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**MONOCULTURAL ECONOMY A DEVELOPMENT  
AND DEEPENING CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT IN  
NIGERIA, 1960 -1999**

Nnamdi Azikiwe Journal of  
Political Science (NAJOPS).  
2002, Vol. 2(2)  
ISSN:2992-5924  
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**Abstract**

Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has in effect been engaged in the gargantuan enterprise of nation-building expressed in socio-economic security and prosperity, dynamic and stable democratic polity, and sustained national unit and integration. It has not been possible to achieve. It's a well-articulated goal because of the poverty of stable, well-focused, visionary, and responsible leadership and consequently poor economic planning. The political economy has largely remained monocultural and praetorian. The adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme has not helped much in changing the monocultural character of the economy. The paper argues that for Nigeria to overcome her crisis of development; there has to be concerted and sustained efforts at bringing about positive attitudinal changes in both the leadership and the followership and a redefinition of the philosophy "of 'governance. There has to be a vigorous prosecution of behavioral and attitudinal adjustment programs if Nigeria must retreat from the inescapable path to self-destruction, she has found herself at the threshold of the 21st century. The polity must be made impermeable to the military by nurturing a caring, protective, and responsive government.

**INTRODUCTION**

The Nigerian economy which was penetrated and dominated by the British imperialists for several years, was inextricably incorporated into the world capitalist economy with the assigned subservient role of primary commodities producer. The quest for cheap source of labour, congenial investment climate, viable markets for the excess goods produced in Europe, the burning desire to acquire raw materials and the host of others, were the motivating factors for such penetration and domination. The phenomenon of industrial revolution amply characterized by mass production of goods- undoubtedly triggered off the rush for colonies by the dominant European powers.

The overriding objective of the British Imperialists in 'Nigeria was essentially to explore and exploit sources of industrial raw 'materials for the sustained growth off the metropolitan economy. To this end; overwhelming emphasis was placed on agriculture with bias in the production of cash crops like cotton, groundnut,-cocoa, palm oil, etc. to guarantee uninterrupted supply of raw materials to the industries at home, and to encourage the consumption of goods manufactured by the metropolitan industries. This explains the lack of articulate and systematic policy of industrialization which promoted what Claude Ake refers to as "disarticulated and 'incoherent' economy (Ake, 1981:43). In

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other words,-the British imperialists bequeathed to Nigeria at independence, an economy that lacked regional complementarity, reciprocity and linkages. This "Invariably led to the emergence of a monocultural economy with heavy emphasis on agriculture before the tragic shift to the oil sector in the 1970s.

This paper takes a critical look at the shift from the agricultural sector to the oil sector and the multiple adversities generated as a consequence. The paper argues that given the centrality of the agricultural sector to the overall transformation of the Nigerian state at independence, the brazen poverty of economic thought displayed by the leadership has undoubtedly generated some crises of development. The untimely incorporation of the economy into global capitalist framework, and the swerve from agriculture as the mainstay of the economy to the oil sector, combined to render the economy a dependent one. Much more tragic, however, was the gross incompetence of the leadership to use the financial; resources generated through the sale of oil to mitigate the multiple structural distortions in the economy. The sudden collapse of the world oil market in the '80's has brought into sharp focus, the desirability of policy of diversification. Thus, the adoption and implementation of the policy of Structural Adjustment Programme aimed at redressing some of the obvious structural distortions in the economy has hardly achieved much of its objectives given the character of leadership in Nigeria. The paper also argues that the growing erosion of the concept of government in Nigeria is more a manifestation of the crises of development induced by badly managed monocultural economy which has made the policy of Structural Adjustment Programme unavoidable even though it was widely and vehemently opposed. The persistent neglect of other crucial sector of the economy and the growing corrupt practices of government officials have rendered the economy so impotent that it has ceased to be responsive to the crisis of development. Little wonder that any policy statement on oil subsidy removal generates a hostile reaction from the public. The paper takes a look at the post colonial economy and the crisis of development as the first section. The second section focuses on the military and crisis of development in Nigeria. Section three examines some unwholesome developments generated by the policy of SAP in the economy. The final section concludes the paper by way of prescriptions.

## **THE POST COLONIAL NIGERIAN ECONOMY AND THE CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT**

To appreciate the extent to which Nigeria's dependence on the oil sector has generated some boomerang effects, we must come to grips with the dynamics of the post colonial Nigerian economy. Having stated the fact that the economy from the colonial to the post-colonial period was consciously shaped and structured to serve external interests particularly British interest. The British groomed elite who succeeded the colonialists, and hardly tinkered with the system bequeathed to them at independence. This uncritical acceptance of the philosophical foundation, and the nature and character of the Nigerian state could not but stagnate development.

The obvious fact that capitalism became only relevant to the British economy after it had attained a particular level of development of its productive forces could have rejuvenated the dormant sense of rational thinking of the leadership at independence in 1960. However, this inadequacy of the leadership, amply demonstrated by the uncritical acceptance of capitalist strategy of development, inevitably, led to the emergence of a dependent capitalist economy in Nigeria.

It is worth appreciating the fact that a predominantly agrarian economy without a modicum of industrial support only fosters a disarticulated and structurally incoherent economy that can hardly survive the periodic capitalist crisis. The agricultural sector which was the mainstay of the economy until the oil sector gained prominence in the 70s, did not receive substantial boost as peasant farmers were neglected in the country-side. There was no concerted and sustained efforts by the post-colonial Nigerian leadership to boost agricultural activities because of the intense acrimony and antagonism that characterized the country's pattern of political interaction. Considerable quantum of resources were committed to strengthening regional dominance thereby undermining the national resolve to lay solid foundation for genuine socio-economic development. Yet there is a dormant economic infrastructure based on the mutual inter zonal/regional dependence for such development. For instance, if the livestock production in the far northern zone, foodstuff production in the central zone and the exploitation of forest products in the southern zone were stepped up to complement the oil sector, the crisis of the economy would have been less pronounced as it is currently. This regionalist proclivities of the post independence politicians derived essentially in part, from the uneven pattern of development that was promoted by the British colonialists. The British economic interest dictated that only those areas with considerable agricultural and commercial potentials should be developed thereby deepening the agony of the less resourceful ones. For instance, only those areas copiously endowed with the desirable raw materials were linked by rail to facilitate shipment to Europe.

However, the uncritical acceptance of the capitalise strategy of development bequeathed to Nigeria by the withdrawing colonialists promoted what is commonly referred to in the literature as "dependent capitalist". While the Multinational Corporations were busy extracting agricultural and mineral resources in the country, some commercial minded Nigerians were enthusiastically marketing manufactured goods imported into the economy by some of these foreign concerns. Indeed, so patently exploitative were some multinational corporations that most people perceived the British firms which pioneered Nigeria's colonization as largely 'trading concerns which were primarily interested in collecting whatever Nigeria had and shipped them overseas, and importing consumer manufactured goods from Britain for sales in Nigeria". (Amechi 1987:80). The lack of sustained determination by the British to lay solid foundation for the industrialization of the Nigerian economy rendered it heavily import dependent at independence.

The quest for economic development in the country, however, led to the adoption of import substitution industrialization strategy by the government of late Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. It was thought that this strategy would save enough foreign exchange when foreign concerns were encouraged to manufacture those essential items locally. One very glaring inadequacy of this strategy as conceived by the government of late Abubakar, was the inevitable dependence of such manufacturing concerns on foreign inputs if they must sustain production at optimal level. Morose, the prevailing social and political atmosphere then was hardly congenial enough to encourage such local production concerns.

It is, however, worth noting the fact that the discovery of oil in commercial quantity in the 50s brought into sharp focus, the origin and dynamics of the contemporary Nigerian economic crisis. The oil boom of the 1970s under military government of General Yakubu Gowon abruptly swerved the economy from a productive one to a consumptive one largely characterised by the progressive neglect of the agricultural sector in favour of the oil sector due, in large part, to the enormous foreign exchanged derived from the sector. As Ernest Shonekan observes:

*Nigeria's economy was largely agrarian at independence with the sector generating the bulk of employment, foreign exchange earnings and government revenues. The situation however changed dramatically in the 1970s following the boom in the world petroleum market. Since then, the economy has largely remained monocultural since the 70s (Ernest; 1997:pp 2-3).*

Thus, the agricultural sector kept stagnating instead of being modernized to complement the oil sector in foreign exchange earnings. However, with the emergence of oil as the chief revenue earner, the country started experiencing a distorted transition from an economy traditionally based on agriculture to one precariously on petroleum (Newswatch 1993:44). The immediate and practical effect of this abrupt and tragic shift was the "unprecedented mass exodus of people from rural formations, traditionally noted for agrarian activities, to urban- areas in search of jobs thereby leaving behind aged population that cannot effectively cope with the arduous task of primary production activities" (Olayide (ed) 1976:21).

This development had obvious negative implication for the economy as it brought about the sharp distortion in the economy because agriculture, until 1973, provided employment for over three-quarters of the Nigerian population, with the oil sector having only 6,000 workers (Newswatch, 1993:44). The consequence of this gross structural distortion in the economy was the inevitable shift from being a leading exporter to a net importer of food. The country's food bill amounted to N1.106 million in 1979. This figure rose to N463 million (Imobighe 1986:59). The enormity of the resources committed to importation of food to feed the teeming population in a dependent capitalist formation was clearly suggestive of the imminent crisis the economy was soon to slip into.

However, because of the heavy dependence of the economy on a single commodity for foreign exchange, the instability of the world capitalist market rendered the oil commodity sharply sensitive to such vagaries. The progressive decline in the oil revenues from \$22.4 billion in 1980 to \$16.7 billion in 1981, \$12.8 billion and \$10 billion in 1983 (Bangura, 1989:177) demonstrated clearly the vulnerability and sensitivity of the economy to changes in the world market. With this sharp decline in the price of oil, importation of essential goods could hardly be sustained because of the growing inability to pay for such imports. This unwholesome development, coupled with the brazen poverty of culture of prudent spending by government officials in particular, made it increasingly difficult for the Nigerian state to meet the basic essentials of her citizenry within the available means. Monumental corrupt practices through over invoicing of imports, kickbacks from contracts, outright lootings of public treasury and above all the ravenously exploitative activities of the Multinational Corporations, accentuated the scope and magnitude of the looming crisis that was to besiege the Nigerian economy.

Indeed, one concurs with Patrick Heinecke on the point that "the ruthless determination to get one's own way by any means and the insatiable obsession with material accumulation are the virtues of capitalism and they are also the sources of corruption in Nigeria" (Patrick, 1986:56). Thus, the period under Alhaji Shehu Shagari was largely characterised by rising inflation, hunger, prostitution, high crime rates, food insecurity, mounting foreign debts, mass unemployment etc. (Julius: 1991:78). All these problems had reached alarming proportion, thereby posing credible threat to systematic stability and efficacy. Faced with these daunting socio-economic and political problems. Alhaji Shagari had to resort to external borrowing which eventually catapulted the volume of Nigeria's external debt. Indeed,

the debilitating socio-economic conditions of the Nigerian citizenry in the Second Republic were poignantly captured by Sanni Abacha when the military struck in the wake of 1984.

*Our economy has been hopelessly mismanaged. We have become a debtor and beggar nation. There is inadequacy of food at reasonable prices for our people who are fed up with endless announcement of importation of foodstuffs. Health services are in shambles as our hospitals are reduced to mere consulting clinics, 'without drugs, wafer, and equipment. Our educational system is deteriorating at an alarming rate, unemployment figures including graduates have reached an embarrassing proportion. In some states, workers are owed salaries arrears of eight to twelve months (Coup broadcast by Sanni Abacha in 1983).*

Though one could refer to the above quoted speech as legitimacy seeking that is characteristic of military coup, it captures correctly the prevailing grim realities of the time. The table below depicts vividly the level of Nigeria's external indebtedness that characterized the Second Republic and beyond.

Table 1.0 Nigeria's External Debt burden 1980-1995 (\$billion)

<b>Year</b>	<b>Amount</b>
1980	4.28
1981	6.36
1982	9.11
1983	12.18
1984	11.39
1985	11.39
1986	19.16
1987	26.46
1988	29.06
1989	30.19
1990	32.39
1991	33.54

1992	24.54
1993	28.72
1994	29.43
1995	32.58

Source: World Bank Report CNB Statistical Bulletin, June, 1995.

The steady rise in the debt figure as reflected in the table demonstrated the desperate bid to meet the basic needs of the ordinary Nigerian citizen. Though the country had been borrowing externally since the 1960s to meet some of its domestic needs, it however took a dramatic turn with the sharp fall in the price of oil resulting from oil glut in the world market. For instance, within four years of Shagari's administration, "Nigeria borrowed \$21 billion dollars (Zuwaghu, 1986:168). Under this debilitating debt burden, the goal of development became very elusive as agonising poverty was widespread. This necessarily rendered workers purchasing power weak and the consequent decline in national productivity. The persistence of problems of mounting debt burden, growing rate of unemployment, declining living standard, mass hunger and poverty, balance of payment deficit etc. compelled the government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari to adopt, in April 1982; the ineffective 'austerity measures' through the economic stabilization (Temporary provisions) Act. This Act sought to reduce government expenditure and curtail imports through massive imposition of import duties on goods brought from outside.

In spite of the implementation of this Act, the crises persisted until they assumed the scope and intensity that the military had to strike, thereby truncating the life-span of a corrupt and managerially bankrupt regime in Nigeria.

### **The military factor and crisis of development in Nigeria in the 90s**

When the military displaced and sup-planted the government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari on the 31st December, 1983, a great deal of hopes were generated particularly among workers who believed that government under General Mohammadu Buhari, in accordance with military tradition, was going to turn things for the better. However, faced with the enormity of crises it inherited from the ousted civilian regime, the Buhari regime adopted a two pronged approach to them. The first was political and was essentially to intimidate and silence those perceived as hostile and antagonistic to the policies of the new regime.

Draconian decrees such as the notorious security decree No. 2 were churned out to clamp down massively on trade unions and other interest groups. The swift and ruthless application of this decree bred a general atmosphere of fear and insecurity in the country. Paradoxically, this measure rather than mitigating the intensity of sustained opposition to the policies of the regime, did heighten the wave of general antagonism in the country. The adoption and implementation of the policy of War Against Indiscipline (WAI) by the regime which was intended to sanitize the muddled system was widely perceived as anti-people into the culture of moral rectitude and orderly behaviour, the aggressiveness with which it was prosecuted could not but generate ill-feelings among the populace thereby stripping it of popular sentiments.

The second approach which was economic, was largely characterized by dogged commitment of the regime to structural adjustment measures and thus, introduced some monetarist measures like aggressive repayment of external debts; mass retrenchment of able-bodied workers; substantial cut in budgetary allocation to ministries and parastatals, complete embargo on employment, massive wage and salary cuts, appreciable reduction in government expenditure, massive devaluation of the naira and extensive trade liberalization among others (Julius, 1991:78). The inflexible disposition of the regime to the political and economic measures aimed at resolving the crises, accentuated the plight of the masses who felt frustrated and alienated from the government because of the introduction of new taxes, levies, fees among others, thereby overburdening them. It is worth noting that a government that generates intense feeling of alienation and frustration among its citizens can hardly enjoy their support and cooperation. This perhaps, provided the immediate context for a counter coup on the 27th of August, 1983 which eventually installed General Ibrahim Babangida as the Head of State and Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The immediate challenges before the military government of president Babangida was the persistent economic crisis which seemed to have defied practical solution. Realizing the widespread resentment of the stringent policies pursued by Buhari/Idiagbon regime, Babangida thought it wise to deviate a little from the typical military tradition in order to avoid the social disabilities that characterized his predecessor. The regime initially adopted a democratic approach to finding lasting solutions to the multiple socio-economic and political problems. For instance, the regime created diversion through debates on such national issues as the IMF loan and the political future of the country. General Babangida immediately re-pealed the odious Decree Number 4, vowing "we do not intend to lead a country where individuals are under the fear of expressing themselves" (West Africa, 1995: 1791 - 1793). Detained Second Republic politicians were freed and journalists in detention were restored their freedom. However, as usual, such a false democratic disposition towards national issues was more of a strategy to mobilize support and loyalty for the purposes of power consolidation rather than genuine search for viable and productive ideas towards resolving the looming crises.

As one would expect, after having sufficiently consolidated itself in power with substantial aura of legitimacy, the regime in a dramatic turn and to the chagrin of most Nigerians, became unbelievably antagonistic to the very ideal it professed initially. The regime with dogged determination and rapidity hitherto unthought of articulated its economic policies which were largely predicated on the monetarist framework. The economic policy framework was the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) adopted on the 27th of June, 1986 which was emphatically and overwhelming opposed by the people in the course of the IMF loan debate. This IMF-inspired SAP, which was masqueraded as Nigeria's designed policy response to the economic crisis, was initially meant to last for two years (July 1st 1986 - June 30th, 1988). Indeed, it was another conscious attempt by the regime to allay the widespread fear associated with the perceived excruciating impact of the policy on the generality of the populace.

The policy of SAP was meant to address certain perennial problems of the Nigerian economy such as excessive dependence on oil, chronic lack of self-reliant growth and development, persistent balance of payment disequilibrium, growing budget deficits, growing decline in productivity, persistent inflationary trend, etc. (Gini., 1992:26). The policy of SAP was said to be crucial because of the general perception that the Nigerian state was heavily loaded and this had tended to undermine the efficacy of the state in playing development roles. Instead of relieving the state of the heavy burden imposed on

her, the policy of SAP has made Nigeria to grapple with the task of how to avert running into a state of inertia due to growing demands made upon it by the populace. People have hardly appreciated the policy of SAP as a corrective measure but more .as a sharp and damaging aberration from the tradition of a caring and protective state. Wide consensus seems to be crystalizing behind the view, that:

*rebuilding the health and strength of the Nigerian economy must begin with diversifying sources of foreign exchange earnings by paying overwhelming attention to agricultural production (Akindele, 1993 p. 30)*

The Nigerian state under the military has hardly demonstrated enough sustained efforts to rebuild the moral values of the society without which economic recovery would be almost impossible. It is believed by many observers of the Nigerian political economy that if the proceeds realized through the commercialization and privatization policies were frugally and prudently managed, the magnitude of our crisis would not have assumed this consuming proportion.

The brazen display of corrupt proclivities by government officials is derived essentially from the fact that moral values have been eroded in Nigeria under military. This cankerworm had reached it's pinnacle under the bankrupt leadership of the former President Babangida who institutionalised corruption as a virtue in the society when he needed desperately to sustain himself in power in the face of widespread resentment. Instead of strengthening the values of honesty, transparency, integrity and frugality in management of the affairs of the state, the General was actively undermining these values which' perhaps would have bolstered up the legitimacy of the regime and his popularity. Given the profound crisis the economy was engulfed in, it could not but prove unresponsive to the growing needs and aspirations of the citizenry and this had considerable potentials for eroding the sense of patriotism and loyalty of the populace to the system.

The United Nations Development (UNDP) Human Development Report on Nigeria articulates the point that:

*a consensus has been achieved for sustainable human development, the imperative of political stability, peace, national cohesion and unity based on shared value such as respect for personal and community rights, justice, fair play and equity, transparency and accountability, and a high degree of public morality and sound ethical code in governance (UNDP: 1997:23).*

This view reinforces the popular perception that public administration is no more responsive to public interest but rather private interest. This has made the state a monster that attracts only those who control it. This very point is well captured by Claude Ake when he observed:

*The state has not become a reassuring presence but remains a formidable threat to everybody except those who control it. It is largely regarded as a hostile force to be evaded, defeated, appropriated as circumstances permit. Most people have turned away from the state to seek safety and fulfilment in their community, ethnic group or nation (Ake, 1994:7).*

The Nigerian state under the prolonged domination of the military has suffered some severe setbacks. Politically, it is unstable, economically, it is steadily and progressively slipping into a developmental



inertia and socially, it is becoming increasingly polarized and incohesive. All these unwholesome developments though had manifested themselves much earlier than the 90s, became much more pronounced both in intensity and scope following the annulment of the 1993 June 12th presidential election widely adjudged the freest and fairest ever in the history of elections in Nigeria. This unpopular decision of the then president General Babangida generated deep resentment and bitter feelings amongst Nigerians with considerable democratic bent. Following his exit on the 27th of August, 1993, an Interim National Government was hurriedly put in place to carry on with the task of governance. The ING under the Chairmanship of Chief Ernest Shonekan who before then was the Chairman of Transitional Council, faced a very formidable and sustained opposition particularly in the South Western part of Nigeria. The growing hostility of the environment within which the ING was to operate, made it monumentally difficult for it to register itself as government in the true sense of it. It was against this background that General Sani Abacha considered it a supreme responsibility to halt the nation from degenerating into a state of anarchy and possible disintegration. Chief Shonekan and his team were however, relieved from the mental and physical agony of having to contend with the challenges before them when on the 17th November, 1993, Abacha took over following the most peaceful coup ever in Nigeria.

Although the initial challenges were overwhelming, Shonekan policy pronouncement with respect to oil subsidy removal set the ING severely at odds with even those who had sympathy for the regime initially. There was swift and spontaneous violent reactions across the length and breadth of Nigeria against the 600 per cent increase in the heavily subsidized fuel prices. The Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) mobilized its rank and file to launch the most paralyzing general strike against the regime's policy. Indeed, it was a political naivety on the part of Shonekan to display such rare courage as if he were a military leader. Oil issues has become so sensitive that any pronouncement on it must be cautious and carefully crafted unless under a military dispensation.

When Abacha took over, it was the same substantial subsidy reduction decision he took. Although it was not without opposition, Nigerians came to accept the prices adjustment coldly following governmental palliatory offer of increase in workers' housing and transport allowances. However, little did the populace know that what was offered to them as relief package was nothing more than palliative to enable government to implement its decision. A Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund (PTF) was also put in place to reinforce the confidence of people in government in respect of its sincerity of purpose. The alarming rate of inflation in the economy had rendered workers' purchasing power unbelievably weak. The table below shows inflationary trend in the Nigerian economy from 1980 to 1996.

**Table 2: Nigeria's Inflation Rate**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Rate of inflation in %</b>
1980	9.9
1981	20.9
1982	7.7
1983	23.2
1984	39.6
1985	5.5
1986	5.6
1987	10.2
1988	38.3

1990	7.5
1991	13.0
1992	44.5
1993	57.2
1994	57.0
1995	72.6
1996	28.0

**Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 6 No. 1, June 1995 (1990-92) FOS, 1995 July 1995 (1993-95), Budget Speech 1997 (1996).**

As can be seen on the above table depicting the inflationary rate in the economy, the most excruciating period for Nigerians was from 1992 to 1995. Among other reasons that account for this phenomenal rise in the inflationary rate instability that was and is still characterizing the polity following the June 12th Presidential annulment, frequent adjustment in the pump price of fuel, gross indiscipline in the application of resources to bring about appreciable growth in the real sector. Indeed, all these have combined to make life almost meaningless for most Nigerians. The UNDP Human Development Report on Nigeria captures accurately the feelings of most Nigerians when it states that:

*majority of Nigeria are at present worse off than they were at independence in 1960. Factors responsible for this includes total managerial incompetence, repeated failure to translate policies into projects and implement them fully, bribery and fraud both by the military and civilian ruling class (UNDP, 1992:8).*

All the above now translated into crisis of governance expressed in the growing unresponsiveness of the government to the demands of the people. This development has set the people severely at odds with the government. In spite of the acute scarcity of resources at the disposal of government, corruption is assuming a scale that threatens the viability and survival of the state generally. It is not therefore surprising that legitimacy of the state is being contested by civil society based organisations such as the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), Campaign For Democracy (CD). Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), just to mention a few. This is just but a reflection of the extent of people's discontent with the performance of government. The perennial fuel crisis that has become an enduring characteristic of Nigeria in the 90s has not only caused extreme material deprivation because of the crippling inflationary consequence of it but more significantly has cast a monumental cloud of doubts upon the relevance and efficacy of the state.

### **Concluding Remarks**

The responsive and distributive capabilities of any system are the two critical ingredients that determine the efficacy and viability of that system. In the 70s, Nigeria could boast of pursuing vibrant and assertive foreign policy goals simply because of the buoyant and redoubtable character of the economy (Courtesy of oil boom) but the same can hardly be said of the nation's foreign policy today. There was a sharp deviation from this dynamic and assertive posture in foreign policy management under Shagari which was an obvious reflection of the growing incapability of the economy to sustain such a tradition. The Nigerian state in the oil boom era was widely perceived as a caring and protective agency which commanded the support and loyalty of all.

However, as the harsh realities started unfolding, it became necessary to tinker with the structure of the economy with a view to adopting a policy that would encourage diversification in order to restore its resilient character that was the hallmark in the boom days. The adoption and implementation of the policy of SAP towards this end had generated a deep crisis of governance owing to the neglect of a

crucially vital counterpart of SAP which is the moral values reconstruction. It is a widely shared perception that whatever might be the gains of SAP, the positive impact is hardly felt by Nigerians. It has rather exposed Nigerians to crippling and agonizing economic hardship. The most disturbing aspect of this unintended negative consequence of SAP is that it is only those outside the system and have no organic link with the system actors that have fallen victims. Little wonder therefore that an overtly anti-people policy like SAP can only be thought of in a praetorian political order. A lot of analysts share the conviction that no civilian regime would have been bold enough to even propose this measure, let alone to implement it.

It is our considered opinion that rebuilding a virile, dynamic, egalitarian and robustly united Nigeria must of necessity, entail institutional capacity building by way of restoring values that tend to strengthen the operation of our institutions. In this wise, ethics like honesty, accountability, transparency, integrity, committal to social justice, fairness, equity and mutual respect can, if well put in place, restore lost confidence and hope as they facilitate the task of genuine mobilization for national development.

The military factor must be seriously addressed if Nigeria must move forward. Given the overwhelming indicators against the military incompetence in the art of governance, one would tend to believe that they have lost relevance because they no longer show a modicum of credibility and honour in the face of Nigerians. The nation's military have become predators in a system that they have been trained to protect and defend against both internal and external subversive tendencies. The uphill task before Nigeria now is to rehabilitate the military in a way that any attempt to strike back would hardly be successful.

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