, it can be argued that the degree of cross-level party integration tends to be higher in societies with presidential form of government than in societies that do not have presidential governments.

Some special institutions within federal democracies such as direct democracy in Switzerland also affect the tendency of parties to integrate or separate their organization. The Swiss political parties operate in a context where many political issues are not resolved during national elections, but are subjected referendum and popular initiatives[27]. Between 1960 and 2003, a total of 321 referendums were held at the national level in Switzerland (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008: 49). Swiss parties employ the tool of referenda and initiatives in their political competition. Just to illustrate, the conservative-right parties have used the referendum for several decades as a favourite instrument for fighting against new competencies for the federal government and the development of the welfare state. However, in recent times, the left parties have successfully used the referendum against proposals by the right parties to cut social security programmes. The referendum appears like an instrument of the opposition because it seems easier to build negative majorities than coalitions of supportive majorities. Hence, parties tend to push more issues into the national political agenda and to put threats of referendum when they are in opposition and require greater visibility among the electorate. This implies that the more a political party campaign on national issues, the more it tends to integrate its cross-level organization.

The Swiss People's Party (SVP) is a good illustration of the above proposition. From being the smallest of the four governing parties at the beginning of the 1990s, the party ended the decade as the strongest party in Switzerland. The SVP's success owed much to a shift in the party's electoral strategy. The SVP emerged from a coalition of two traditional parties: the Party of Farmers, Artisans and Independents (BGB) and the Democratic Parties of the cantons of Glarus and Graubunden. Its focus was narrowly based on defence of the professional interests of farmers, artisans, craftsmen and independents. However, this changed in the early 1990s following the push by Zurich SVP for inclusion of new issues on the national political agenda. This move was expressed in the party's politicization of asylum issues and the question of European integration. In 1992, the SVP was virtually the only party that stood against Swiss accession of the European Economic Area (EEA) – an issue which won it a victory in popular vote. Since then, the party has established itself as a major player in national politics and the guardian of Swiss independence, neutrality and nationality. As the SVP gained ground at national politics, the party became increasingly integrated as a national party, contrary to the traditional Swiss system of parties with loose organizational structures and weak central party (Skenderovic 2009: 129).

Another institutional measure that could influence the degree of cross-level integration or autonomy of a party is the electoral law, particularly as it relates to the timing of elections. Two different dimensions of election timing need to be considered: vertical and horizontal simultaneity (Deschouwer 2006). Vertical simultaneity is the coincidence of elections at two or more levels. An example is where federal and state elections take place on the same day or within the same cycle as is the case in Nigeria[28].

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[26] This is contrary to the Swiss collegial executive where the members of the executive are appointed by the parliament.

[27] Referendum is a 'popular vote on parliamentary decisions, with the citizens having the last word: they decide whether a parliamentary proposal becomes law or is rejected' (Linder 2010: 93). There are different forms of direct democracy instruments including mandatory and optional referendum as well as popular initiative and counterproposal. A wide variety of issues have been put on popular vote, ranging from minor subsidies to the abolition of the army.

[28] See Section 25 of the Electoral Act 2010, Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Vertical simultaneity increases cross-level integration of party organizations. This is simply because national electoral stakes are usually higher, and national issues may tend to overshadow state or local issues. This may force the state and local parties to align with the national party organisation and harmonize their campaign strategies. A state election organised just before or immediately after a national election is likely to be influenced by the national election. In Nigeria, political analysts talk about 'bandwagon-effect' in elections when the result of national election triggers a winning wave at the state and local government levels. The separation of national and sub-national elections, as is the case in Switzerland, offers state and local parties more opportunities to independently engage with local issues and to distinguish their organization from national party organization[29]. The second dimension of election timing is horizontal simultaneity - the conduct of most or all state elections on the same day or in the same cycle (Deschouwer 2006). The results of state elections in the entire federation can be aggregated and interpreted within the national frame of competition. Like vertical simultaneity, horizontal simultaneity increases integration of cross-level parties because it may compel political parties to devise national campaign strategy. This is contrary to what the situation would be if state elections are staggered and each state party is free to develop its own campaign strategy.

Finally, the degree of cross-level integration or autonomy of a political party can be influenced by the nature of political party regulation that operates in a country. Nigeria represents a case of very stringent party regulation. Between 1989 and 2002, Nigerian electoral commissions denied registration to no less than 64 political associations for failing to meet the party registration requirements (Bogaards 2010: 730). Unlike Swiss parties which are officially registered by the Federal Chancellery once they acquire 'the legal form of an association in terms of Articles 60-79 of the Swiss Civil Code[30], Nigerian parties have to satisfy rigorous conditions stipulated in the Electoral Act and the Nigerian Constitution[31]. These requirements aim at creating a national party system that would transcend regional, ethnic, linguistic and religious cleavages. They were designed to restrain the formation of ethnic parties; make it difficult for regionally-based parties to be registered; and compel parties to demonstrate a cross-ethnic/regional composition as a pre-condition for their registration and participation in national elections (Phillips 1980, Whitaker 1981, Sklar 1981, Diamond 1982). Because these requirements constitute a set of incentives for building national parties, they could be considered in a positive light[32].

In order to meet the requirements for registration as political parties and electoral success[33], political associations in Nigeria has been forced to organize 'based on top-down integration of national elites, rather than, as was the case with previous large parties, a regional elite seeking to incorporate other regional elites into a national framework' (Kendhammer 2010: 57). The PDP in particular pursued this strategy through open elite recruitment and commitment to zoning of political offices. The PDP, like the other parties in Nigeria, has relied on community leaders and a chain of political 'godfathers' – prominent and wealthy individuals with strong patron-client networks – for recruiting local elites (Ibid 62, see also Sklar et al. 2006, Omobowale and Olutayo 2007). Over the years, Nigerian parties have consolidated the

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[29] Article 10(1-2) of the Federal Act on Political Rights, the Swiss Confederation, 2010.

[30] State-wide parties in Switzerland are specifically required to be represented by a minimum of one member in the National Council or by a minimum of three members in each of any three cantonal parliaments. See Article 76a (1) of the Federal Act on Political Rights, the Swiss Confederation, 2010.

[31] See Part V of the Electoral Act 2010, Federal Republic of Nigeria; and Section 222 & 223 of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.

[32] The stringent requirements for registration of political parties in Nigeria have been criticized as 'draconian' and an infringement on the right of freedom of association; see Oluyemi-Kusa (2001).

[33] As well as the distribution requirements for presidential and gubernatorial elections which stipulates that candidates for an election to the office of President or Governor shall be deemed to have been duly elected, only where: (a) he/she has the highest number of votes cast at the election; and (b) he/she has not less than one-quarter of the votes cast at the election in each of at least two-thirds of all the States in the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja in the case of President, and not less than one-quarter of all the votes cast in each of at least two-thirds of all the Local Government Areas in the State in the case of Governor. In the event that a single candidate does not meet this requirement, a runoff election is required. See Sections 141-142 and 186, *the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999*. Lagos: Federal Government Press.

patron-client networks and political coalitions between ethnic elites, waving an integrated chain of local, state and federal elites. Consequently, the bid to satisfy party regulation and electoral requirements has forced Nigerian parties to incorporate diverse ethnic elites into their structures and facilitated the emergence of cross-level elite networks and integrated organization in the parties.

Path dependent explanation
The tendency towards integration or bifurcation of party organization can also be strongly conditioned by the parties' institutional inertia. This is particularly true in parties where structures and rules may have been internalized over a long period of time (Hopkin 2003). In this case, structures and rules of engagement between different levels of party organization are likely to become path-dependent. The path dependent perspective highlights 'how actors choices create institutions at critical moments, how these institutions in turn shape subsequent actor behaviours, and how these actors responses in turn culminate in the [*sustenance of existing or*] development of new institutional patterns' (Mahoney 2001: 115, emphasis mine). Angelo Panebianco's party 'genetic model' provides one of the most useful insights on the consequence of party origins for their subsequent development. According to him, 'every organization bears the mark of its formation'; in other words, a party's organizational structure depends more on how the organization originated and consolidated than any other factor (Panebianco 1988: 50). Panebianco argues that party organizations originate through three complex processes: territorial penetration, territorial diffusion and a blend of diffusion and penetration. Territorial penetration occurs when the 'centre' (national party) 'controls, stimulates, or directs the development' of the 'periphery' (state and local parties). On the other hand, diffusion occurs when party development results from 'spontaneous germination: local elites construct party associations which are only later integrated into a national organization'. Panebianco acknowledges that in some circumstances, 'mixed' types of organizational development can occur:

> [D]evelopment initially takes place through diffusion: a number of local associations autonomously spring up in various parts of the country; later they unite to form a national organization. The national organization then goes on to develop local associations where these are still absent [penetration] (Ibid 51).

The Nigerian and Swiss cases provide ample examples to support the 'genetic model'. The PDP is a good case of 'penetration'. The party was established in 1998 during the closing days of military rule in Nigeria through a 'top-down integration of the national elite' (Kendhammer, 2010: 57). The national party was first put together through the union of the G-34, a group of some ex-military officers, and an alliance of some political groups denied registration by the regime of General Sani Abacha during its failed transition programme[34] (Amadi 2000, Agbaje et al. 2009). The major factor in PDP's formation was not ideology but the establishment of ethnic coalition of regional barons that could secure party registration and capture power at the federal level:

> Nigerian political parties were conceived to be cohesive, national bourgeois parties…[T]he aim or political project of most Nigerian parties has been the development of a national system for sharing out the national cake as a system of patronage. This is why the parties are established as

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[34] The G-34 is a national coalition of some relatively credible politicians who felt that they could not sit aloof and watch the political manipulations that were culminating in the self-succession of General Sani Abacha in the late-1990s. The coalition was first convened by the G-18, a group of 18 top Northern politicians led by Solomon Lar, former governor of Plateau State in the Second Republic (1979-1983). They were later joined by additional 16 leaders from the South led by Alex Ekweme, the former vice president in the Second Republic. The two groups coalesced and became the G-34. The other political groups that merged to form the PDP include the People's Democratic Movement (PDM), All Nigeria Congress (ANC), Social Progressive Party (SPP), and People's Consultative Forum (PCF).

coalitions of various factions of regional and economic rent-seekers. Most party leaders see their political party activity as a means to further their business interests (Ibrahim et al. 2006: 10).

The PDP was nurtured as an ideologically amorphous national organisation with several factions led by political godfathers from different regions. It was these godfathers that were responsible for establishing state and local branches of the party:

> At the early stage of the PDP's development, each godfather in the party was expected to deliver his own constituency, wherever it was and however the network beneath him was constructed, whether it was by traditional or by financial loyalties (Kew 2004: 144).

The political godfathers used their political machines to construct state and local branches of the PDP and to install their protégés as state and local party officials, governors, federal and state parliamentarians as well as chief executives of local government councils (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007). Over the years, several of the political godfathers that 'midwifed' the birth of PDP state and local branches have lost their influence and the local coalitions that gave the party its initial foothold have been reformed. However, the PDP has continued to maintain the top-down integration of its state and local branches despite the immense autonomist pressures and intra-party squabbles that the party has had to endure (Kendhammer 2010: 63).

Unlike the PDP, the Swiss People's Party (SVP) represents the 'mixed' version of the 'genetic model'. The SVP was founded in 1971 by the merger of the Party of Farmers, Traders and Independents (BGB) and the Democratic Parties of the cantons of Glarus and Graubunden. The history of its predecessors dates back to the late 1910s when a number of cantonal farmers' parties were established in agrarian German-speaking areas of Switzerland (Skenderovic 2009: 124-125). These parties were born out of concerns by some young peasant activists that the right-wing Radical Party did not object strongly enough to socialist tendencies, particularly militarism and internationalism. The parties also reflected the cleavage between the economic interests of the farmers and entrepreneurs in the Radical Party. From its local base in Berne and Zurich, the peasant movement spread to other cantons like Aargau, Basel, Vaud and Schaffhausen[35]. In 1936, the Party of Farmers, Traders and Independents (BGB) was inaugurated at the national level as a representative party of the peasant parties. From the 1930s, the BGB launched itself into the mainstream of Swiss politics as a right-wing conservative party. The party positioned itself to defend the interests of local Swiss traders and farmers against big businesses and international capital (Ibid 125). In the face of growing implosion of many small parties in Switzerland, the BGB merged with the Democratic Parties of Glarus and Graubunden to strengthen the parties and broaden their political base. Having changed its name to the Swiss People's Party (SVP) following the merger, the SVP sought to expand its electoral base to the entire federation. This it did by putting new issues on the national political agenda, adopting campaign activities and style that appeal to the national electorate, and establishing local party branches in cantons where they were not in existence. During the 1990s, the SVP doubled the number of its cantonal branches to eventually be represented in all cantons (Ibid 133), and these branches are loosely integrated to the national party organization.

As the cases of PDP and SVP demonstrate, the characteristics of a party's origin are in fact capable of defining its organizational structure long after the formation of the party. The PDP's story shows that organizational development through penetration is usually driven by a sufficiently cohesive national party organization right from the start, and it is normally difficult for the national party's grip on the state and local parties to be released. On the other hand, from the analysis of the SVP, it is clear that parties which develop through diffusion usually find it hard to come up with a fully integrated national organization since the national party is a mere federation of intermediate and local parties, and differences among federating units may be extremely hard to reconcile. The attempts by the SVP, under the

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[35] In the early 1960s, Christopher Hughes wrote: '[T]he BGB is very much a cantonal party, with its centre of gravity in Canton Berne. It has made little progress in East Switzerland, and none in Roman Catholic districts' (1962: 29)

leadership of Christoph Blocher, to integrate its cantonal and sectional branches were vehemently resisted by the more traditional faction of the party (Skenderovic 2009: 129).

Structural explanation
Structural explanation to integration or bifurcation of party organization looks at the way in which power is organized and shared in an organization or society; pointing particularly, in this case, to the shifts in the balance of power within the state and parties. The argument here is quite simple: since party organization 'mimics' the state structure, a shift in the power relations between the federal and state governments is likely to reflect on the structure of party organization. This means that the stronger the federal government for example, the stronger the national party organization. Unlike Switzerland where the structure of inter-governmental power relations has been largely stable since creation of the federal state (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008: 34-36), Nigeria has had significant shifts in federal-state relations, and this has reverberated in the way parties organize. Three broad phases can be delineated in the history of federal-state relations in Nigeria. The first phase is between 1954 and 1966 when the regions/states dominated Nigerian federation. The second phase (1966-1999) is the period when the federal government gained ascendancy over the state governments, while the third phase (since 1999) is marked by a gradual resurgence of the power of the states in Nigerian federation.

Between 1954 when federalism was formally introduced in Nigeria and the initial military intervention in 1966, the regional governments enjoyed political primacy in the federation. Although the Constitution divided powers between the federal and the regional governments in a coordinate manner, the regional governments had political advantage over the federal government. The regional governments were first granted self-government in 1956[36] and this compelled leaders of the three dominant parties to take up positions as premiers of the regional governments. The absence of the party leaders at the centre meant that the regional party organizations controlled the real power (Riker 1964: 131, Ademolekun and Ayo 1989: 158). The strength of the regions also reflected in their dominance of the early constitutional negotiations that preceded Nigeria's independence. At this time, regional politicians pressed for the adoption of several decentralist measures, including fiscal decentralisation and regionalisation of economic and social development. This handed over to the regions the important and expensive task of promoting economic and social development together with the control of rich development corporations and agricultural marketing boards. The preponderance of the regions inspired First Republic parties to build strong regional party organisations, with which they fought to secure their regional hegemony. Because the early parties were largely regionalist, their national organisations were greatly underdeveloped, particularly in the case of the NPC. Like other First Republic parties, the NPC focused tremendously on establishing strong regional support base. The party appealed not to the national electorate, but to 'a region in which its supporting interests were dominant' (Smith 1981: 373).

Things however changed so dramatically after the military intervention of 1966 with the advent of a new structure of federal-state relations in Nigeria. The year 1966 marked the beginning of the decline in the ascendancy of the regional governments over the federal government. The military coup of 1966 produced serious centralizing trend in the distribution of powers and resources between the federal and state governments (Osaghae 1992: 186). After the military intervention of 1966, the federal government took over the power to legislate for the entire country and did not limit itself to the exclusive and concurrent lists of the Nigerian Constitution[37]. The Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) further widened the influence of the federal government, making it more autonomous and assertive. The old regional mentality of self-determination and self-sufficiency waned with the defeat of the separatist Biafra, while victory for the federal government came with a tendency for it to intervene, arbitrate, and provide national leadership. The centrist posture of the post-war Nigerian federation reflected on the parties, with an

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[36] This was before the colonial government withdrew from the central government in 1960
[37] One military Decree that widened the powers between the federal and state governments was the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 1 of 1966. This decree bestowed on the federal government, the 'power to make laws for the peace, order, and good governance of Nigeria or any part thereof with respect to any matter whatsoever'.

unprecedented institutional engineering of the electoral and party systems, of which I have earlier discussed.

Since 1999, there appears to be a gradual resurgence of the influence of the state governments in Nigerian federation. This is mainly a result of the stricter enforcement of the constitutional allocation of powers, leading for example to a much more disciplined enforcement of revenue sharing rules and respect for state governments; as well as the greater coordination by the governors on the platform of the Nigerian Governors Forum. Between 1999 and 2007, the Supreme Court decided fifteen major inter-governmental cases that span issues such as the ownership of natural resources, the allocation of public revenues, the status of local government, and the policing of public security (Suberu 2008). Some of the decisions of the Supreme Court have accorded the states greater leverage in national politics. For instance, the Supreme Court decision that barred the federal government from allocating federal revenues to a Special Fund, of which it controlled, transferred substantial amount of revenue to the state governments. Overall, the share of state and local government budget spending in the consolidated budget doubled, increasing from 23 per cent in 1999 to 46 per cent in 2005 (World Bank 2007). The increasing autonomy of the states was accompanied by the increased coordination and activism by state governors.

Since 1999, state governors have played greater interventionist roles in national and party politics than governors have done in post-civil war Nigeria. For instance, the governors intervened in 1999 and 2010 to avert situations that could have resulted to constitutional crisis (Yusuf 2010). Specifically, the statesmanship exhibited by the governors in February 2010 following their successful lobbying of the National Assembly to empower Vice President Goodluck Jonathan to work as acting president after President Yar'Adua hastily departed to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment without officially handing over to his Vice, illustrates the position of the governors as major power brokers in Nigeria (Yusuf 2010: 28-29). The PDP governors, in particular, rallied and outwitted other groups within the PDP to engineer the emergence of Vincent Ogbulafor as the party's national chairman in March 2008. Until he received the support of the governors, Ogbulafor's chances in the race were very slim (Agbo 2010: 23). The increased activism of state governors in national politics improved the level of autonomy of state parties, particularly in the areas of self-organisation, selection of candidates and mobilization for state and local government elections. As active political actors with sufficient resources to pursue their political agenda, most state governors are in firm control of political affairs in their state[38]. In so doing, they restrain the national party from intervening in state and local politics while getting strongly involved in national party affairs.

The influence of state governors (and by extension, the state party branches) on party affairs was consolidated during the regime of President Umar Musa Yar'Adua (2007-2010). President Yar'Adua appeared reluctant to play active role in party affairs leaving much leeway to the governors[39] (Mumuni 2007: 20). This is in contrast with the situation during President Obasanjo's tenure (1999-2007) when the President attempted to dominate the PDP. Just to illustrate, soon after President Obasanjo assumed office in May 1999, he tried to side-line other factions in the PDP and to assume supreme authority within the party (Awowede 2000, Ojewale 2001, Mohammed 2008). President Obasanjo's main tactics include

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[38] Nigerian state governors are powerful actors in party politics because they possess a lot of resources that enable them to influence the careers of federal and local politicians. Firstly, governors control access to state and some federal government jobs, some of which they use to reward their loyalists. As party leaders of their respective states, governors make considerable input into who will succeed them as governors, who will enter the state and national legislature, as well as who would run as local government chairperson. In federal appointments, the principle of federal character has over the years dictated the understanding that governors recommend nominees from their states for ministerial, ambassadorial and top federal positions to the president. Governors can trade jobs for support, allowing the national and local party officials to nominate candidates to the jobs in exchange for support to the governors' position - they also control contracts worth huge sums of money. Governors can facilitate the campaigns of their favoured candidates by using the state machine to support their candidacy. If a governor is popular in his state, merely demonstrating a close relationship with the governor may help win the support of the state electorate, therefore ambitious candidates often struggle to get closest to the governors through several channels, including billboards and posters (Yusuf 2010: 29).

[39] This is perhaps due to the fact that he was ill for most of his regime, an illness of which he later died mid-way into his administration.

arm-twisting other leaders of the party to install his cronies as officials and candidates of the party (Ibrahim et al. 2006). There are several reports of how President Obasanjo tried to manipulate candidate selection in the state party branches and to frustrate his opponents using the party machinery (Ajaero, 2007; Agbaebu and Adzegeh, 2007). The highpoint of Obasanjo's high-handedness was in December 2006 when he imposed Umaru Yar'Adua on the party as his successor (Suberu 2007, Adeyemo 2006, Onyekwere 2006). Although the president is probably the most powerful actor in the PDP[40], President Obasanjo's overbearing interference in party affairs led to frequent conflicts between him and many party leaders especially the state governors, this prompted the governors to regularly challenge his actions.

Conclusion

This study examined how political parties organize in federal states and explained the conditions that influence the tendency of parties to integrate or bifurcate based on Nigerian and Swiss experience. It notes that Nigerian and Swiss parties 'mimic' the state structure in their various countries in line with the expectation of many analysts. Nonetheless, the study finds that Swiss parties exhibit a greater degree of integration than many observers expect (Hadley et al. 1989, Ladner 2007). The tendency of Swiss parties to integrate can be seen mostly in the joint effort and functional division of labour that have been established between the national and cantonal party organizations. Swiss parties are organized in such a way that the national party is mostly responsible for formulating the ideological and programmatic positions of the parties, cantonal parties deal with candidate selection and campaign financing, whereas issues such as the election of national party officials and amendment of party statutes are jointly handled by national and cantonal parties. The interdependence that this method of allocation of responsibilities engenders has tended to increase the degree of cross-level integration in the parties.

For the Nigerian parties, what is striking is the degree of mutual penetration of national and state parties in the organizational structure of one another. This study observed high degree of involvement of state parties in national party affairs. Conversely, the national party wields a huge influence on state party organizations. One longstanding feature of party organization in Nigeria that we need to note is that much of the affairs of the Nigerian parties are decided outside the formal organization structure of the parties (Sklar 2004: 442). It is common for the so-called 'party leaders', who are not part of the parties' formal structure, to initiate or participate in meetings where important decisions are reached. As Ibrahim et al. (2004: 7-8) also observed, these unofficial 'party leaders' intervene in the performance of party functions: propaganda, recruitment, finance, nomination of candidates, and settlement of disputes. The activities of these ancillary elements, however, help to blur the national-state divided and to fuse the different levels of party organization.

Finally, the experience of Nigerian and Swiss parties has helped us to flesh out the theoretical assumptions about why parties tend to integrate or bifurcate. The close examination of Nigerian and Swiss parties by this study yielded substantial illustrations and anecdotes that were useful in clarifying the institutional, historical and structural factors that shape a party's inclination to integrate or not. Nigeria's People's Democratic Party (PDP) and Swiss People's Party (SVP) excellently illustrated Angelo Panebianco's 'genetic' model. The two parties equally provided a rich ground for elucidation of institutional and structural explanations of party organization. The analysis of the SVP revealed the tendency of non-integrated parties to begin to integrate once they become more interested in national issues and seek to appeal to the national electorate. Based on the findings of this study, this situation may apply more to the opposition parties, who are more eager to gain visibility among the electorate. The case of the PDP demonstrates the effect of a society's power structure on the way parties organize. It points to the shifts in federal-state power relations and shows how this reflects on the structure of party

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[40] Owing to the vast resources at the president's disposal - the president controls vital resources such as political and bureaucratic appointments, award of contracts and allocation of business licenses, which are highly prized in Nigeria's patronage democracy. The president is also a member of almost all the key decision making organs of the PDP. In fact, in some cases, it is required that the president be consulted before the meeting of certain party organs are summoned (Article 12.70, Constitution of the People's Democratic Party, 2006).

organization. The analysis lays credence to the assumption that the stronger the federal government, for example, the stronger the national party organization.

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