



Article

Nigeria and The Management of Sub-Regional Conflicts: The Case of Liberian and Sierra-Leonean Crisis

Nnamdi Azikiwe Journal of
Political Science (NAJOPS).
2002, Vol. 2(2)
ISSN:2992-5924
©NAJOPS 2002
Reprints and permissions:
www.najops.org.ng

N.J NWOSU

Introduction

The colonization of Africa and several third-world states ensured that people of diverse cultures were brought together under one country. Due to the mission of colonialism, most of these people were not well integrated into the new states. Instead, some of the imperial powers played on the cultural divergence of these groups to ensure the maximization of their objectives. It is thus, not surprising that years after colonialism, these states remain lowly integrated. This low level of integration has precipitated crisis in many of these countries. Africa has witnessed many of these. Some of these have resulted into wars, political and economic instability as well as social disequilibrium. The resultant consequence is political and economic underdevelopment.

It is following from these, that the United Nations (UN) resolved that international peace and security should constitute one of its primary objectives. This objective has been pursued tenaciously by the UN through its pursuance of international peace and security through persuasion, reconciliation and arbitration of disputing states. It has also resolved conflicts through several peace keeping operations, (Eze, 1996:3; Sangotade, 1996:2-3; Garuba, 1997). Nigeria participated in several of these peace-keeping operations.

Aside from the UN, regional and subregional institutions have also through the instrument of peace keeping attempted to ensure peace in their regions. These include the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) peace keeping initiative in Chad in late 1970 and early 1980 and the Economic of West African States (ECOWAS) peace process in Liberia and Sierra-Leone. Nigeria participated actively in these peace-keeping operations.

The purpose of this paper is to examine Nigeria's effort at resolving sub-regional conflicts. Attempt is made to draw out reasons why Nigeria has endeavoured to maintain peace in the West Africa sub-region. In doing this, particular emphasis shall be given to the resolution of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts.

Analytical and Historical Background

The personality of Nigerian leaders appears to have played an important role in the foreign policy decision-making process of the country, political leaders, one way or the other, have allowed their

Corresponding Author:

N.J NWOSU. Email: po.oguejiofor@unizik.edu.ng

personality characteristics to influence policy. This is true of Balewa and the subsequent government's that followed. The personality factor in Balewa's foreign policy was captured by Fredrick Schwarz (1965:233) when he opined that:

The Prime Minister's personality and philosophy have had a profound influence upon the tone of Nigeria's foreign policy. He is a calm and moderate man with a knack for compromise. His expressed aversion to even an African bloc, in the sense of a group automatically voting together at, say, the United Nations, is illustrative of his belief that issues should be judged on their merits on a case by case basis.

Other scholars who wrote on the first republic have also indicated the importance of Balewa's personality in understanding the country's foreign policy (Idang, 1976, 52-55; Ogwu, 1986:52-53).

The same personality factor could be used to interpret General Yakubu Gowon's position on several external issues. It was due to Gowon's belief that for peace to endure in Africa, there was a need to work within the umbrella of OAU that his regime decided to break diplomatic relations with Israel in 1973 following the OAU directive. (Nweke, 1980:228-231; Aluko, 1981:82). The same regional institution also decided the regime's position on the Angolan independence conflict. A change in Nigeria's Angola policy became inevitable following the overthrow of the Gowon administration and the take over of government by General Murtala Muhammed. As has been stated by Obafemi Awolowo, Muhammed has the 'personal qualities of toughness, imperturbability and swiftness' which do not allow gerrymandering in decision-making (Sunday Times, 22 February, 1976). As a member of the Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA) together with his deputy, General Olusegun Obasanjo prior to coming to power, he appeared to understand the intricacies of external relations much more than his predecessors. His regime, therefore, did what was perhaps improbable when against the United States and the OAU position it recognised the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) as the sole legitimate government of Angola in November 1975.

The Babangida regime in its several foreign policy forays showed a distinguishing characteristic of the personality of the President. These were noticeable in Nigeria's stand over many African and extra-African issues, especially in the country's attempt to assert itself as a regional power. This was in spite of the recessed economic condition of the country. In fact, Babangida's distinct personality trait in both his government's foreign and domestic policies earned him the tag of 'Maradona'. The perception of several Nigerians was that Babangida had many jokers which made his government's policies often unpredictable. These distinct personality characteristics was also evident in Abacha regime's foreign policy.

There has also been a marked presence of the influence of intellectuals in Nigeria's foreign policy. Two particular regimes have extensively employed this group in their decision-making process. These were the Muhammed/Obasanjo and the Babangida administrations. According to Joe Garba (1978), the Minister of External Affairs under the former's government:

... since the attainment of Nigeria's independence in 1960, no administration, civilian or military, has taken as much pains as this present administration, to take into full consideration, the temper of Nigeria's domestic opinion ... Indeed, I can say without any fear of contradiction that no government has done as much as this government in involving

various categories of individuals and institutions in its policy decision-making whether domestic policies or foreign policies.

The idea of involving intellectuals in Nigeria's foreign policy seems to have continued under the Babangida administration. This could be seen from the choice of Bolaji Akinyemi as the Minister of External Affairs by the regime immediately on coming to power in 1985. Even when Akinyemi was dropped, the President still surrounded himself with many intellectuals. What this indicated was a certain level of introduction of theory into the practice of the country's foreign policy. It was, therefore, not a surprise that in recognition of the role of intellectuals in foreign policy process, the regime in April 1986 organised the All Nigerian Conference on foreign policy. This was meant to give each participant an opportunity to make an input into the way that the country's foreign policy would be conducted (Akinyemi, 1986:5).

Another important variable in understanding Nigeria's foreign policy is the constitutional and legal framework established for its operation. This becomes most crucial under a civilian government. The civilian administrations usually work under greater handicaps than their military counterparts. First, civilian governments are democratic and thus subject to a lot of pressures both within and outside the government. Second, there is a constitutional limitation which required the executive arm of government to consult the legislature on several foreign policy matters.

There are also external factors which propel different Nigerian governments to act in a manner akin to the perception of each administration. For instance, many Nigerian governments seem to see Libya as a threat to the country's effort to attain the status of a regional power. Hence, they try to undercut perceived Libyan influence within the African region. It was not for nothing that Bolaji Akinyemi, the Nigerian Minister of External Affairs reacted the way he did when United States bombed Libya in 1986. According to Akinyemi (1986:6):

...there is no disputing the fact that we have responsibilities to Africa. There should also be no disputing the fact that Africa has responsibility to stand up for and respond to Africa, we are owed an obligation to be consulted when the situation allows for consultation and a lot of situations allow for consultation.

Other perceived external threats to Nigeria's strive for the status of a regional power are the constant France meddling in African affairs as well as the United States attempt to get some African states as satellites. These form essentially the central thrust for the analysis of Nigeria's management of sub-regional conflict.

Background to the Liberian crisis

The coming to power of Samuel Doe on 12 April, 1980 marked a new beginning in Liberia's political development. It marked a break in the political domination of the country by the Americo-Liberians (Okolo, 1981:149) and for the first time, gave the indigenous Liberians who constitute more than ninety percent of the population an opportunity to participate in the governance of their nation. This occurrence coupled with some other reasons which included economic poverty, made the people accord legitimacy to the Doe coup that ousted the Tolbert administration. And Doe in his first broadcast as the Liberian President emphasised the expected new lease of life when he stated:

Our dear Liberian people, let us assure you that this new government is in the interest of all our people ... the government shall undertake to bring about equal economic and social opportunities for all (Givens, 1986:18).

This promise of a new lease of life for the majority of the Liberian people played a crucial role in winning support for Doe and his government. However, Doe's regime could not fulfil its promises to the Liberian population. Subsequent events after the initial euphoria demonstrated in large measure that nothing positive was about to happen. The suffering experienced by Liberians under Tolbert regime persisted as the economy did not show any sign of improvement (Osaghae, 1990:20). What was observed was increased corruption by government officials (James, 1986a:49).

Besides, many of those who alleged the government's persecution of its opponents had pointed to ethnic chauvinism as one of Doe's driving spirits. Many of the political elite saw the Doe's regime's action as attempts to impose domination by the Krahn on the other ethnic groups (Osaghae, 1990:5). With this perception of the regime as principally representing the interest of the Krahn ethnic group, the initial support enjoyed by Doe's government flagged; many indigenous Liberians felt betrayed.

However, the major catalyst to inter-ethnic problems in Liberia was the abortive attempt by Thomas Quiwonkpa to overthrow the Doe government in 1983. Quiwonkpa was one of the leaders of the 12 April, 1980 coup d'etat that brought Doe to power. His attempt at toppling Doe's administration was due to his belief that the regime had betrayed the ideals that inspired the overthrow of the Tolbert government. Quiwonkpa was to strike again, 1985 in another attempt to remove Doe from power. Again, the attempt failed and led to his execution by the government. The killing of Quiwonkpa and some of his men gave a strong basis for the other members of the Liberian elite to mobilise opposition against Doe's administration. Their clarion call was that the regime was incompetent and tribalistic.

The skepticism which followed the 1985 election to return Liberia to democratic civilian rule did not help the tense situation. The manner in which the government conducted the exercise left a lot of room for doubts by the country's political elite. First, Doe indicated his intention to contest the election as a civilian president, and he did go ahead to vie and win the election. Second, stringent conditions were imposed on the recognition of political parties - a condition perceived by many as a subtle way by the government to discourage the formation of opposition parties. The third factor was the incarceration of Liberian opposition leaders. They were only released in September after each paid a \$1,000 penaln (James, 1986:32). Finally, the way in which the Electoral Commission (SECOM) went about its job encouraged speculation on the sincerity of the Doe regime to organise a free and fair election. There were persistent allegations that the Commission's activities such as the announcement that the ballots would be recounted by a special body, a procedure not provided for in the electoral regulation, did create doubts about its impartiality.

With this atmosphere generated before the election, it was evident that the result would be seriously disputed especially if Doe was declared elected. And he did win. According to SECOM, Doe scored 50.9 per cent to emerge victorious (James, 1986a:48). As expected, many of the Liberian opposition political parties did not accept the result. They claimed that the election was rigged in favour of Doe (James, 1986a:48).

The hostile domestic environment created a conducive atmosphere for insurrection., and this came from diverse quarters. Doe was able to control most of them. However, one proved intractable. That one began in December 1989 and it was led by Charles Taylor.

Nigeria, ECOWAS and the Liberian Crisis

The political crisis in Liberia following the invasion of that country by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) rebel forces in December 1989 incited Nigeria's active interest in resolving continental problems. The NPFL invasion was primarily aimed at toppling the government of Samuel Doe and installing Charles Taylor as President. Following a prolonged military warfare between the NPFL and troops loyal to Doe over who controls the presidential mansion in Monrovia and the attendant suffering this was brought on Liberian residents, Nigeria and some ECOWAS member-countries decided to intervene and stop the conflict. The reason for the failure of the NPFL to capture the Presidential Palace could be traced to the crisis within the organisation which led to the formation of a break-away faction named Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) under Yormie Johnson, a former confidant of Taylor.

It was under this stare of attrition that the Nigerian government, in collaboration with some other member-states of ECOWAS, initiated a peace process for Liberia, the aim being to alleviate the sufferings of foreigners trapped in Liberia as well as to save the country from itself. The process began with the Banjul, Gambia meeting in July 1990. The result of that summit was the formation of a West African Peace Monitoring Force (ECOMOG) and the setting up of an interim government with Amos Sawyer as President. ECOMOG's mandate was:

- i. to intervene in the fighting between the Liberian forces;
- ii. to separate the belligerents and cause a cease fire to be established;
- iii. to restore law and order in the country;
- iv. to create an interim government which would conduct elections within six months; v. to evacuate nationals of ECOWAS countries trapped in Liberia. (The Guardian, 21 September, 1990:10).

To achieve these objectives, Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Guinea contributed troops to form the ECOMOG. The set-up was that states should take care of the need of their soldiers. Nigeria's contribution in both men and materials constituted more than half of the 7,000 troops that made up the ECOMOG. Again, apart from Ghana which nominated Lt. General Arnold Quainoo as the Commander of the Peace Keeping Force and Guinea which provided the deputy commander, Nigeria virtually had her men heading other strategic posts. Lt. General Quainoo was later replaced by Lt. General Dogonyaro of Nigeria. Lt. General Dogonyaro was the man who on 27 August, 1985 announced the overthrow of the Buhari administration and the coming to power of the Babangida government.

The coming of Dogonyaro as ECOMOG commander changed the tempo of the peace-keeping operation. This was not only through military actions. It also adopted persuasion as a strategy. A veritable method of persuasion which was used by the ECOMOG was the distribution of leaflets calling on Liberians to stop the blood bath (The Guardian, 2 October, 1990:7). Also, members of the ECOWAS mediation committee arranged other conferences besides the Banjul instance to resolve the Liberian conflict. These include the ones in Bamako, Mali (November, 1990), Lome. Togo (February 1991), the All Liberian

Peace Conference in Monrovia (March 1991) and the Yamoussoukro, Cote D'Ivoire (July 1991);. These conferences succeeded in narrowing the differences between the factions involved in the Liberian conflict. It is on record that the Bamako summit succeeded in getting the three main warring factions to sign a cease fire accord to stop further bloodshed. However, due to the refusal of the disputants to respect the agreement, a third conference was convened between 12 - 12 February, 1991 in Lome, Togo. After two days of intense negotiations a document detailing agreements reached was signed by the leaders of the three main warring factions. The highlights of the signed document were:

- i. no leader of a warring faction should head the future interim government;
- ii. whoever heads the interim government should not be eligible to contest the ensuing presidential and general elections;
- iii. confinement of the troops of the warring factions to the positions to be determined by the ECOMOG in consultation with them;
- iv. upon the formation of an interim government, appropriate action should be taken to disarm the troops of the warring parties.

(The Guardian, 9 February, 1991:9). This summit could be considered as a step forward in the attempt by ECOWAS to solve the Liberian conflict. Both Taylor and Johnson attended it: so too, the President of Burkina Faso. Blaise Campaore and the Prime Minister of Cote d'Ivoire, Allasane Qualtara and two principal West African supporters of Taylor. For the first time since the conflict, they subscribed to the need for ECOMOG in Liberia (Sunday Times, 17 February, 1991:10). Indeed, it was following this summit that Mali sent some of her soldiers to join the ECOMOG (National Concord, 14 February, 1991:1).

Another success registered by the Lome meeting was that it provided the necessary impetus for the All Liberian Peace Conference in Monrovia. This conference began on 15 March, 1991. Exactly, a month after the commencement of the conference, a broad consensus on the structure of an interim government was apparently reached, viz: that there should be a President who should come from outside the warring factions. Below the President, there should be two Vice Presidents one from the NPFL and the INPFL. None of these two Vice Presidents would succeed the President, in the event of his death. This clause was necessitated by the fear that one of the warring factions may decide to eliminate the President so that its candidate will ascend the office. The resolutions of this conference and subsequent ones together with the Peace keeping operation of Nigeria led ECOMOG resulted finally in the resolution of the Liberian conflict.

Nigeria's commitment to the resolution of the Liberian conflict resulted in the death of several of her citizens. Of particular note were two Nigerian Journalists. Krees Imodibie, the political editor of The Guardian and Tayo Awotusin of the Champion newspapers. Apart from these deaths, several Nigerians questioned the commitment of Nigerian resources in the resolution of the Liberian conflict. The above indication of problems faced by the Nigerian government with regard to her commitment to the resolution of the Liberian conflict leads to the inevitable question: what were the factors that compelled the country's policy elite to remain resolute on the matter? Several reasons could be proffered. First, is the attempt to avoid extra-African involvement in a purely African problem. This has become a very crucial factor in Nigeria's African policy since the Angolan episode of 1975. The Nigerian government, following the intervention of South Africa on behalf of the FNLA and UNITA and the United States subtle support for

the move discovered that the interest of non-African forces particularly the West in the region was mainly selfish (Cleaver and May, 1995:485).

Again, the frequent intervention by France in the West African sub-region has affected the degree of cohesion within ECOWAS. In the Liberian conflict, it was suspected that France was nudging Taylor through Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. Therefore, it became imperative for Nigeria to intervene so as to forestall France's motive of gaining political access to Liberia. As Olatunde Ojo (1980:601) claimed:

Domestically, one of the factors in Nigeria's active role in the formation of ECOWAS was and is the country's desire to become the industrial heart of West Africa with all the political power... A concomitant of this is the desire to undermine or erode French economic and political influence which has sometimes been inimical to Nigeria's interest in the sub-region.

Second was a need to come to the aid of a friend whose political power was being challenged. It would be remembered that the cool-off in diplomatic relationship between Nigeria and Liberia, following the Shagari government's initial refusal to recognise Doe's Presidency in 1980 improved under the Babangida administration. In fact, Presidents Doe and Babangida's state visit to Liberia between 30 November and 3 December, 1988, an agreement to enhance economic, scientific and cultural co-operation between Nigeria and Liberia was signed between the two Presidents (Olusola, 1990:134). A major highway in Liberia named after Babangida was also opened during this visit. And a graduate school named Babangida School of International Affairs at the University of Liberia was also opened. Nigeria pledged a donation of \$1 million to this institution (Tarr, 1993:79) and sent some of the country's university academics to teach at the school. As a further testimony of their friendship, the University of Liberia awarded President Babangida an honorary doctorate degree in Law. In a reciprocal gesture, the Nigerian President conferred Doe with the Grand Commander of the Federal Republic (GCFR) (Olusola, 1990:143). Nigeria also facilitated the rescheduling of US\$30 million Liberian debt with the African Development Bank (Tarr, 1993:79). This friendship between Doe and Babangida was also confirmed when arms supplied by the Nigerian President to the Liberian army were captured by the Charles Taylor NPFL soldiers (Yoroms, 1993:88).

These events, including Doe's visit to Nigeria in 1990 when he was in deep trouble following the invasion of Liberia by the NPFL forces illustrate the level of friendship between the two Presidents. It could, therefore, be suggested that Nigeria's attempt at solving the Liberian crisis was one way President Babangida thought he could help a friend in serious trouble.

Third, Nigeria's intervention in Liberia could also be attributed to the country's possession of superior military power. According to Ah men Fulani (1989:18), Nigeria's overall military power is superior to that of the other fifteen countries within the West African sub-region combined. Essentially, if Nigeria possesses the military capability which is more than that of all West African States combined and, according to Akinyerni is only comparable to that of South Africa within the African continent (new Nigerian, 8 May, 1987), she must have felt duty-bound to intervene in the Liberian conflict. In the words of O.B.C. Nwolise (1997:36) 'Nigerian troops are well trained and very experienced... Apart from their training at home, the soldiers and police have acquired and continue to accumulate practical experience in peace missions abroad'.

Fourth, the Nigerian government in intervening in the Liberian crisis must have felt the need to protect the lives of her citizens and other West Africans living in that country, particularly when it had initially in defiance of domestic public opinion refused to evacuate them. Again, the fact that Charles Taylor believed that Nigeria was supporting Doe sent a danger signal to the government that he might visit his anger on Nigerians in Liberia. And he did persecute them as the activities of his group in plundering churches and Nigeria's embassy in Monrovia revealed (Yogis. 1991:104-113); Tarr. 1993:77. Yoroms, 1993:88-89; Inienger, 1996:81-82; Magaji, 1996:65). In fact, Taylor did not hide his hatred of what he perceived as Nigeria's partiality in the Liberian crisis; he threatened to kill Nigerians if anything happened to Liberians. Perhaps, this perception of Nigeria's role as that of a biased umpire by Taylor and the entrapment of many Nigerians in Liberia compelled the Babangida administration to intervene decisively in the conflict and save the lives of her nationals.

Fifth, the intervention of Nigeria with four other ECOWAS countries in the Liberian conflict was perhaps, to give meaning to the clinche that politics could not totally be divorced from economies. This could have been informed by events that precipitated the demise of the former East African Community (EAC). The events were more political than economic in spite of the fact that the central basis for the community was economic.

Nigeria sensing that the Liberian political conflict could undermine the objectives of ECOWAS if a rigid interpretation is given to the community as a principally economic group engineered some West African states to intervene with her on behalf of the organisation. It must be noted, that the Liberian conflict was primarily a political problem arising from people's disenchantment with the government of Samuel Doe.

It should also be noted that Liberia is one of the English speaking Countries out of the sixteen states that constitute the West African sub-region, thus, it shares a common language with Nigeria. As the most populous and endowed country within West Africa, it was imperative that she should strive to save a sister state from a self-inflicted conflict. The importance of language in the Liberia incident becomes clear when it is realised that four out of the five countries that initially contributed troops to the ECOMOG (Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Sierra Leone) are all English speaking states. However, it is important to remember that at its independence in 1958, Guinea broke its close affinity with France and aligned instead with Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah. This language thesis was buttressed by Gani J. Yoroms 91993:87) when he contended that:

Disagreement among the member states can be seen in the context of the historical divisions between Anglophone and Francophone states. The fear was expressed by Senegal, seen by as a neutral state in this dispute, that Nigeria might use ECOMOG to complete an ambitious design in the sub-regions.

The active involvement of Nigeria in finding a lasting solution to the Liberian conflict also stemmed possibly from the country's longstanding commitment to playing decisive role in the resolution of intra-Africa conflicts. Nigeria's resolve to play an active part in Africa to a very great extent informed the inclusion of section 19 in the 1979 Constitution. This section enjoined Nigerian governments to 'promote African unity, as well as total political, economic, social and cultural liberation' of the continent.

Again, Nigeria's participation in international peace-keeping operations had together with sports helped to boost her image externally (Saliu, nd:12X Perhaps as a way to further endear the country to the

international community particularly at a time when domestic opinion was unfavourable to the regime, the Babangida administration used the ECOMOG to win support for itself.

It should also be remarked that by sending Nigerian troops to Liberia, the Babangida administration was reducing tension in the barracks. This was especially so coming on the heel of the 22 April, 1990 military coup which accused the government of several offences (Ihonvbere, 1991:608-611).

The Sierra Leonean Instance

Nigeria and ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone stemmed from the overthrow in May 1997 of the democratically elected government of Tejan Kabbah by soldiers led by Major Paul Jonny Koromah. This overthrow came at a time when the global community was emphasising democratization. Again, the new military government was not popularly accepted domestically as it lacked 'support from any credible group of organisation' (Abdullah, 1998:233). This negative environment incited Nigeria and Ecowas intervention to restore the democratically elected government of Kabbah. In doing this, Nigeria used the ECOMOG troops already stationed in Liberia.

Reasons for Nigeria's intervention in Sierra Leone were essentially identical to that of Liberia. Again, it was claimed that those who engineered the coup were basically junior and uneducated officers who could act as a model to their colleagues in other West African countries. In order to stem this, Nigeria and ECOMOG had to intervene decisively to restore President Tejan Kabbah. In the words of Ibrahim Abdullah (1998:231).

Those who organised and executed the operation... belonged to the same social group as the bulk of the RUF fighters. They were predominantly the 'rural unemployed, a fair number of hooligans, drug addicts and thieves' - in a word, the quintessential lumpenproletariat.

Concluding comments

Nigeria's intervention in sub-regional conflict illustrates the importance attached to the principle of Africa as the centerpiece - of the country's foreign policy. It demonstrates a crucial fact that, despite the economic recession under which Nigeria's foreign policy is formulated and executed, the country's elite still take pride in playing leadership role in solving continental problems. The country's participation in ECOMOG is a renewal of Nigeria's activist foreign policy first given impetus in late 1975 by General Murtala Muhammed during the Angolan independence crisis. The renewed activism in foreign policy was necessary due to the reasons adduced previously. It is, the sense of duty and the prevailing environment of military dictatorship with little domestic inhibitions than civilian governments that created a conducive atmosphere for the interventions. Also important in understanding Nigeria's interventions is the personality of Generals Babangida and Abacha both of who saw the conflicts as personal challenge as well as a way of building up national prestige as a leader of the West African sub-region. This is in line with the recommendations of the 1986 All Nigerian Conference on Foreign Policy which urged that 'Nigeria must identify with, and indeed, lead the progressive anti-imperial forces in the search for African solutions to African problems'. (Akindele and Ate, 1986:367).

REFERENCES

1. Abdullah I. (1998) 'Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone'. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 203-235.
2. Akindele R.A. & Ate, B.E. (1986) 'Nigeria's Foreign Policy, 1986-2000 Ad: Background to and reflections on the views from Kuru'. *Afrika Spectrum*, 3 pp. 363- 370.
3. Akinyemi A. (1986) 'Welcome address by the Minister of External Affairs at the formal opening of the all- Nigerian conference on 'Foreign Policy' Nigerian *bulletin on Foreign Affairs* Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 5-7.
4. Aluko O. (1981) *Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy* London: George Allen & Unwin.
5. Cleaver G. & May R. (1995) 'Peace Keeping: The African Dimension' *Review of African Political Economy* No. 66, p. 485-497.
6. Eze I. (1996) 'Nigeria's increasing role in international peace keeping operations' paper written for Command and Staff College, Jaji - Kaduna.
7. Fulani A. S. (1989) 'Nigeria: Strategic Ambitions and West African Security' *Review of International Affairs*. Vol. XL No. 950, pp. 17-20.
8. Garba J. (1978) 'Nigeria's Foreign Policy and National interest' address b the Honourable Commissioner of External Affairs at the Ahmadu Bello University.
9. Garuba C. A. (ed.) (1997) *International Peace and Security: The Nigerian Contribution* Abuja: National War College.
10. Givens W.A. (ed.) (1986) *Liberia, the road to democracy under the leadership of Samuel Kanyon Doe* Bucks: Kensal Press.
11. Idang G. (1986) *Nigeria Internal Politics and Foreign Policy (1960 - 1966)*. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.
12. Ihonvbere J. O. (1991) 'A Critical Evaluation of the Failed 1990 Coup in Nigeria' *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 29 No. 4, pp. 601-626.
13. Inienger J. M. (1996) 'The Peace Initiatives' *Defence Studies* Vol. 6 No. 27 pp. 7Z-9L
14. James L. (1986s) 'Quiwonkpa's Fatal Gamble' *Africa Report* January-February pp. 47-49.
15. James L. (1986b) 'A Seven- Corned Solution?' *Africa Report* November - December pp. 31-33.
16. Magaji M. H. (1996) 'The Impediments to Peace Process in the Liberian Crisis' *Defence Studies* Vol. 6 No. 2, pp. 64-77.
17. Nweke G. A. (1980) *Harmonization of African Foreign Policies 1955 - 1975: The Political Economy of African Diplomacy* Boston: African Studies Center.

18. Nwolise O.B.C. (1997) 'Principles, Culture and Values: Influences on Nigeria's Role in International Peace and Security' in Garuba C. A. (ed) *International Peace and Security: The Nigerian Contribution* Abuja: National War College pp. 31-44.
19. Ogwu U. L (1986) *Nigerian Foreign Policy – Alternative Future* Lagos. NIIA.
20. Ojo O.J.B. (1980) 'Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS' *International Organisation* 34, 4 pp. 571- 604.
21. Okoio J. E. (198!) 'Liberia: the military coup and its aftermath' *The World Today* Vol. 37 No. 4 pp. 149-157.
22. Olusola D.S. (1990) 'Nigeria's Relations with Liberia Under Doe, 1980 to 1990' unpublished M.Sc. thesis in the Department of Political Science. University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
23. Osaghae E.E. (1990) 'Toward Explaining the Liberian Civil War' paper presented at a staff seminar, Dept. of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
24. Saliu H.A. (nd) 'Nigeria in International Peace Keeping Efforts: emerging trends and implications for Policy' unpublished manuscript.
25. Sangotade A.A. (1996) 'The Nigerian Army in Global Peace Keeping Operations: Problems and Prospects' essay submitted to National War College Course 4 Abuja.
26. Schwartz Jr. F.A.O. (1965) *Nigeria: The Tribe, the Nation or the Race - The Politics of Independence* Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.
27. Tarr S. B. (1993) 'The ECOMOG Initiative in Liberia: A Liberian Perspective' Issue Vol. XXI/1-2 pp. 74-83.
28. Vogts M.A. (1991) 'Nigeria's Participation in the ECOWAS Monitoring Group - ECOMOG' *Nigeria Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 17 No. 1 pp. 101-121.
29. Yoroms G.J. (1993) 'ECOMOG and West African Regional Security: A Nigerian Perspective' Issue Vol. XXI 1-2 pp. 84 - 91.

NEWSPAPERS

1. National Concord (Lagos) 14 February, 1991
2. New Nigerian (Kaduna) 8 May, 1987.
3. Sunday Times (Lagos) 22 February, 1976.
4. Sunday Times (Lagos) 12 February. 1991.
5. The Guardian (Lagos) 21 September, 1990.
6. The Guardian (Lagos) 9 February, 1991.