Article

Human Security Challenges in the Horn of Africa and the Precarious Contours in Managing Regional Security Problems

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Abstract
The horn of Africa, houses the people and region where crises, famine, drought, food insecurity and human insecurity had consistently taken a great toll of lives, a region, at the strategic importance of the world and African politics. With long history of people dominated from outside by forces operating at the global level that had made it to face a critical human security challenges that have strangled its regional strength and history of existence. This enclave, where the menace of AL-Shabaab terrorist group, sea pirates, inter-state feud, food crisis and the heinous role of al Qaeda had placed it a risk zone, thereby becoming a problematic issues in African security trust, deserves investigation. This study, situated on national interest model of power framework, utilized secondary data, descriptive and analytical approach. The study noted that human security as regarding civil rights and rights of competitive equality is at danger in the region. The study observed that over one-third (1/3) of African states seems not to be free with the horn of Africa at home with five (5) human insecurity problems. The study revealed that the level of insecurity in the Horn of Africa puts the continent on grievous time bomb. The study suggests operational enhancement of the African high command and NEPAD in tackling the growing threats to human security particularly in the Horn of Africa.

Keywords
Human security, Environmental Degradation, Crisis, Terrorism, Food insecurity

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Introduction

Globally, the World and Africa inclusive, in the 21st century are currently battling a new face of human insecurity with food insecurity and civil/rights violations being the old order not minding the decay in leadership positions. With cold war over long ago and Arab Spring/Neo-democracy leading to the re-introduction of hostilities through the back door, the west are not only in a fist but considerably confused

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as to how to reinage the growing controversies over human security problems created indirectly by their avalanches of national interest exploits. With the aftermaths of Arab Spring not new, the plundering and destructions of the Syrian war, the rising havoc and rampaging of the Islamic States of the Iraq Sunnie and Levant (ISIS) creating unforeseen tensions and the carnage of several terrorist groups all over the globe not relenting, to which the World today are terrified, the most disturbing of all is the growing spate of human insecurity, especially as it is affecting states in the current dispensation.

Africa and the Horn of Africa being inclusive are greatly disturbed and gasping for breath that may not revive its daunting challenges. Faced with lack of food security, harsh climatic condition, droughts, climate change and possible famine among others that seemed not to be enough or accommodating, the Horn of Africa is embroiled with human security problems that it cannot help itself. Terrorism, poor leadership, poor health condition, lopsided economy, gross rights violations and general discontent are some of the occasioned quagmires bedeviling the region.

Premised on this, the study tends to examine this enormous human security challenges facing Horn of Africa by evaluating the true position of things vis-a-vis the Horn of Africa and human security: the interface, human security challenges in Somalia, human security challenges in Sudan and South Sudan and the efforts of AU in addressing the human security challenges in Africa.

Theoretical Argument

This study adopts the National Interest Model of the Power Theory Framework. National interest is the totality of state's values. It is an instrument of action, which evaluates the sources of nation's diplomatic foreign policy. It serves as a means of justifying, denouncing, or proposing policies. The notion of national interest tends to confine the intended meaning of what is best for a nation in foreign affairs. National interest in a simpler term rests on the notion that a state cannot engage in anything without having interest attached to it. Hence, it is as old as mankind itself. With theorists like Joseph Frankel, Hans Morgenthau, and Hugo Grant among others, the model argues that state's interest is always in anything that will be of benefit to it. Hence, to the state, it is inevitable, as she selfishly devices means of actualizing her goals in any particular situation.

Frankel (1993) agreeing to this view, postulates that people maintain social order in a bid to satisfying their selfish national interest. He contends that national interest is a fundamental notion that defies definition by reference to other terms, because it is analytically convenient although often empirically impossible to determine whether the value found in the formulation of a specific interest had been internalized by the decision-makers or introduced only in response to environmental pressures, generally domestic but sometimes also international.

Morgenthau (1960) sees national interest in terms of power. To him, national interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed, hence the objective of a foreign policy must be defined in terms of national interest. He went further to posit that the interest of the state is that peace should be maintained, but whereby such fails against an aggressor, that the state should alternate her interest for war, Hugo (1969) one of the protagonists of the school aptly notes that states behave the way they do because it is in their interest to do so.

Construing from the above contentions, and in relation to the subject under study, human security challenges in the Horn of Africa and the precarious contours in managing regional security problems,

certain questions that need to be asked to further this investigation are: why are African states known for continual crisis and high incident of political instability? Why were the problems of Horn of Africa and her politics of unsecured environment a major issue to Africa and the world, particularly in the period under study? Why was it that in the post-cold war-Africa, certain forms of government, especially the types that encourage human insecurity and crises are recognized? Why was the west divided and ready at the same time to make mockery of their fellow state that had failed in their area of sphere of influence in the course re-alignment? Why did the kind of contours that enveloped diplomacy in the Horn of Africa allowed for the consistent rebels, pirates and militias incursions? Why African diplomacy was dwarfed of any kind of remedy against the growing number of human security challenges in the region? Why, and what informed the trajectory that the problems, despite the New Charter of African Union had lingered for long?

While the above questions may sound rhetoric or be answered in thoughts, the major reasons for such intuition are the place and roles of national interest in state qua state and government qua government relations. Suffice it to note that these characters are always found in a conflictual paradigm of their separately avowed national interest that needs to be satisfied. A fact to which might have contributed in creating the situation leading to the escalation or problematic underpin of the numerous human security problems facing the people of the Horn of Africa vis-a -vis insecurity problem, food security problem, health security problem, economic problems and lack of incentives to attend to growing population of the region.

Thus, while we further observe the role of national interest, it will suffice to highlight with reason that the Western interest, Chines interests, Middle Eastern interests and Russian interest among others vacillated between the desires to preserve their traditional sphere of influence in the region where their economic interest in Mediterranean prospecting is at stake owing to other states' interest. Just as Vassilier (1997) notes that Africa lies in the sphere of the United States and Europe global interest, which might have led to the growing tension in the region. This could be an outward demonstration, rather than a sign of real national interest of states' mentioned above.

The salient features that had been masking the cyclical leadership problems in Africa, leading to the abysmal diplomacy role and the human security crisis in the Horn, however, also lay its contradictions as experienced and seen in other conflict zones since all actors were directly or indirectly modulated by its national interest model.

Horn of African and Human Security: The Interface

The Horn of Africa region includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan, while the greater Horn incorporates Tanzania and Uganda. These countries shared similar geographic endowments, and besides that, the countries of this region are, for the most part, linguistically and ethnically linked together (Joireman, 1997:1), evincing a complex pattern of interrelationships among the various populations (Fukui and Markakis, 1994:4).

The political climate in the Horn of Africa today is influenced by local political and social conflicts not only in terms of specific histories and effects, but also their interaction with forces operating at a global level. The history of the countries of the Horn since the end of colonialism in the region has largely been one of violent repression and insurgency (Wasara, 2002:1). The Horn of Africa is known for decades as one of the hottest geographical spaces of internal dissidence and interstate conflicts. Africa's longest civil

wars occur in this region Assefa, 1999). This was the case of the Eritrean war of liberation against Ethiopian regimes. The civil war in Sudan is another civil war that is associated in one way or the other with the region. No matter how governments in the region came to power, in practically every case, force has been the means of dislodging them. Succession by peaceful election has been the exception (Maxted and Zegeye, 2001:3). The situation is critical with more than 13.3 million people affected, 4 million in acute need of humanitarian assistance, and 250,000 who are thought to be in dire need of food and at risk of starvation (CRS report, 2012). Conditions in this region have created an escalating refugee crisis, mainly in Kenya and Ethiopia (Astatke, Bayou).

There are three major reasons why the Horn of Africa has attracted international attention for many centuries .Schulz, 2011:41). First, its strategic location: four countries in the Horn of Africa, namely Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan, border two crucial sea routes, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. These waterways are currently regaining importance in international naval trade now that a number of Middle Eastern countries, Asian countries and Russia are trying to open new markets in Africa in the wake of the end of the Cold War. With the discovery of large quantities of oil in Africa especially in the gulf of Guinea, Africa is emerging as a lucrative market for Asian technology. Second, the region has the most diverse religious and ethnic groupings. In view of a tendency for ethnic and tribal wars to erupt throughout the region, this situation requires careful management. Most of the residents of the Horn of Africa espouse Sunni Islam as their religion and most of them can trace their historic origins to the Middle East. With its radical religious politics, it is likely that the Horn of Africa will witness, as has already been the case in Sudan and some parts of Somalia, the rise of Islamic radicals trying to impose their version of Islam on others, thereby fuelling global insecurity.

Finally, the Horn of Africa has significant agricultural potential. The source of over 80 per cent of the waters of the River Nile and its tributaries is in the area. With such agricultural potential, the Horn of Africa could achieve economic prosperity should its leaders assign top priority to peace in the region. The Horn of Africa has the capacity to identify trade interests in East Africa and neighbouring Middle Eastern and Asian countries.

However, the states of the Horn of Africa are weakened by acute environmental degradation. A fragile ecological inheritance of cyclical drought has been aggravated by armed conflicts. Pastoralists and other hinterland populations have been among the primary victims. Desertification, droughts, and a scarcity of resources have displaced large numbers of people, driving them across national borders as migrants or as environmental refugees. Aside from putting pressure on state boundaries, their arrival sometimes results in feelings of insecurity and intolerance among the local population, who now has to compete for the same limited resources (Maxtec and Zegeye, 2001:5).

People who live in this region of Africa have faced pervasive crises for a very long time. The dynamics of the crisis originate at the local and at the global level. The people suffer from the impact of colonialism and authoritarianism, and the rule of those who try to manipulate and control the role of the state for their own narrow interests. The crisis is manifested in many different forms: civil wars, violation of human rights, the suppression of civil liberties, abject poverty, famine, epidemics, debt problems, population displacement ecological disasters and disenfranchisement. The crisis in the Horn appears to be without end creating one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes in modern era (Refugees International, 2011). The inequitable distribution of resources generates intense armed conflicts among different social groups.

These conflicts result in further depletion of resources, violence, disruption of economic production and increased demographic displacement. Eventually, the crisis destroys the social fabric by promoting militarization, tyranny and mutual animosity and together these over time produce a 'culture of warfare' (Wasara, 2002:57-62).

The region's asymmetric integration to the global capital markets escalated the security crisis leading to the disruption of regional economies by unequal exchange and exploitative relations with the West and the formatic of an alliance between global capital and the region's economically privileged and ruling political elite (Weintstein, 2008). The myriad of human security pathologies in this region are engendered by the violent struggles for state power among the various ethnic groups that have cross-cutting cleavages. The overlapping ethnic identities between the states in this region create regional security complexes as instability and insecurity in one country gravitate to insecurity in neighbouring countries. States have been the central conduit to power, and resources and the ruling groups are clientelists and sectarians, leaving no political space for disenfranchise and marginalized social groups who often have no choice but to resort to resistance to obtain freedom and emancipation through the application of ethnic and religious solidarity (Attilio, 2006:1).

Consequently, the states themselves in the Horn of Africa have become central elements of the crisis, largely through their incessant quest to centralize and concentrate power. These states then produce and reproduce hegemonic facades, seemingly so inextricably caught up in their own political practices that they cannot extricate themselves from it Centralizing power in this region was often a response to or excuse for ethnic strife and political competition, and served to exacerbate underlying problems even while temporarily overwhelm symptoms. The main investment in governance in the Horn was the multi-faceted instrument of internal security subverting broader development of governance and civil society (ibid).

Besides colonial legacy, Cold War rivalries contributed significantly to the deplorable human security condition in the Horn of Africa. The strategic proximity of this region to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea with its oil traffic made it a strategic hub which excited the interests of the superpowers. The Cold War imperatives influenced the policies of external actors towards the region. Although, states and their associated social welfare systems received enormous resources, aid was accompanied by hundreds of millions of dollars in military assistance which reinforced repressive security apparatus and legitimized divide-and-rule governing policies (Agyeman-Duah, 1996).

The northeast corner of the greater Horn was particularly targeted because it is close to the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union poured hundreds of millions of dollars into Somalia before and billions into Ethiopia after 1977. The United States did the reverse, although on a lesser scale. The US also supported governments beyond Ethiopia and Somalia, including Kenya and Sudan under Numeiry (Ball, 1991:199).

As Cold War priorities subsided and military aid dwindled, authoritarian states met violent ends or mutated to attempt to address donor states' post-colonial interests, particularly democratization. Nevertheless, the legacy of overdeveloped internal security systems and bloated military budgets remain fixtures in most Horn states, even in countries where governments are attempting to make clean breaks with the past (Patman, 2009:38).

Human Security Challenges in Somalia

Having lacked a functioning state for over 20 years, Somalia has faced protracted insecurity and human suffering. Various manifestations of armed conflict are occurring in Somalia: civil war, foreign interventions, regional proxy wars, and communal clashes, clashes between paramilitaries, piracy, Islamist movements and armed criminality (APFO, 2012:4).

The colonial contradiction of arbitrary state boundaries accompanied Somalia's independence in 1969. Hence, the attempt to reunite with three large Somali groups trapped in other states, such as French Somaliland (Djoubti), in Ethiopia (the annexed Ogaden and Haud regions) and in northern Kenya was resisted by the Western support for Ethiopia and Kenya, which causes Somalia to look to the Soviet Union for military aid. Nevertheless, the Somali government managed to maintain a fairly neutral stance in international affairs during the 1960s, a position which changed dramatically after 1969 (Hassan, 2010:3).

The 1969 elections which ushered in President Muhammad Egal under the Somali Youth League were truncated by his assassination in the same year. The ensuing political upheaval provided an opportunity for the commander of the army, Mohamed Siad Barre to seize power. Barre introduced a brutal Marxist dictatorship, insisting upon the supremacy of party and nation as opposed to the local clan loyalties which are a strong feature of Somali culture. In 1977, with Ethiopia in chaos after the fall of Haile Selassie, Somalia attacked Ethiopian garrisons in the Ogaden. Soon a Somali army was even besieging the city of Harar. But President Siad was betrayed by his chosen superpower. The Soviet Union saw a more important potential client in the new Ethiopia. Early in 1978, the Ethiopian army, using Soviet equipment and reinforced by troops from Cuba, recaptured the Ogaden. The result is the mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees over the borders into Somalia (Lockyer, 2006).

In the aftermath of this disaster, guerrilla groups, clan-based and regional, was formed in and around Somalia with the intention of toppling Barre's repressive and centralizing regime. By 1988, the result is full-scale civil war, resulting in the overthrow of Barre in 1991. He withdrew to the safety of his own clan, becoming one warlord among many in this increasingly chaotic nation. In 1991, the faction controlling the former British Somaliland confused matters by declaring its independence as the Republic of Somaliland. The conflict destroyed Somalia's crops during 1992 and brought about widespread famine. Food flown in by international agencies is looted by the warring militias. By December, 1992, the situation was such that the UN actively intervened, sending a force of 35,000 troops in Operation Restore Hope. The UN briefly calmed the situation, persuading fifteen warring groups to convene in Addis Ababa in January, 1993, for peace and disarmament talks. These seem at first to make progress, but the situation on the ground continued to deteriorate. In March, 1994, American and European units in the UN force was withdrawn, finding the level of casualties unacceptable. Troops from African countries and the Indian subcontinent remained in Situ.

During the rest of the decade, the situation got worse rather than better. From late 1994, the capital, Mogadishu, was divided between the two most powerful of the warring factions. In each, the leaders declared themselves the president of the nation and organized a supposedly national government. In March, 1995, the remaining UN forces were evacuated from the coast under the protection of an international flotilla. At the end of the decade, the only remotely stable region is the breakaway Republic

of Somaliland, in the northwest. An interim constitution was introduced here in 1997 and a president was elected. But the would-be republic failed to win any international recognition (Le Sage, 2005:3).

In 2000, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan was selected as the President of the nation's new Transitional National Government (TNG), an interim administration formed to guide Somalia to its third permanent republican government. Subsequently, former Puntland President Abdullah! Yusuf Ahmed was elected as President of the succeeding Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in October 10, 2004 (Rulers, 2004).

In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an Islamist organization, assumed control of much of the southern part of the country and promptly imposed Sharia law on the people. The Ethiopian intervention into the crisis in 2006 toppled the UIC and accentuated the disintegration of the Somali state as competing clan groups and warlords struggled for control of local productive resources. In addition to facilitating an administrative and security vacuum, the intervention proved transformative. The authority of the TFG was reestablished with assistance of Ethiopian troops and the African Union peacekeepers (O'Kasick, 2007).

Following this defeat, the Islamic Courts Union splintered into several different factions. Some of the more radical elements, including Al-Shabaab, regrouped to continue their insurgency against the TFG and oppose the Ethiopian military's presence in Somalia. Throughout 2007 and 2008, Al-Shabaab scored military victories, seizing control of key towns and ports in both central and southern Somalia. At the end of 2008, the group had captured Baidoa but not Mogadishu. By January, 2009, Al-Shabaab and other militias had managed to force the Ethiopian troops to retreat, leaving behind an under-equipped African Union peacekeeping force to assist the Transitional Federal Government's troops (USCIRF, 2009). On 29 December, 2008, Abdullah! Yusuf Ahmed announced before a united parliament in Baidoa his resignation as President of Somalia. In his speech, which was broadcast on national radio, Yusuf expressed regret at failing to end the country's seventeen-year conflict as his government had mandated to do (BBC News, 29 December, 2008).

He also blamed the international community for its failure to support the government, and said that the speaker of parliament would succeed him in office as the Chairman of the Transitional Federal Government. Taking advantage of the advanced collapse of the state in Somalia and the inability of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to make headway against it or any of the other challenges confronting its rule, Al Shabaab took control of large areas of central Somalia, given it control over the entire south and central Somalia. In 2007 it claimed an affiliation with al-Qaeda, and took responsibility for its first major attack outside of Somalia in July 2010, when twin bombings in Kampala killed more than 70 people watching TV coverage of the World Cup soccer final (Uganda Media Centre, 2010). In February, 2010, it issued a declaratory statement of practice support for AQAP that prompted Western policy-makers to worry about the prospect of enhanced cooperation among al-Qaeda affiliates in the region, although to date this remains more rhetorical than actual (Joscelyn ant Roggio, 2012:1). The increasing level of threat from Al-Shabaab was merely one of multiple insecurities afflicting Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa.

Meanwhile, economic motivations constituted potent drivers of conflict elsewhere, crossing national boundaries and contributing to the appearance of generalized zones of instability and border conflicts. These included damage to pastoralist livelihoods arising from infrastructural neglect and disruption to trade routes, uneven access to seaports, energy-related issues, the impact of drought and the pernicious

effects of localized conflicts on the intraregional economy (OCHA, 2012). Thriving shadow networks constituted a parallel economic structure that facilitated regional trade in arms and the smuggling of people and fuel. This created an enabling environment for individuals and groups that sought to utilize these illicit networks for more sinister exchanges. Finally, the regionalization of localized conflicts enabled the UIC to receive transfers of arms and advisers.

Factional fighting between Al Shabaab and TFG-allied forces has continued to undermine human security situation in the country and has in fact, spiral into neighbouring countries. Piracy, terrorism, human trafficking and famine are symptoms of the wider instability that has plagued Somalia. According to US Embassy in Nairobi, in the past 2011/2012, Al Shabaab has carried out at least 17 attacks involving grenades or explosive devices in Kenya. At least, 48 people died in these attacks, and around 200 people were injured. Nine of these attacks occurred in North Eastern Province, including locations in Dadaab, Wajir, and Garissa. Four attacks occurred in Nairobi, and four in Mombasa. Targets included police stations and police vehicles, nightclubs and bars, churches, a religious gathering, a downtown building of small shops, and a bus station. Other attacks included two simultaneous assaults on churches in Garissa on 1st July, 2012. In this attack, 17 people were killed and about 50 people were injured (US Embassy, 2012). The terrorist group has claimed responsibility for the 21st September, 2013 attack, when unidentified gunmen attacked the Upmarket Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The attack, which lasted until 24th September, resulted in at least 67 deaths, including four attackers. Over 175 people were reportedly wounded in the mass shooting, with all of the gunmen reported killed. The Islamist group al-Shabaab characterized the attack as retribution for the Kenyan military's deployment in Somalia.

Human Security Challenges in Sudan and South Sudan

Sudan which gained her independence in 1956 from Egyptian-British colonial rule had faced variation of human security crises which eventually led to the secession of Southern Sudan as a sovereign state in 2011. It was clear from the beginning that peace could not last as incipient animosities between North and South were not resolved before and immediately after the independence. Sudan has been characterized by internal conflict and tensions. Ethnic, cultural and religious divisions have coincided with unequal political and economic relations between North and South. The divisions and imbalances led to the first North-South civil war (1955-1972), followed by the second North-South civil war (1983-2005) and the Darfur conflict which began in 2003, continuing to this day. The human cost of the latter two wars was particularly great with around 1-2.5 million, mostly civilians, left dead from the fighting (US Committee for Refugees, Sudan: 2001). The Second Sudanese Civil War, fought between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) of the South and the Northern government based in the capital Khartoum, was brought to a conclusion by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) see http://www.aec-sudan.org/docs/cpa/cpa-en.pdf. The CPA addressed many issues, but an important stipulation of the treaty was the referendum which decided South Sudan attainment of self-determination from the North in 2011 (McKay, 2012:4).

In spite of such proclamations, however, the inception of the Republic of South Sudan has been gradually maligned by violent clashes which have been spreading, like wildfire, in areas around the North-South border and elsewhere. Abyei an oil-rich region along the North-South border has seen violent conflict devastate its landscape and inhabitants since January, 2011, and this has become worse as time has progressed. Abyei was due to hold a separate referendum at the same time as the South's, when its

inhabitants would also decide whether to become part of the North or South. Unfortunately, progress on that vote still remains deadlocked. The settled populations of the area, the more southern-oriented Ngok Dinka, assert that they alone should have that right to vote. But the nomadic Misseriya people, who migrate to Abyei from the North, are equally adamant that they should also have the right to vote. In the past, there have been major tensions between the two groups and thousands have died on account of feuds over water and land (McKay, 2012:7).

The Abyei dispute assumed broader political dimensions due to the oil reserves and its geostrategic importance and had been used as a bargaining chip between North and South. In May, 2011, Sudan Armed Forces from the North and their allied civil militias stormed Abyei, set homes on fire, looted stores and forced anybody healthy enough to flee for their lives. More than 100,000 people were displaced (UN News Centre, Sudan: 2012). The dispute over Abyei has become one of the most intractable in Sudan. Elsewhere along the border, hostilities have surfaced in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Instead of having their own referendum, both areas were granted more vague 'popular consultations' to decide whether or not the CPA had met the aspirations of the people, but the findings placed little or no obligation on the central government in Khartoum to fulfill those expectations. The two regions were heavily contested during the Second Sudanese Civil War, and these regions have become areas of continued instability and insecurity.

Human security challenges in South Kordofan escalated ahead of the gubernatorial and state assembly elections, held on 2nd May, 2011 when the National Congress Party candidate Abdul Aziz al-Hilu narrowly beat the SPLM candidate, but the SPLM alleged the voting was rigged. The tensions exacerbated, and fighting commenced in early June, 2011 when SAF moved into South Kordofan's capital Kadugli and initiated aerial attacks, triggering clashes with SPLA units in the region and causing mass displacement. Some 50,000 people fled from South Kordofan and Blue Nile state to Ethiopia (UNOHA,2011). Violence has reached a particularly intense pitch in Jonglei, the largest state in the South which is bordered by Ethiopia. The incidence of fighting between the Luo-Nuer and Murle tribes has rapidly increased since December 2011 when 8,000 armed men from the Luo-Nuer attacked the Murle's home of Pibor County. Over 1,000 people were killed in fighting between the Luo- Nuer and Murle tribes between June and December, 2011 (IRIN, AIIAfrica, 18th March, 2012).

The ethno-religious cleavages between the North and South Sudan are the major sources of conflict in what was formerly the largest and perhaps most diverse country in Africa. The northern Sudan which is presently known as Sudan is a model vision of a unified Arab/Muslim culture and constitutes about 70 per cent of the previous Sudanese population. Meanwhile, South Sudan is populated mostly by non-Muslim Nilotes, speaking languages of one section of the Nilotic sub-branch of the Eastern Sudanic branch of Nilo-Saharan. They are marked by physical similarity and many common cultural features, constituting about 30 per cent of the former Sudanese population (UNWPP, 2010). Nilotes share a cattle culture, one that nurtures qualities of "courage, love of fighting, and contempt of hunger and hardship" that distinguishes them from peasants (Evans-Pritchard 1940, p. 26).

The North/South question started in the colonial era when the two provinces were separately administered under the British-Egyptian condominium. Reflecting this division, British administrators argued that the south should be incorporated into Kenya or Uganda, as the people were considered to have affinity with Black Africa. Because of the distinct administrative structures, south Sudanese under British rule had few if any channels to Khartoum (Sarkesian 1973, 2-5). The condominium government instituted "closed

door" ordinances which restricted movements between the two regions and prohibited the Muslim North from proselytizing in the south. There was also separate curriculum in southern schools. The amalgamation of the two regions without due consultation with southerners created tension in the south, who feared being subsumed by the political power of the larger north. The relations between the two regions heightened after the February, 1953 agreement by Britain and Egypt to grant independence to Sudan without commitments to create a federal system that would give the south regional autonomy coupled with imposition of Arabic as the official language of administration, which deprived most of the few educated English-speaking southerners of the opportunity to enter public service (lyob and Khadiagala, 2006:14). The south also felt threatened by their gross marginalization and the replacement of trusted British district commissioners with unsympathetic northerners. Out of 800 civil service jobs vacated by the British official, only 6 positions of junior officers were given to the south (Jok, 2007:41). Before the independence in 1956, the first civil war had erupted and extended from 1955 to 1972 when the British-administered southern army units (Equatorial Corps) mutinied in Totit, in August, 1955 in protest of their transfer to garrisons under northern officers. The rebellious troops killed several hundred northerners. The government ruthlessly suppressed the revolt by executing seventy southerners for sedition (Hizkias, 1987:34). However, the reaction failed to pacify the south as some of the mutineers escaped to remote areas and organized resistance to the Arab-dominated government of Sudan which gradually crystalized into the Anyanya guerrilla army. The immediate causes of the mutiny were a trial of a southern member of the national assembly and an allegedly telegram urging northern administrators in the south to oppress Southerners (O'balance, 1977:62).

However, there are ingrained animosities that have exacerbated this division. For instance, the south resented Prime Minister Abbud's southern policy after the military take-over of 1958. The Abbud's government openly tried to Arabize the South, and to suppress cultural freedom. In February, 1964, Abbud expelled foreign missionaries from the south. He then shut down parliament to cut off a last outlet for southern complaints. These policies impelled southern leaders to support the incipient rebel group Anya Nya that had begun sporadic attacks on the Sudanese forces since 1955 (Metz, 1991). The human security consequence of the first Sudanese war was estimated to about half a million deaths while many hundreds of thousands were internally displaced or forced to live as refugees (Wells and Dilla, 1993:5). The Addis Ababa Agreement ended this war in March, 1972 by granting the Southerners a single administrative region with various defined powers, but it turned out to be only a temporary pause in the unrest because, within a decade, another tragic war started. The second Sudanese civil war was a continuation of the first war. It originated in southern Sudan in 1983 and ended with the signing of the Comparative Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM/A) in Nairobi in 2005 (Taha,2011:20).

The war resulted in the death of about two million people and the displacements of about four million, causing widespread poverty and disease. The civilian death toll is one of the highest of any war since World War two and was marked by a large number of human rights violations particularly the atrocities perpetuated by the GoS against the people of south Sudan (Seymour, 2003:7).

Besides, the ethno-religious contrast between Islam and emerging Christianity in north and south Sudan, there is a related linguistic element to the North/South cleavage. Choice of language also played a political role in the ethnic and religious cleavage between the northern and southern Sudanese. English has been associated with being non-Muslim, as Arabic was associated with Islam. Thus language was a

political instrument and a symbol of identity. In early 1991, with about 90 per cent of the southern third of the country controlled by the SPLA, the use of Arabic as a medium of instruction in southern schools remained a political issue, with many southerners regarding Arabic as an element in northern cultural domination. Juba (or pidgin) Arabic, developed and learned informally, had been used in southern towns, particularly in Al Istiwai, for some time and had spread slowly but steadily throughout the south, but not always at the expense of English. The Juba Arabic used in the marketplace and even by political figures addressing ethnically mixed urban audiences could not be understood by northern Sudanese (Metz, 1991). Historical patterns of interaction and rule, religion, race (Arab vs. African), and language have worked to deepen the North/South cleavage in Sudan.

In the South, the Nilotic peoples are themselves divided. The Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk are the three largest Nilotic groups. They entered southern Sudan before the tenth century, and constituted about 60 per cent of the South's population in 1990 (making about 10 per cent of Sudan's population). The Dinka live in a wide swath over the northern portion of the southern region. The Nuer, the next largest group, was only about one-fourth to one-third the size of the Dinka. The Shilluk, the third largest group, had only about one-fourth as many people as the Nuer. Tribal migrations going back to the fifteenth century led to distinct cultural settlements with a wide range of political institutions, going from acephalous anarchy among the Nuer to centralized monarchy among the Shilluk (Gwen, 2009).

Any suggestion of a culturally united Nilotic south needs to take into account the separate institutions and histories of the Nilotic groups. It also needs to contend with the reality of an ugly Dinka/Nuer war in 1991. With the collapse of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia in May, 1991, the SPLA lost a key supply line and military bases in Southwest Ethiopia and this brought 350,000 southern Sudanese refugees back to Sudan, exacerbating the security situation. In response to this new difficulty, John Garang, the leader of the SPLA and a Dinka, summoned a meeting of the SPLA high command, in which those summoned feared that they would be arrested. But Riek Machar, a Nuer, took this moment to break away from the SPLA to form the SPLA-Nasir faction, in part due to an agreement with Khartoum. Head-on intra-Nilote warfare followed in which many civilians were killed. The Nasir faction controlled much of the Upper Nile while Garang's Torit faction controlled most of Equatoria and Bahr-el-Ghazal. Indeed, the South-on-South death toll, in Jok and Hutchinson's reckoning (1999, 126-27), "exceeds those lost to atrocities committed by the Sudanese army."

It was northern oppression rather than cultural unity that brought the Dinka and the Nuer to cultivate a common identity as "southerners" (Reed, 1972, 20). This is a quite different claim than one that portrays a culturally unified South as a coherent side in a social cleavage.

Intra-Nilotic conflict is not the only complexity in the South. The South also has several groups of non-Nilotes. The Azande people, who entered southern Sudan in the sixteenth century, established the region's largest state. In the 1950s, the Zande were seeking independence for their own state, which they called the Sue River Republic (Reed, 1972, 20). The Avungara are another non-Nilotic population in the South. In the eighteenth century, the Avungara conquered the Azande, who were de facto vassals to Avungara power until the British recognized their autonomy (Metz, 1991).

Further confusing the territorial divide between "North" and "South" are the Ngok Dinka, living on the borderlands in Kordofan between North and South. Many Machar signed a separate "Peace Charter" with Khartoum in April, 1996.

The North too is culturally divided. "The two largest of the supratribal categories are the Juhayna and the Jaali (or Jaalayin). The Juhayna category consisted of tribes considered nomadic, although many had become fully settled. The Jaali encompassed the riverine, sedentary peoples from Dunqulah to just north of Khartoum and members of this group who had moved elsewhere. Some of its groups had become sedentary only in the twentieth century. Sudanese saw the Jaali as primarily indigenous peoples who were gradually arabized. Sudanese thought the Juhayna were less mixed, although some Juhayna groups had become more diverse by absorbing indigenous peoples.

There are further complexities among northerners. The Baqqara tribe, for example, moved south and west in earlier centuries, and mixed with the indigenous populations there. Today, they are scarcely to be distinguished from them, and are popularly thought to be the descendents of southern slaves. Yet they are considered in ethnic reckonings to be unquestionable northerners. And so, in 1951, proposals to give special status and protection to the south were defeated, and received the greatest calumny from these Baqqara. Deng quotes Mansour Khalid (1995,130-31) "Abd al- Tam...can be deemed, like so many other Sudanese of markedly Negroid origin, to have been compelled to take positions like that in order to out-Herod Herod." This is true, Deng asserts, for the Baqqara, who have no traditions of links to Arabs - these are the greatest Arab chauvinists, and most strongly anti-Dinka.

In Darfur, still in the North, the Fur (who were ruled until 1916 by an independent sultanate and oriented politically and culturally to peoples in Chad) is a sedentary, cultivating group long settled on the western frontier. They are non-Arabized Muslims, and referred to invidiously by other northerners as "Zurga" or blacks. Living on a plateau north of the Fur (and many in Chad) are the seminomadic people calling themselves Beri whom the Arabs call Zaghawa. They are Muslims who have retained many pre-Islamic rites. Herders, the Zaghawa also gained a substantial part of their livelihood by gathering wild grains. The Masalit, a Nilo-Saharan-speaking agriculturalist tribe, also Muslim, over the past century encroached through small scale war on traditional Fur land (Metz, 1991, HRW April 2004, 6). HRW (May, 2004, 5) refers to the Zaghawa, Fur and Masalit as "African", and these became the principal victims of the military campaign against a rebel insurgency beginning in 2003. "Arabs" are the principal recruits into the Janjaweed militia.

The Nubians, living in the Nile River valley in far northern Sudan and southern Egypt, are the second largest Muslim group in Sudan. Nile Nubians speak Arabic (usually as a second language), but do not consider themselves Arab. In the early 1970s, an organization uniting the Fur and the Nuba, among others, into a United Sudan was formed.

African Liberation Front spoke for the interests of "Africans" (as opposed to Arabs) who were residents of the North (Reed, 1972, 9). The organized presence of non-Arabs in the North further undermines the notion that there is a sharp difference between the Arab/Muslim North and the African/Christian South.

All of this ethnographic description is complicated still by migration. One estimate has it that in 1973 alone, more than 10 per cent of the Sudanese population moved away from their ethnic homelands for economic reasons. Most of the migrants were of employment age and moved to cities, particularly in the Khartoum metropolitan area, which attracted a third of all internal migrants. Migrant flows escalated in the latter 1980s because of drought and famine, civil war in the South, and bandits crossing over from Chad (Metz, 1991).

The Darfur debacle constitutes an addition to the catalogues of human security pathology in Sudan. Darfur is the Fur homeland, and has been Muslim since its first sultan, Sulayman Solong, decreed in the sixteenth century that Islam was to be the sultanate's official religion (Metz, 1991). However, large-scale religious conversions did not occur until the reign of Ahmad Bakr (1682-1722), who imported teachers, built mosques, and compelled his subjects to become Muslims. In the eighteenth century, several sultans consolidated the dynasty's hold on Darfur. The sultans operated the slave trade as a monopoly. They levied taxes on traders and export duties on slaves sent to Egypt, and took a share of the slaves brought into Darfur. Some household slaves advanced to prominent positions in the courts of sultans, and the power exercised by these slaves provoked a violent reaction among the traditional class of Fur officeholders in the late eighteenth century. The rivalry between the slaves and traditional elites caused recurrent unrest throughout the next century (Muhammad al-Idrisi, 2000:114-115).

The British annexation of Darfur to Sudan terminated the Fur sultanate. Many Furs educated themselves in Arabic in the expectation of getting advancement in the Sudanese political environment. They were seen as outsiders by the Arabs, however, and advancement was slow. Moreover, Arabs and Fur competed for scarce land. When in the late 1970s, oil was discovered, the Fur had greater incentives to demand autonomy, which was de facto achieved in the 1980s. The civil strife in Chad during the 1980s spilled over into western Darfur and exacerbated the historical tensions between the non-Arab Fur and Zaghawa ethnic groups. As Metz, (1991) reports, "At the time of the Bashir coup in June, 1989, western Darfur was being used as a battle ground by troops loyal to the Chadian government of Hissein Habre and rebels organized by Idris Deby and supported by Libya." Deby was from the Zaghawa ethnic group that lived on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border, and the Zaghawa of Darfur provided him with support and sanctuary. Hundreds of Zaghawa from Chad had also fled into Sudan to seek refuge from the fighting. In May, 1990, Chadian soldiers invaded Sudan's provincial capital of Al Fashir, where they rescued wounded comrades being held at a local hospital (Prunier, 2005: 16-24). During the summer, Chadian forces burned eighteen Sudanese villages and abducted 100 civilians. Deby's Patriotic Movement for Salvation (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut) provided arms to Sudanese Zaghawa and Arab militias, ostensibly so that they could protect themselves from Chadian forces. The militias, however, used the weapons against their own rivals, principally the ethnic Fur, and several hundred civilians were killed in civil strife during 1990. Sudan's government was relieved when Deby finally defeated Habre in December, 1990. The new government in N'Djamena signaled its willingness for good relations with Sudan by closing down the SPLM office. Early in 1991, Bashir visited Chad for official talks with Deby on bilateral ties. But there is every reason to see the Chad civil war, and the use of Darfur as a sanctuary for rebels, played a key role in arming African Muslims in Darfur in fighting against Arab herders and challenging the state.

Another major contributor to the insecurity in the region was the 1984-85 drought which heightened relations between Fur and Arab, and between Fur and Zaghawa pastoralists. The proliferation of automatic weapons made recurrent clashes over pasture lands and theft of livestock bloodier. In 1988-1989, the intermittent clashes in Darfur evolved into war between the Fur and the Arabs. It became a civil war and not just a communal conflict when the government in Khartoum began to arm the Arabs (HRW, April 2004, 7-9). By 1990-91, much of Darfur was in a state of war, with many villages being attacked (Metz, 1991).

The conflict in Darfur pitted the government of Sudan and allied militias, called the janjaweed, against an insurgency composed of two groups. The Darfur Liberation Front metamorphosed to the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Initially, rebels were made up of the Zaghawa, the Fur and the Masaalit. But later, the Jebel and Dorok peoples joined the rebellion (HRW, 2003:36).

In April 2003, the SLA launched a surprise attack on El Fashir, the capital of North Darfur, and damaged several government owned military aircraft and helicopters and looted fuel and arms depots. The Sudanese government responded with a heavy bombing campaign and the introduction of heavy equipment, including tanks to stave off rebel attacks (HRW April, 2004, 7-9). The Darfur region of western Sudan has been the site of terrible violence, death, and displacement; what the United States has labeled 'genocide.' Despite what is currently the world's largest relief operation, efforts to calm the conflict and assist the approximately five million Darfurians suffering ongoing deprivation have produced precious few results. With no end in sight for the turmoil, Ahmad Sikainga, a native of Sudan and Professor of History at the Ohio State University, explores the origins and current status of the Darfur conflict.

The Efforts of the African Union in Addressing the Human Security Challenges in Africa

The African search for human rights, dignity and identity crystallized into the formation of the Organization of African Unity in May, 1963. The Charter establishing OAU was based on the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference, and stipulated the struggle for the decolonization of Africa among its fundamental objectives, as it was believed that Africa could not be considered free unless the last colony had gained its independence, achieved the right to self-determination, and won the fight against apartheid (Gawanas, 2009:137).

Linked to this was an obligation on OAU member states to provide support to people involved in liberation struggles, as set out in Article 20(3) of the African Charter. Furthermore, the justification of human rights as the basis of OAU struggle was enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Rights 1949, which in its preamble recognizes the inherent dignity, equality and inalienable rights of all members of human family as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. It gave credence to the aspiration of African people.

Hence, the OAU was built on the theoretical foundation on Ubuntu as encapsulated on the concept of Pan-Africanism. However, the OAU perception of human rights as evidenced by the decolonization struggle and the right to self-determination precludes the salient rights of African people as it relates to their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights (Heyns, 2006:15).

The preponderance of human security pathologies and gross violation of individual rights within the continent as exemplified by the escalation of conflicts, increasing cases of genocides, killings, torture and other civil and political rights violations that beset the continent show that OAU failed to adequately addressed the aspirations of African people (Human Security Report, 2005:22). For instance, in 2007, Freedom House found that, of the 20 countries in world with the worst protection of civil and political rights, eight are in Africa (Cote dlvoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland and Zimbabwe). It also determined that, of the 45 countries classified as "not free" in the world, 18 are in Africa (Freedom House, 2007). Thus, 18 out of the 53 countries in Africa are seen to be not free. In the 1990s, 160 million Africans lived in countries ravaged by civil war; three million of them were killed

in the course of such conflicts (Sarkin, 2009:13). Intra-state conflict of this kind comprised 79 of the 82 conflicts on the continent during that period (Kibble, 2003). Of the 32 intra- and inter-state armed conflicts that have occurred worldwide since 2004, nearly half took place in Africa (Project Ploughshares, 2005:2). Children are often used as soldiers in these conflicts and it is estimated that 300,000 child soldiers are involved in 21 ongoing or recent armed conflicts around the world (Sheppard, 2000:12). It has also been estimated that 2 million children died and 6 million children were wounded as a result of conflict in the years between 1994 and 2004 (Davison, 2004).

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) states that there are about 37 million displaced people around the world as a result of conflict. Many of these people are in Africa, the largest numbers coming from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan and Somalia. 25 million of the 37 million are internally displaced people (UNHCR, 2006). From 1956 to 2001, 80 successful and 108 unsuccessful coups took place in Africa, nearly half of them in West Africa (McGowan, 2003:42). The fact that 50 of these coups, 13 of which were successful, took place in the final decade of the twentieth century indicates that forced regime change is on the rise. Even in relatively peaceful states, many Africans endure abject poverty and lack access to food and basic necessities such as potable water (McGowan, 2003:43).

In the face of these egregious human rights abuses and the incessant unconstitutional changes of government, the historical response both at continental and international levels, had been hand-wringing when hostilities break out, but little if anything in the way of serious preventive action, has been done. Yet, there are often obvious signs that war may be coming in particular official policies that violate human rights through systematic discrimination and disregard for the rule of law, stolen elections (if any are held at all), and impunity for gross abuses (Nowrojee, 2004:38). The major world powers have not given the United Nations (UN) the capacity to respond effectively to Africa's wars. Although, some of the Africa's former colonizers have sent troops in recent years to areas ravaged by conflict including the 2000 British intervention in Sierra Leone and the French engagement in Cote dlvoire in 2002. However, the major powers have repeatedly made it clear that they will not make the necessary commitment to prevent the massive human rights violations in Africa that result from conflict as evidenced by the neglect in such areas like Rwanda, the DRC, Burundi, and the Central African Republic (Nowrojee, 2004:40). OAU was handicapped as the principles of sovereignty and non-interference were repeatedly used to fend off criticism of state sponsored violence against its citizens (Kioko, 2003:809).

With the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, and the emergence of a new world order in which values like democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights had gained wider acceptability, the imperative need to find collective ways and means of effectively addressing the many grave problems of the continent such as endemic poverty, HIV/AIDS and armed conflicts, as well as responding to the challenges posed by a globalizing and integrating world necessitated the transformation of OAU to African Union in 9th July, 2002. African leaders were generally agreed on the need to promote and consolidate African unity, to strengthen and revitalize the continental organization to enable it to play a more active role and keep pace with the political, economic and social developments taking place within and outside the continent. These leaders felt that the many problems the continent was confronted with required a new way of doing things; such a new approach should include building partnerships between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youths and the private sector, as well as strengthening the common institutions and providing them with the necessary powers and resources to enable them to discharge their respective mandates effectively (AU Constitutive Act, 2000).

The AU is provided with the Constitutive Act that envisages a more integrated level of continental governance. Under the Act, there is a commitment to "promote and protect human and peoples' rights," and it specifies that "governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union." It also provides for a fifteen-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) to replace the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. The council will facilitate the AU's response to crises and will "promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts" (AU, 2002). The Article 4 (h) of the AU Protocol explicitly authorizes the organization to "intervene in a member state in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" (AU Constitutive Act, 2000).

At the same time as the process establishing the AU was ongoing, African governments led by South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria created another new mechanism known as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), to promote good governance and economic development. NEPAD rests on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a global war. It sees peace, security and democracy as prerequisite for attracting investments, garnering growth and development, and reducing poverty. It places demands on African governments to commit to a set of targeted initiatives intended to strengthen their political and administrative frameworks in line with the principles of transparency, accountability, integrity, respect for human rights and the promotion of the rule of law (NEPAD 2001: para. 1).). NEPAD is built on five core principles of good governance; entrenchment of democracy, peace, stability and security; sound economic policy-making and execution; productive partnerships; and domestic ownership and leadership.

One of the NEPAD systems for monitoring adherence to the rule of law is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) created in 2003. Under the APRM, a group of African "eminent persons" is to conduct periodic reviews of members' "policies and practices" "to ascertain progress being made towards achieving mutually agreed goals." Membership in the APRM is not mandatory. Rather, states choose peer review by signing an additional memorandum of understanding (Cilliers, 2004:5).

In 2002, the AU adopted a Memorandum of Understanding on Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). This includes a set of undertakings on a wide range of issues related to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The CSSDCA, loosely modeled on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), has a peer review implementation mechanism that resembles but in some respects is stronger than that of NEPAD. There are obvious areas of overlap between the CSSDCA and NEPAD, and there is now an attempt to coordinate the two processes, with ongoing discussions about harmonizing the standards used and division of responsibilities under the different review systems. The AU places much emphasis on the nexus between peace, democracy, and development. The organization's institutional architectures are based on the principle that democracy and development can help promote peace. Each of the three areas has its own protocol, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 2002; the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance of 2007; and the NEPAD Framework Document of 2001 (AU, 2002, 2007). Each also has a legal instrument with an implementation mechanism, the Peace and Security Council; the Democracy and Electoral Assistance

Unit; and the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency. The three sectors are intended to coordinate their efforts closely .The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) were both established in 2003 in support of NEPAD's work.

The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme of 2003 is recognized as a sound approach to rejuvenating and strengthening agricultural production and resource management, as well as food security on the continent. It seeks to provide a policy framework for the agricultural sector, which generates 35-40 per cent of Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs about 70 per cent of its population. In essence, CAADP is about bringing together diverse key players at the continental, regional and national levels to improve co-ordination, to share knowledge, successes and failures, to encourage one another, and to promote joint and separate efforts to achieve the CAADP goals. The overall, CAADP's goal is to eliminate hunger and reduce poverty through agriculture. To do this, African governments have agreed to increase public investment in agriculture by a minimum of 10 per cent of their national budgets and to raise agricultural productivity by at least 6 per cent (accessed at http://www.nepad-caadp.net/about-caadp.php). Thirty African countries had joined the programme by February, 2013, but just eight are allocating 10 per cent of their national budgets to agriculture as pledged in 2003, and only 26 have established appropriate plans and monitoring (Adebajo and Paterson, 2012:23). By January, 2013, 33 countries had joined the APRM, which sets and investigates standards of governance and addresses democratic deficits and to oversee important tax and electoral reforms. 17 countries have undertaken its review process (APRM January, 2013). Many African countries have also not signed the agreements regarding women's rights (ratified by 36 states), and combating corruption ratified by 34 states (AU 21 February, 2013). Moreover, seven African states have not signed the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (AU 28 February, 2013). Compliance with these mechanisms has been hampered by the non-binding nature of its findings and capacity constraints at the national level.

In the face of these daunting challenges, the AU has made some landmark achievements since its transformation. Between 1960 and 1990, no single ruling party in Africa lost power. Between 1989 and 1998, the number of multi-party political systems in Africa increased from five to 35. After 2002, ruling parties were voted out of power in Benin, the Central African Republic (CAR), Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Zambia though; the quality of democracy in many countries has arguably declined since 2005, in particular with the curtailing of political rights during elections.

Furthermore, the number of inter-state conflicts has decreased since the creation of the AU from eight in 2002 to four in 2012. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the African Union (AU) has made a significant contribution to this positive development through its peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-building and conflict transformation efforts.The AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) framework which was adopted at the 9th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council in Banjul, Gambia, in July, 2006, remains a credible conflict prevention tool for responding to current and future post-conflict security challenges or threats. It addresses the needs of countries emerging from conflict, including the requirements of affected populations, prevention of the escalation of disputes and avoidance of relapses into violence, as well as focusing on the root causes of conflict and consolidating sustainable peace (Addo, 2012:90). The PCRD framework has six key indicative elements that form the basis of efforts across different phases of action. These are security,

humanitarian/emergency assistance, political governance and transition, socio-economic reconstruction and development, human rights, justice and reconciliation, and women and gender (Mathews, 2009:29).

The AU had intervened in a variety of ways to prevent, resolve conflicts and ameliorate human security challenges within the continent. At the RECs level, the ECOWAS military interventions were witnessed in Liberia (1990-1998 and 2003), Sierra Leone (1997-2000), Guinea Bissau (1998-1999), Cote dlvoire (2003-2004), and Mali in 2012. The SADC intervened in Lesotho (1998), and Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998. At the regional level, the AU intervened were witnessed in Burundi (2003-2004), Sudan (since 2004), Somalia (since 2007) and in CAR since 2012 (Adebajo and Paterson, 2012:18). However, the numbers of localized crises and intra-state conflicts have continued to undermine its efforts. The AU Peace and Security Council is increasingly focusing on these conflicts. Between 2003 and April, 2013, 11 coups d'etat took place in Africa. The AU suspended Mauritania, Guinea, Niger, Madagascar, Cote dlvoire, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and CAR from its membership between 2008 and 2013.

To foster the role of civil society in its work, the AU established the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) in 2004, and the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) a year later. However, the PAP has yet to be granted legislative powers, while ECOSOCC has been largely ineffective in fulfilling its mandate of mobilizing grassroots participation in the AU's bodies.

However, one of the fundamental challenges faced by the AU is the relative powerlessness of its institutions. African member states sometimes do not comply with norms to which they have agreed, both on the continent and internationally. In addition, unlike the UN Security Council, the AU does not have a body with the power to enforce its decisions. The AU Peace and Security Council often lacks the power to implement its decisions with the possible exception of suspending countries whose soldiers have staged coups d'etat.

Since, the Africa's governance framework is premised on the voluntary compliance of member states for its implementation. If this cooperation is withheld, its structural mechanisms are undermined. For example, the APRM's authority has weakened since Tshwane questioned its findings on xenophobia in South Africa. President Thabo Mbeki's government objected to criticisms made in a 2007 report issued by the body, in particular dismissing its warning about a xenophobic threat in South Africa as "simply not true". Less than a year later, 62 African immigrants were killed and 100,000 displaced in xenophobic attacks (Mwanasali, 2012:73). Furthermore, other key AU agreements remain unratified by many member states (Engel, 2012:24). The African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance only reached its threshold of 15 signatories in January, 2012. The many states that have not signed the document are not obliged to observe its principles. Indeed, about one-third of AU member states actively oppose its efforts to entrench human rights and democracy principles and protocols, while many others appear to support its goals merely in response to peer pressure.

Other challenges facing the union are lack of consensus, weak early warning capabilities in intelligent field, lack of financial and institutional capacities for intervention and donor dependency (African Briefing Report 16 May, 2011). The dynamics of inter-governmentalism, tensions within its supranational architecture, weak institutional and political integration of its RECs, coupled with ambiguities in terms of common governance values and standards have impeded the effectiveness of the Union in promoting human security in Africa. To this end, the AU's credibility, authority and reliability have suffered following several crises in the past to which this paper is of the opinion that the proposed

AU roadmap for resolving conflicts and promotion of human security should be the priority base of action at present if African human security issues must be put behind the yearning and aspiration of the entire continent.

Conclusion

It is evidence that the preponderance of human security pathologies and gross violation of individual rights within the continent as exemplified by the escalation of conflicts, food insecurity, endemics of HIV/AIDS, awful cyclical dependence, increasing cases of genocides, killings, torture and other civil and political rights violations that beset the continent show that OAU actually failed to adequately addressed the aspirations of African people (Human Security Report, 2005:22). Hence, the course of the new AU, that has moved from difference to indifference, non-interference to interference and non-collective security to collective security with the existence of one high command should not only be taken as a working document but ... should be the basis of every actors' action towards the African project in tackling the level of human security challenges that has impeded all progress for peace and development in the continent.

The Horn of Africa cannot be left alone with its daunting challenges that have rendered the region less important and inactive in the scheme of things in Africa politics and government. It should not only be known with the incidence of terrorism, food insecurity and rebels incursions. The African states hold it as a duty to engineer a turnaround proactive measure that could reposition the needful to be done in Africa, especially as affecting human security challenges.

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