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## **Insurgency, Forced Migration and the Question of Human Capital Development in North-east Nigeria (2010-2015)**

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### **Abstract**

At the moment, insurgency has continued to exact high cost on human capital development across the North-East states (Borno, Adamawa and Yobe) in Nigeria. In fact, it is on record that insurgent activities occasioned by Boko Haram insurgency in the North East Nigeria have over the past five years created about 1.5 million Internally Displaced Persons, who have not only have to move from their place of abode but have lost their means of livelihoods, food reserves, and therefore facing a very bleak future. Interestingly, some Nigerians from the affected states have even gone as far as migrating to neighbouring countries like Cameroun, Niger Republic and others. Incidentally, while attention to the challenges of migration from the global south to the global North has increased over the past years, the Impact of forced migration caused by Insurgency and the attendant human capital development challenges within the global south has remain insufficiently explored. This paper therefore investigates the inter-linkages between Insurgency, forced migration and human capital development with particular interests on how to provide good health services as well as quality education, which are necessary for human capital development, to this category of people. The Import of the paper therefore, Is the attempt to suggest ways through which the state and non-state actors could alleviate human capital within the constraints posed by forced migration in Nigeria. This would also be relevant for countries facing forced migration caused by Insurgency.

### **Keywords**

Insurgency, Forced Migration, Displacement, Human Capital, Development, North-East Nigeria

### **Introduction**

Nigeria at the moment has over four million internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have been forced to leave their communities and homes. In fact according to International Displacement Monitoring Centre in 2013 Nigeria is the third worst country in the world ranking of IDP numbers, following Syria (6.5 million) and Colombia (5.7 million) (Premium Times, December 22, 2014). The cause of IDPs in Nigeria can be traced to violent conflicts and natural disasters such as flooding, landslides, surges and fire outbreak. However, the number of those people displaced by violence, especially the one perpetuated by the radical Islamic sect know as Jama'atu Sunnah Ladda'awatih wal-Jihad (People Committed to the

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Propagation of the Prophet's Teaching and Jihad or Boko Haram) far outweighed those displacement caused by natural circumstances.

This Boko Haram sect, which colloquially means "Western education is sin" is an extremist Islamic sect poised to create an Islamic state in Nigeria based on sharia law. The group came into being in the mid-1990s around Maiduguri in the North-Eastern state of Borno under one Abubakar Lawan (Copaland, 2013). During this period the sect lacked any coherent identity until it came under the leadership of an Islamic cleric known as Muhammad Yusuf. The sect later spread from the city of Maiduguri in Borno state into other North-Eastern states like Yobe, Adamawa and Bauchi. In the course of time, the group attracted more followers by addressing their basic physical needs such as food, shelter and other forms of welfare handouts, which the people were not able to receive from the state. Thus, Nigerian unemployed youths and war refugees across the border from Chad, Mali, Sudan, Libya, etc formed the bulk of the group's membership (Awortu, 2015).

According to Gilbert (2014), the Boko Haram sect killed over 2,000 persons in 2014 alone and is responsible for more than 12,000 deaths and over 8,000 maimed persons since it started its murderous campaign of insurgency. These killings and destruction of properties have reduced the work force in the affected region of the country, destroyed properties that owners cannot recover in their life time, defaced the beauty of towns, cities and villages, increased destitute in the society and have largely increased the number of people that were forced to move from their homes to displacement camps and other regions that are believed to be relatively safer.

According to the statistics released by the Internally Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), as of April 2015, an estimated 1,538,982 people that were forced to flee their homes in Nigeria were still living in internal displacement camps during that period. The biggest rise in the number of IDPs was registered in Borno state, one of the three North-Eastern states most affected by Boko Haram violence, followed by Adamawa and Yobe (IDMC, 2015). Ironically while poverty is unevenly distributed in Nigeria the North-Eastern region which is largely affected by the activities of the sect has been the most poverty ridden region of the country and with paucity of skilled human capital, even before the emergence of the insurgency. The activities of the Boko Haram sect therefore worsen an already worst situation.

For instance the National Bureau of Statistics' Report (2012) showed that 70% of Nigerians in the North-Eastern part of the country (Boko Haram's traditional stronghold) lived on less than one US dollar a day compared to 50 and 59% in the South-Western and South-Eastern Nigeria respectively. Also, government's demographic and health survey in 2008 cited in Human Right Watch Report (2012) revealed that less than 23% of women and 54% of men in the North-East Nigeria could read and write compared to more than 79% of women and 90% of men in the South. Furthermore, chronic malnutrition among children is also more prevalent in Northern Nigeria than in the South. Infrastructural development also lags behind in the North. In the North-East, for instance, only 24% of households have access to electricity compared with 71% of households in the South-West (Wakili, 2013; Ugwu, 2015).

Therefore the plight of displaced persons as a result of insurgency in a region that has been battling with challenges of poverty and human capital development for decades has become a formidable problem of a great significance and implications for the Nigerian state. While government at various levels have been donating relief materials to displaced victims especially those in IDPs camps across the country, individual philanthropists and organisations have also been assisting in providing relief to victims, the

condition of the camps however is said to be appalling as basic infrastructure is lacking. Source of clean water, clinic, toilets, shelter, and lack of school, food and clothing are facilities the displaced persons at the camps have to grapple with. The most vulnerable among them remain women and children and new babies born in camps. Unfortunately, human capital challenges that this forced migration induced by the Boko Haram insurgency throw up and which it might also throw up in the future have remained largely unaddressed.

Upon the backdrop of the above, this paper which major objective is how to address the issue of human capital development within the context of forced migration induced by insurgency is divided into five sections. The first section attempts a conceptual clarification of major terms, section two takes an overview of the activities of the Boko Haram sect in North-East Nigeria, section three analysis the impacts of forced migration, while the fourth section examines how to address human capital challenges posed by insurgency induced forced migration and such other human capital challenges it might likely cause in the future, for the Nigerian state.

### **Conceptual Clarification**

Under this section attempt is made to examine scholars position on some of the major terms used in the work as well as the context in which they are applied in the course of our analysis;

### **Insurgency**

According to Powell and Abraham (2006), Insurgency refers to a violent move by a person or group of persons to resist or oppose the enforcement of law or running of government or revolt against constituted authority of the state or of taking part in insurrection. Traditionally, insurgencies seek to overthrow an existing order with one that is commensurate with their political, economic, ideological or religious goals (Gompert and Gordon 2008). According to Kilcullen (2006), insurgency is a struggle to control a contested political space, between a state (or a group of states or occupying powers), and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers. Insurgency according to Wikipedia is a movement with a specific aim. According to this source, the ultimate goal of an insurgency is to challenge the existing government for control of all or a portion of its territory, or force political concessions in sharing political power. Insurgencies require the active or tacit support of some portion of the population. External support, recognition or approval from other countries or political entities can be useful to insurgents, but it is not required.

It is pertinent to observe that insurgency is different from terrorism. First, while some of the more successful insurgencies employed terrorism and terror tactics, and some developed into conflicts where terror tactics and terrorism became predominant; there have been others that effectively renounced the use of terrorism. The deliberate choice to use terrorism considers its effectiveness in inspiring further resistance, destroying government efficiency, and mobilizing support. Insurgency is applied in the context of this paper as a movement with the aim of creating an Islamic state in Nigeria based on sharia law.

### **Forced Migration**

The term forced migration is fraught with controversial and, sometimes, contradictory interpretations and connotations. We talk of forced migration in opposition to voluntary migration. In this way, displacement is viewed from its causes and/or from its purpose. Thus, accordingly, we may talk of economic migration as opposed to socio-political migration (Turton 2003). Whereas, the former refers to migrants who leave their respective residence and settle elsewhere in search of economic opportunities such as employment, business opportunities, education, etc. (Berger 1987; Adepoju 1989, Rwamatwara, 2005); the latter refers to migrations caused by social and political problems such as armed conflicts, human rights violations, natural disasters, etc. (Berger 1987; Bolzman 1996, Anthony, 1999, Rwamatwara, 2005). In these cases forced migrants, commonly referred to as refugees, flee their places of residence for their physical security and to protect themselves from an imminent threat to their physical well-being. Thus, Nick Van Hear (1998) talks of voluntary as opposed to involuntary nature of the forces that lead to migration. Anthony Richmond (1994) distinguishes between 'proactive' and 'reactive' migration. He classifies migrants in two main categories of those with agency (choice) and those without agency, forced migrants being those with little or no agency.

According to Deng (1993) forced migration is associated with the threat and/or fear that force people to flee their place of residence in search for security and safety. In Sen (1981) and Deng (1993) opinion and as supported by Rwamatwara (2005) forced migrations can be divided into two categories depending on the causes of displacement. In their claim we can distinguish between forced migration caused by natural disasters on the one hand and migration caused by violence and/or armed conflict, also known as man-made displacement as well as migration in response to repressive state policies and persecution, that is, refugee migration in a narrow sense, as defined by international humanitarian law, on the other. However, the realities in Africa show many instances where the delimitation between these types of migration is not clear. Their causes and consequences also present socio-political and economic factors specific to African historical realities.

Under this work we shall adopt the definition of forced migration suggested by the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration (IASFM) which describes the phenomenon as 'a general term that refers to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people (those displaced by conflicts) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects' (International Association for the study of Forced Migration online). For the purpose of this work therefore forced migration is applied to describe those that are forced to flee their homes to displacement camps or neighbouring states as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency.

### **Human Capital**

Human capital according to the Wikipedia is the stock of knowledge, habits, social and personality attributes, including creativity, embodied in the ability to perform labour so as to produce economic value (Available at Wikipedia.org). Alternatively, Human capital is a collection of resources—all the knowledge, talents, skills, abilities, experience, intelligence, training, judgment, and wisdom possessed individually and collectively by individuals in a population. These resources are the total capacity of the people that represents a form of wealth which can be directed to accomplish the goals of the nation or state or a portion thereof. It is an aggregate economic view of the human being acting within economies, which is an attempt to capture the social, biological, cultural and psychological complexity as they interact in explicit and/or economic transactions (Ibid).

### **Insurgency and Forced Migration in the North-East Nigeria: An Overview**

At the risk of being repetitive especially as we have established under the introduction of this paper, but as matter of emphasis we shall point to the fact that the Boko Haram, which its promoters translate to mean "western education is sin" is referred to by its adherents as "Jama'atu Ahlussuna Lidda'wati Waljihad". This group is an extremist Islamic sect poised to create an Islamic state in Nigeria based on Sharia law. The group came into being in the mid-1990s around Maiduguri in the North-Eastern state of Borno under one Abubakar Lawan (Copeland, 2013 cited in Odo, 2014). The sect lacked any coherent identity until it came under the leadership of an Islamic cleric known as Muhammad Yusuf.

In 2003, Yusuf led the sect in a movement, which espoused a conservative theology that opposed the Nigerian secular state referring to it as corrupt and unislamic (Odo, 2014; Ugwu, 2015). The sect later spread from the city of Maiduguri in Borno state into other states like Yobe, Adamawa, and Niger. In the course of time, the group attracted more followers by addressing their basic physical needs such as food, shelter and other forms of welfare handouts, which the people were not able to receive from the state. Therefore, Nigerian unemployed youths and war refugees across the border from Chad, Mali, Sudan, Libya, etc formed the bulk of the group's membership (Ugwu, 2015). The group/sect is believed not to be against Christian alone but supports opposition to the Muslim establishment and the government of Nigeria. The group largely conducted its operations peacefully between 2002 and 2008. In 2009, based on security reports, the Nigerian government started investigating the activities of the sect. This was on account of security reports that its members embarked on stocking arms and arming themselves as reported in the Guardian Newspaper (2009). It was believed that the government initially ignored the reports on the sect prior to 2009.

Thus, the group had remained relatively docile and un-noticed by the larger Nigerian population and the international community until July, 2009, when it clashed with the security forces resulting in the death of its leader, Muhammad Yusuf. The deputy leader of the group, Abubakar Shekau, assumed the mantle of leadership of the group and organized deadly attacks on the civilian population, government establishments, military and police installations, schools, churches and mosques, offices, including United Nations Headquarters in Abuja. These operations expanded Boko Haram's theatre of activities from the North-Eastern states to other parts of the north such as Kano, Kaduna, Niger, Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, Jigawa and Abuja (Ugwu, 2015). Of particular concern are the growing sophisticated arms and weapons used by its militants in these attacks, evidenced in seizures made by security forces in North-Eastern Nigeria.

Going by their activities and mode of operation, it is necessary to emphasise that the Boko Haram sect appeared determined to establish control and authority over the Northern parts of Nigeria and progressively overwhelm the rest of the country. Their activities are thus, no less an armed revolt against the sovereign state of Nigeria. As former president of the country, Goodluck Jonathan notes, the Boko Haram group in many places have destroyed the Nigerian flag and other symbols of state authority and in their place hoisted strange flags suggesting the exercise of alternative sovereignty (Wakili, 2013; Ugwu, 2015). This is to confirm the fact that the sect pursues a fanatical agenda of mayhem, mass murder, division, and separatism, which conflict with government's duty and obligation of ensuring the security and well-being of its citizens as well as protecting the territorial integrity of the Nigerian state.

In fact as Agomuo (2011) argues, for a while, the sect targeted serving and retired military and other security personnel, perhaps to avenge the blood of Yusuf their leader who as stated above was allegedly

killed in 2009 by some policemen. More so, since they started their operations, members of the sect have assassinated a number of high profile Islamic scholars in Maiduguri and like Afghanistan Taliban, the group has also attacked many drinking and eating rendezvous where they dispatched hundreds of souls to their early graves. Furthermore, clashes with security agents in 2009 escalated in July of that year into a full scale armed insurrection targeting police headquarters, stations and police officers homes in a failed attempt to establish an Islamic state in Maiduguri and some cities in the North-East (CGAR, 2014).

As Walker (2012) observes, since August 2011 there have been almost weekly attacks by the Boko Haram militants planting bombs in public or in churches in Nigeria's North-East geopolitical zone. For instance, on 2 December 2013, about 200 insurgents dressed in military uniform and armed with rocket launchers and explosives with assault rifles infiltrated Maiduguri and conducted coordinated attacks on the Nigerian Air Force base and military barracks. In 2014 and 2015, Boko Haram attacks have increased resulting to high death toll and kidnapping of women and school girls. Examples of these include April 14, 2014 bomb blast in Nyanya District of Abuja killing about 75 people and leaving not less than 215 others injured, the April 15, 2014 abduction of over 250 school girls by the Boko Haram group from Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, Borno State (Gilbert, 2014), the Thursday May 1 2014 bomb blast that rocked Nyanya area of Abuja killing about 71 persons and injuring several others (Sahara Reporters, 1st May 2014). From the foregoing, it is glaring that Boko Haram insurgency has unleashed several attacks on Nigeria rendering many lives and properties destroyed, invariably leading to mass exodus of people from their homes.

The above suggests the fact that one of the major effects of the insurgency in the North-East and other affected areas in the North was the forced migration of the people in the affected areas from their homes. Therefore, some of those that were displaced have their homes and properties destroyed due to the attacks by these insurgents, while some fled their homes to displacements camps and neighbouring states due to the fear of been attack by the sect. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) no fewer than 6 percent of those displaced in Nigeria were those fleeing inter-communal clashes and disasters, while the vast majority of the displaced people in the country were those displaced by the activities of the Boko Haram sect. According to the report released by the centre in 2015, while most were displaced in 2014, up to a third fled violence in the first four months of 2015 alone. We shall illustrate this with the example below. According to Philip (2012), soon after the Boko Haram's attack on Kano in January, 2012, the Kano chapter of Ohanaeze Ndigbo (a socio-cultural body of the Igbo speaking people from the South-Eastern part of Nigeria) issued a press statement thus:

*The Igbos resident in Kano is living with naked fear and apprehension. Though there are few of us who like to stay and defend ourselves, the majority of us, particularly women and children numbering over three million are jostling to leave the north because unfolding events indicate that the north is no longer safe for Easterners. Ohanaeze Ndigbo, Kano, hereby calls on the governors of the Eastern states and the South-South to provide means of transportation with adequate security to evacuate our brethren who would want to leave because human life is precious and should be protected as such (Ugwu, 2015:54).*

Various reasons have been advanced to explain the increased activities and the destructive tendencies of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria. One of the arguments is that the Boko Haram sect under the leadership of Yussuf and Abubakar Shekau took advantage of the failure of the Nigerian government at all levels in the North (Local, State and Federal government) to provide basic welfare schemes to criticize western education and drum up support for their false Islamic teachings. They thus exploited the lacuna created by the high unemployment level, non-availability of basic infrastructure and the general high poverty level in the area to their benefit through the deliberate strategy of providing some welfare packages to the citizenry. Consequently, they used food, money and employment to attract youths to their fold and created the impression that their fundamentalist Islamic viewpoint of societal organization is better and more profitable than the western capitalist mode of production. Eventually, they succeeded in garnering support from the youths whom they recruited as suicide bombers and fighters under the leadership of Shekau who took over after the untimely death of Yussuf in police custody in 2009. And it was this second phase of violent attacks by Boko Haram that have increased forced migration and its attendant challenges in Nigeria (Awortu, 2015), herein lays the focus of this study.

### **Impacts of Forced Migration on Human Capital: The North-East Nigerian Example**

It is an indisputable fact that forced migration has a very negative impact on human capital development. Forced migration has a very negative impact on the displaced people, the host community of the displaced people and a range of stakeholders. Under this section we shall pay more attention to how forced migration has negative effects on human capital in respect of the displaced people and the society at large. References would only be made to the impact of forced migration on the host community and range of stakeholders in order to emphasise a particular point. Furthermore, the impacts of forced migration on human capital development of displaced people shall be juxtaposed with the impacts of operational approaches to respond to forced displacement situations for the purpose of explanation.

Before venturing into the analysis of the impacts of forced migration on human capital development in the North-East, Nigeria, it would be relevant to state further that the impact of displacement vary according to a range of key factors, including the time-frame, the duration of the displacement, and whether short- or long-term impacts are to be identified and estimated (University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre, 2015). It is therefore essential to mitigate a variety of potential dangers which may arise when estimating the costs of displacement. For instance, the different socio-economic profiles of displaced populations might potentially lead to the conclusion that the displacement of a relatively small number of skilled individuals leads to a greater loss to the economy of the state of origin, and therefore requires a more significant response from the government, as compared with the displacement of a much larger number of, for instance, subsistence farmers or nomadic pastoralists (Ibid).

More so, the demographic composition of the displaced population influence the kinds of socio-economic impacts experienced as a result of displacement. Therefore, the gender, age, family size and composition, physical ability, educational levels, existing skills, and nature of social networks of a displaced population are amongst the characteristics which will influence the extent to which forced migration affects human capital development (Ibid). We shall in turn attempt a critical examination of the impacts of forced migration on the displaced populations and the entire society with reference to the North-Eastern region of Nigeria.

Forced migration typically has particularly notable impacts on the health and well-being of displaced populations, including: injuries sustained before and during displacement increased susceptibility to

infectious diseases and illnesses, trauma and mental health conditions, consumption and nutrition, etc. With respect to the increased susceptibility to diseases and illnesses especially to those in enclosed camps, this may be due to unbalanced nutritional intake, low levels of immunisation and vaccination, exposure to new illnesses in transit and host environments, illnesses related to poor sanitary infrastructure and/or over-crowding, and limited access to clean water and healthcare services (University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre, 2015).

According to Omole et al (2015), Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states, health indices such as maternal and child mortality are worst in the North- East region compared with elsewhere in Nigeria even before the insurgency. They further justify their claim by stating that in 2013, 53 cases of polio were recorded in Nigeria, more than half of which were in Borno and Yobe. More so, apart from few official camps (housing about 150, 000 people) with potable water supplies, internally displaced people access water from streams. According to them in Malkohi camp in Adamawa state, for example, about 50 cases of diarrhoea occur per week in a population of about 1000 people. Respiratory tract infections rank second, with about 30 cases per 1000 people per week (Omole et al, 2015). Thus, the maternal and child mortality invariably affects the number of skilled manpower and by implication the level of human capital development in the area. Omole and his colleagues succinctly paint the gloomy health situation of the displaced persons thus:

*there Is high measles outbreak with hundreds of cases in North-East Nigeria; cases of malaria are more difficult to ascertain because the diagnosis is often recorded as fever, especially if a qualified health worker is not available to examine the patient; estimations of the incidence of Injuries are uncertain, mainly because only Individuals with major injuries present for treatment; about one In five people in the camps are severely malnourished, Including children and nursing mothers; no facilities are available for pregnant women, they give birth under risky conditions and all the maternal deaths on record in the Adamawa camps have been caused by excessive bleeding; there is the spread of HIV infection (Omole et al, 2015:35).*

They substantiate the last point by underlining the fact that in Adamawa state, some individuals with HIV and other chronic diseases, such as hypertension and diabetes, have been off medication for at least 3 months. Furthermore, the primary obstacle in accessing health care for many IDPs is their lack of resources, including the money to pay for transport to the nearest facilities, which can be some distance away (Multi-Sectoral Assessment, May-June 2014). Though the Nigerian government ordered hospitals to treat IDPs free of charge on receipt of a SEMA letter authorising their expenses, SEMAs, however failed to reimburse hospitals, leading them to refuse to accept the organisation's letters in lieu of payment. This has effectively priced IDPs out of medical treatment, given that they have to pay an initial registration fee of 500 naira (\$2.80) plus their consultations and medication costs.

Unfortunately for IDPs, especially those in Adamawa state there were few if any medical supplies in government health facilities in the state (USAID, 30 July 2014). Therefore, in communities without health programmes run by international NGOs, many IDPs have no access to health care at all (IDMC



2014). As the saying goes that a healthy nation is a wealthy nation, the lack of adequate health facilities for those displaced by insurgency invariably affects the level of human capital in the North-East, Nigeria.

The incidence of forced migration as a result of insurgency has also affected the education of both the displaced population and those still living in most areas in the North-East Nigeria, which incidentally already has a very high rate of illiteracy. According to EI-Rufai (2012) if one take the education of the girl-child as indicator the South-East having an enrolment rate of 85%, South-West having an enrolment rate of 85%, South-South 75%, while the North-East has 20% and North-West 25%. From this statistics it is crystal clear that the North-East zone of Nigeria which is mostly affected by insurgency already has the highest percentage of children who have never attended school, the lowest literacy rates and the highest percentage of children who not able to read. Thus, considering the relevance of education for human capital development the North-East region is at the risk of having serious paucity of quality human capital.

We shall furthermore make some illustrations to buttress this position and to also establish how insurgency is affecting education and by implication human capital development. We shall kick-start such illustration and analysis by positing that in local government areas in the region where people have been displaced because of the Boko Haram insurgency schools were shut for two years. For instance, schools are still closed in about 20 of the 27 local government areas in Borno State. Interestingly, some schools are used as IDPs camps which have made it practically impossible for the students in those schools to resume normal academic activities (The Punch Newspaper, January 16, 2016). An official of the Borno State Universal Basic Education Board claims that some schools in the state, particularly boarding schools, have been closed down for about two years. The official said only day schools in a few local governments in the state are open to pupils as residents of other local governments have had to vacate their homes. According to the official, boarding schools have not resumed because most of them are used as IDPs camps. And until people vacate the IDP camps, the schools cannot reopen.

The implication of the above is that pupils from these schools have lost about two years; especially the ones who were supposed to take the West African Senior Secondary School Certificate Examination and that of the National Examination Council. The official said persons from more than 20 local governments in the state now reside in Maiduguri and a few other local governments, meaning that pupils from as many as 10 schools could be attached to one. More so, some of the teachers in the local governments that were unsafe have joined the teachers in the schools that are open but a lot of them have been displaced too, so some of them are not really in the schools anymore (The Punch Newspaper, January 16, 2016).

Similar fate also befalls those children in various displacement camps. Available record shows that most of the displaced population are women and children, majority of who are in displacement camps. According to statistics reeled out by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), there are 258, 252 babies and minors, 207, 583 women and 147, 894 men in various camps for internally displaced persons across the federation (Daily Independent, 2015). The children in these camps have not been provided with opportunity to enrol in schools since there are no schools in these camps. For children who are within the schooling age deprived of their opportunity to education constitute a serious challenge to the future aspiration of the affected children.

Furthermore, with many IDPs sheltering in schools and humanitarian assistance often limited to life saving interventions, displaced children are generally unable to pursue their education. Boko Haram

attacks against schools since 2012 and state governments' closure of facilities in the worst affected areas, such as Borno state, have drastically decreased access to education. For instance, all schools in the towns of Baga, Bama, Jajeri, Umarari Garnam, Mai Malari, Mungono and Gamboru which were forced to close between February 2012 and June 2013 are yet to be reopened. More so, all state schools in Borno that were closed in March 2014 have not been reopened. We shall however state that the displaced children's access to education varies from state to state.

Moving away from the impact of forced migration on education is my attempt to examine impact of this forced displacement on the increase of housing needs of the displaced population and the implication of this on human capital development. During the insurgency by the Boko Haram sect/group most Reuses and properties are always destroyed, looted or burnt down (Ladan, 2012), Therefore, most often IDPs in the North-East region flee to neighbouring communities that are relatively safe, usually taking refuge in temporary shelters such as public buildings, schools, and places of worship among others; having been deprived of their homes and sometimes their land and livelihoods. They most times lack access to necessities of life such as food, water and shelter. It is a common logic that when people decide to flee from insurgents they sacrifice their homes, livelihoods and the support of their communities in order to ensure their immediate safety. The effect of this on rental value is three fold. Areas which experienced net population gain had increased rental values due to increased demand for residential apartments and vice versa for areas with low net loss. In areas where population change is even, there was little or no change in rental pattern. Eme and Ibietan (2012) noted that rent in major metropolises in Yobe, Kano and Borno reduced significantly as the crisis accelerated. This is normal as population depletes. The same logic could also be used to explain rent increase in satellite towns of Abuja where displaced persons from the affected North-East states have rushed to for safety.

Another problem which is quite related to the above is that the task of rebuilding homes is daunting for those IDPs who decide to return to their areas of origin and start to live a normal life. According to Global IDP Project, homes and infrastructure have often been systematically destroyed and looted during - and sometimes after-outbreaks of violence or insurgency, in order to deter returning IDPs. This is evident in the Nigerian situation, especially as it relates to my case study. For instance, Human Right Watch reported that thousands of residents of Baga in Borno State, North-Eastern Nigeria, remained displaced for fear of further clashes breaking out between radical Islamist group (Boko Haram) and troops from the Nigeria-Niger-Chad Multi National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) (Olukolajo etal, 2014). Logically therefore people in such areas are living a life without a secured future.

In another dimension we shall underscore the fact that insurgency induced forced migration is associated with separation from sources of Income and lack of income-generation opportunities. This is anchored on the fact that in those areas affected by insurgency many people are naturally severed from their sources of income and therefore cannot engage in profitable ventures. For instance, one of the damages caused by the Boko Haram insurgents is that people living around Sambiza forest, such as Maiduguri, Konduga, Mafa, Dikwa, Damboa, Kala-Balge among others did not farm in some farming seasons because the insurgency did not allow them to do so.

More so, economic activities in Borno state dropped to its lowest ebb as a result of the protracted Boko Haram insurgency which has made it impossible for traders to move from one location to another and the

inability of farmers to cultivate their crops which they sell to supplement their food crops. While the insurgency lasted, only farmers in southern Borno were able to farm as their counterparts in the northern and Central zones were constantly subjected to attacks when they attempted go to their farms (Gabriel et al, 2014). The simple logic in this claim is that the displacement of farmers means that land is not being cultivated for consecutive growing seasons and the multiplier effect of this is that people in the North-East Nigeria who are largely farmers and pastoralists have been cut-off from productive activities for the period in which the insurgency has lasted. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) has pointed to this direction when it establishes the fact that more than 60 percent of the farmers in the food basket near Lake Chad have fled (Daily Mirror Newspaper, December 06, 2014).

Accordingly, there are continue concerns about food security and its effects on the survival of the population of those in displacement camps as well as those still living in the insurgency ravaged areas. Thus, the scourge of the Boko Haram has increased the challenges of food scarcity in Nigeria, which has larger implication on human capital development. For instance in July, 2012 when there was increased in the attacks perpetuated by the sect prices of food items and vegetables skyrocketed in the southern part of the country. This was as a result of the inability of traders from the north to transport commodities to the south and the low level of farming in the North. It should be emphasised that most of the migrants from the north are in their productive age and farmer and trades men by profession. This explains why most of the motorcycle riders in the Western States who initially were farmers and pastoralists are of Northern extraction. The danger is that they have abandoned their profession (farming) as this has reduced food production and compound the problem of food importation in Nigeria. As Okpaga et al (2012) observe in 2011 Nigeria spent unprecedented over 10 billion dollars on importation of four food items alone including sugar, wheat and rice.

Furthermore, refugees compelled to stay in remote refugee camps where the only possible sustaining activity is small scale farming have been forced to further migrate to urban areas in search for alternative income generating activities. These are mainly the youth who cannot foresee any meaningful future by staying in a remote closed IDPs camp and educated displaced persons who cannot use their skills while staying in a remote rural IDPs camp. Once in urban centres, the majority of these forced migrants lead a destitute life which has been compelling some of them to engage in illegal activities for survival (Rwamatwara, 2005).

### **Addressing Human Capital in the Face of Forced Migration**

Under the above section I have variously established that those that have been forced to migrate from their homes due to insurgency live life of misery either in their enclosed camps or in their host communities, which grossly has implications for human capital development. As we have stated earlier, most of the displaced people who are not in IDPs camps have to seek out friends, relations and village mates to stay with. Others are dependent on religious organisations. Given the general poverty in the North-East the quest of taking care of IDPs in the North-East Nigeria is a real strain on the government, non-state actors and host communities. With every sense of objectivity it is not a misplaced position to assert that the Nigerian government, non-state actors and host communities have been trying to ameliorate the plight of the displaced victims. For instance, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) through the coordination of emergency relief operation to IDPs have distributed agricultural inputs to farmers to boost food security in North-East Nigeria. Moreover, the Nigerian government through NEMA also established Strategic

Response Plan since 2013 at various communities in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States to cater for the humanitarian needs such as food insecurity, malnutrition and epidemics to displaced persons. The government also established a five years developmental plan (2010-2015) under NCFR with the responsibility for overseeing all IDPs and refugee matter in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States (Emmanuelar, 2015).

It is however important to quickly establish the fact that NEMA only appears after a tragedy has occurred and provides some emergency relief such as food and first aid medical facilities, which does not address the nutritional needs of the people and beddings. More so, NEMA does not have the mandate to address the real needs of IDPs in terms of food security, education, child protection, health, nutrition and water, sanitation and hygiene. The National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons has statutory responsibility for IDPs in the country. They have however not been heard of since the problem of IDPs, especially as it relates to Boko Haram attacks, became chronic. They simply have not been provided with the resources to do their work, not even the resources to register and monitor the conditions of IDPs. Virtually all the available resources go to NEMA, which has strong political support but has no mandate to address medium and long-term needs of IDPs and refugees (Premium Times, December 22, 2014).

Thus, the upsetting scenario of forced migrants especially as it relates to educating the displaced children propelled the Kano State Government in North-West Nigeria to establish a special boarding school to cater for the educational needs of some of the affected children. The school, located within Kano city has more than 100 children from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states who were displaced by the insurgency. The affected children are receiving education and psychological therapy, courtesy of the Kano State Government. This special intervention programme is aimed at taking up full responsibility of 100 children, who are between the ages of 5 and 6 years. These are children whose parents are dead, displaced or missing as a result of the insurgency. The state government will take care of the children's education, training, upbringing, feeding, clothing, security, health care and accommodation.

Under this arrangement the government would look after the children until they completed their basic education, while the security situation in the states affected by the insurgency had improved considerably to facilitate their safe return to their states (The Nigerian Observer, October 21, 2015).

In fact, as part of efforts to add value to the initiative, the Nigeria Federal Government has established special mobile classrooms to cater for the educational needs of the children of IDPs in the North-East. Inaugurating the mobile classroom programme at Dalori IDPs camp in Maiduguri, the Vice President of the country, Yemi Osinbajo said that the facilities would help school-age children in the IDPs camps to receive quality education before they could return to their respective homes in the liberated communities. The scheme is just a pilot programme and a temporary measure to address the challenge of insurgency as it affects the education- of many school-age children who were forced to flee their communities as a result of Boko Haram attacks. It is expected that the mobile classrooms could be moved to other locations whenever the IDPs finally returned to their communities (The Nigerian Observer, October 21, 2015).

It is important to point out that both the Nigerian authorities, Non-Governmental Organisations and the international community have focused on addressing human capital challenges occasioned by insurgency in North-East Nigeria, the emphasis on short-term and emergency response prevents understanding of how vulnerabilities increase with each cycle of displacement and how to facilitate IDPs' achievement of

durable solutions (IDMC, 2014). More so, national efforts to respond to displacement and mitigate its long-term effects on IDPs and human capital tend to be fragmented, uncoordinated and inadequate. It should also be clearly stated that the absence of humanitarian law and policy framework in Nigeria to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of humanitarian agencies hampers the coordination of various humanitarian efforts. Similarly, the lack of systematic data collection continues to pose serious challenge of difficulty in estimating the exact total number of displaced people in need as well as the lack of access to rural areas by various humanitarian agencies due to its volatility (Global IDP Project 9th May, 2014).

From the foregoing it is crystal clear that the Nigerian government needs to move from palliatives measures at addressing the problems of human capital caused by the Boko Haram insurgency by embarking on actions and policies that focus on rehabilitation, resettlement, return and re-integration of forced migrants after displacement. The starting point of such move is the formulation of National Policies or Plan of Action that can complement national legislation on displaced population. Such National Policies or Plan of Action should for example spell out national and local institutional roles and responsibility for responding to internal displacement as well as identify the mechanism for coordination. The policy should extend to all relevant branches of government - national, local, military and police - and also to non-state actors who also must be held accountable. The policies should be tailored according to guiding principles on internal displacement. Guiding principles are the first international standards specifically tailored to the needs of IDPs. Based on international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law by analogy, the Guiding principles set forth the right of IDPs and explain the obligations of national authorities and non-state actors towards IDPs. They cover all phases of internal displacement: the pre-displacement phase during displacement; and during return or resettlement and re-integration (Oduwole & Fadeyi, 2013).

The final section of the Guiding Principles emphasizes the importance of providing IDPs with long term options, namely voluntary return in safety and dignity or resettlement in another part of the country. It also emphasize the importance of ensuring durable solutions, including the needs to provide IDPs with integration assistance, whether they return or resettle, and to ensure they have equal access to public services. In addition, this section explains the beauty of national authorities to assist IDPs recover the property and possessions they lost upon displacement or, when this is not possible, to assist them in obtaining compensation or another form of just reparation.

Throughout the guiding principles special attention is paid to the protection, assistance and reintegration needs of women and children. The guiding principles call for the participation of women in the planning and distribution of relief supplies. They require special attention to be paid to the health needs of women, including access to female health care providers and services, and special efforts be made to ensure the full and equal participation of women and girls in educational programmes. They also prohibit sexual violence, stress the need for family reunification, and highlight the right of women to equal access to personal identity and other documentation and to have such documentation issued in their own names. Principle 23 recognizes the right to education and states that special efforts must be made to ensure that women and girls enjoy equal and full participation in educational programme (Ibid).

Importantly, the guiding principles are being used at the national level in countries affected by internal displacement. In Africa for example, Angola led the way as the first country in the world to incorporate the Guiding Principles into domestic legislation, with the Norms for the Resettlement of displaced

populations. For instance, they affirm that all returns must be voluntary and should occur in conditions of safety. They specify that returning IDPs are to have access to land and should receive seeds and tools. Further, the Norms provided that rule of law and public infrastructure such as schools must be located in areas of the returnees. Nigeria at the moment need to conclude the process of developing this policy on internal displacement which it has already drafted, as a comprehensive concern on displacement, addressing all its probable causes, including conflict, natural disaster and development projects. To be most effective, the policies should be developed in full consultation with civil society and IDPs communities and disseminated to IDPs in their own language and in form they can easily understand (Oduwole & Fadeyi, 2013). Such policies and National Plan of Action would immensely ameliorate the plights of forced migrants from incidences of displacement and ensure rehabilitation, resettlement, return and re-integration after displacement.

The logic running through this work and which cannot be overemphasised is that the plight of forced migrants is rather pathetic and there is urgent need to assist these set of people. The support for local integration of IDPs can mean offering land and housing solutions through social housing programme, construction grants in the affected place of displacement, new housing and cash assistance, and legal assistance in Nigeria. The government at various levels must also intensify integration of local communities in providing security solution in their domains (Olukolajo et al., 2014). More so, the government has a duty to establish conditions to allow forced migrants to return voluntarily, in safety and dignity, to their places of habitual residence or, if they choose, to resettle in another parts of the country, and to assist forced migrants to recover property and possession or obtain compensation or reparation. Decisions on when displacement ends must be taken on the basis of humane criteria ensuring respect for the full range of human rights of the displaced (Oduwole & Fadeyi, 2013).

A closer partnership between International donor agencies and the Nigerian government in mitigating the plights of the forced migrants in this regard would be invaluable. There is also the need of proactive disaster management in Nigeria. This is because insurgency induced displacement has been consistently occurring and it is almost becoming inevitable too. Instead of approaching disaster from charity perspective, there must be collaborative efforts by the government at various levels and must be given national attention. There is therefore the need to establish a National Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of forced migration and displaced persons in Nigeria. The Trust Fund would enable the Nigerian government and contributing donors to respond to different dimensions of emergency situations by intervening jointly, flexibly and quickly, in response to changing needs. The proposed Trust Fund will support stability, promote resilience, economic development, security, and migration management. It will provide Nigerian State with a swift and flexible tool capable of delivering more rapid results. At the same time it provides a platform for stronger political visibility and will contribute to a more integrated and coherent approach.

It is also expected that as immediate assistance to forced migrants economic activities and outcomes should be maximised within IDPs camps. That is there should be policies granting displaced people freedom of movement and permission to work outside of camps. In some other countries where there are cases of internally displaced persons living in camps informal camp economies are often established, run and managed by displaced people themselves. International policies which attempt to maximise displaced people's economic activities in IDPs camps, are often premised upon the desirability of promoting self-sufficiency in camps in order to facilitate self-sufficiency upon return (i.e. Dube and Koenig, 2005 re

Dadaab and Kakuma camps in Kenya). Therefore, in the Nigerian context diverse motivations behind, and impacts of the promotion of economic activities and outcomes in IDPs camps must be borne in mind during the collection and analysis of data (University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre Review on the costs and impacts of forced displacement). This could also include the training of IDPs in basic vocational training that would assist the displaced people in the process of resettlement and rehabilitation.

The suggestions under this section remain durable solutions and long term means of ensuring the (re)integration of forced migrant populations into a wider community and to also enhance human capital development. Though it is expected that forced migrants in Nigeria would suffer political, social and economic marginalisation and stigmatisation in the process of reintegration and rehabilitation, but such challenges are surmountable. Long-term studies of repatriation has consistently demonstrate the difficulties of integration, particularly following protracted forced migrants situations or if the insurgency cause of forced migration has not be resolved (Koser 2007; Milner 2009; Adelman 2009; Haider 2009) This study is mindful of such constraints and has therefore suggested options as exhibited under this section to address both the short and long term challenges of the insurgent induced forced migrants.

### **Conclusion**

As exhibited under this study, forced migration as induced by the activities of the Boko Haram insurgency has contributed to the human capital development challenges in the North-East Nigeria. This is more pronounced in the manner at which the insurgency has affected education, health and source of livelihoods of those that have been displaced and other stakeholders that have been staying in the affected areas despite this insurgency. The question that therefore arises under this work is that how do the Nigerian state and other non-state actors address the problem of human capital development considering the fact that the North-East of Nigeria has been the most underdeveloped region, especially as relates to human capital development, in the country before the Boko Haram insurgency.

The suggestions under this work remain more lasting solution at addressing the challenges posed by the Boko Haram insurgency, in respect of the issue of human capital development. Such measures at addressing the challenges include the need to formulate policies and plans of actions that focus on how to address the challenges of forced migration induced by insurgency. The plan of actions and policies include the resettlement and reintegration of displaced people in which the activities of the government and non-state actors remain invaluable, especially for a region that has been the least developed region in human capital development, before insurgency.

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