Globalisation and Transnational Terrorism in West Africa: Islamic State, West African Province (ISWAP) Dimension

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Abstract

Propagators of globalization have emphasized full beneficial packages from the networks of socio-economic and political activities of nations. Unfortunately, the outcome of the global interactions among nations continuously left scares of wounds and pains as daily experiences for many. Transnational terrorism is such dilemma that breaks the backs of the big and small players in the system. In West African sub-region, a terrorist group, ISWAP holds states in bondage with military weapons of modern technological innovations and intelligence. Based on the foregoing, this paper examined the activities of ISWAP to ascertain how globalization has aided this terrorist adventure and undermined globalization benefits. The study is exploratory in design and qualitative in methodology. It utilized documentary method of data collection analysed through qualitative content analysis. Regional Security Complex Theory served as a theoretical framework for explanation. Findings showed that globalization has contributed to the emergence, expansion and consolidation of transnational terrorism by aiding the spread of extremist ideology and providing terrorists with access to modern communication tools and new opportunities. This resulted from national leadership incompetence, unprepared embrace of globalization, poor bargaining capacity and new forms of imperialism. Based on the above findings, the paper argued that until the negative effects of globalization are controlled, the benefits will continue to experience setbacks in many social formations. Transnational terrorism in West Africa and the world should be a collective concern through shared intelligence, coordinated efforts, and joint strategies by authorities and other stakeholders. Identification and freezing of terrorist assets, prevention of the flow of illegal funds, drug trafficking, kidnapping and money laundering are viable options in this direction using well trained and committed security personnel for implementation.

Keywords

Globalisation, Terrorism, Transnational Terrorism in West Africa, ISWAP

Introduction

The processes of interconnectivity, expansion and consolidation of human interactions in politics, economies, technology, science and other human engagements around the world is understood as globalization. It is a complex system of interconnections across different domains influenced by various interlinked elements, including advancements in technology, economic interdependence, and human

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movement. The "cobweb model" is a theoretical construct that effectively represents the trajectory of globalization (Bloor, 2022). The benefits and pains are distributed across nations depending on operational capacities of nations to navigate in the global system and the vulnerability to the undesirable conditions of the system. Transnational terrorism is an epitome of such pains militating against the peace and security of the world.

However, it is not a strange phenomenon; rather it is an outcome of the opposition of interests and roles of nations and a condition where resistance meets illiberal governance, exploitation, hegemony and stringent socio-economic and political conditions that result from them. Terrorism is a manifestation of the negative tendencies in man – the evil in man (Agbaenyi, 2022). It is a confirmation of the realist understanding that man is by nature selfish (Machiavelli, 2015). Man's selfishness transferred to the state led to the production of weapons of mass destruction and undermined production of food and other necessities of life.

In today's era of globalization, the pace of events has been remarkable with consequences that can be immediate and far-reaching across different parts of the world. The advancement of communication technology has connected the world in ways that were once unimaginable. As McLuhan (1964) notes, we now live in a "global village," and some have even suggested that globalisation marks the end of distance (Cairncross 1997). Over the past 50 years, globalisation has been built on a complex network of communication in the political, cultural, and economic domains. The term "interconnectedness" succinctly captures the phenomenon of globalisation (Cairncross 1997). Ultimately, globalisation is a process that fosters greater and broader levels of interaction and integration among various entities, including international organizations, multinational corporations (MNCs), and states. Transnational networks go beyond conventional boundaries, making them mostly relevant in a world system that is progressively interconnected.

The three conventional categories of globalisation are economic, political, and socio-cultural. Each of these domains illustrates the degree to which the world is interconnected, and it seems improbable that this will change in the foreseeable future. Economic globalisation, for instance, has turned the world into a global marketplace where local and national economies are interdependent, with supply and demand dynamics that go beyond national borders. For instance, a child selling or promoting a homemade product outside her home may accept various currencies in advertisements for the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd. (HSBC). Such a scenario would have been unimaginable before the advent of globalisation. Deregulation and technological advancements have led to an increase in economic interdependence. The 2008 financial crisis and credit crunch were clear indications of this trend. The financial contagion was the result of a complicated interplay between deregulation, investment in subprime mortgage bonds, the issuance of low-cost mortgages, and the failure of banks in the United States to consider systemic risk.

Politically, the relevance of the Westphalia concept of the nation-state has been challenged by globalisation. The notion of national sovereignty has been a fundamental aspect of international relations for a long time. However, due to the interdependence of the global system, nation-states are compelled to collaborate in addressing cross-border issues such as terrorism, security, and refugee migration, among others. In a globalised world, even the most powerful states work with other actors to achieve their objectives, as demonstrated by the increased importance of International Organizations at both the global (United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, International Criminal Court, etc.) and regional (European Union, African Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, etc.) levels, where such interconnectivity, cooperation, and common interest are evident (Bloor, 2022).

The Internet has revolutionized cultural interactions, bringing people together in ways that were previously unimaginable. The statistics are staggering; with Facebook having a population that surpasses that of any country in the world (Taylor, 2016). Additionally, the number of monthly Twitter users now exceeds the entire population of the United States (Statista Research Department, 2021). Such unparalleled levels of communication promote even greater economic and political interconnectedness. Protests against the Tunisian regime, for example, spread via social media to five other countries in 2011, resulting in the overthrow of several long-standing regimes, the consequences of which are still being felt today in both Syria and Libya.

Terrorism, whether domestic or international, is controversial on the purpose and function of the actors, identities of the perpetrators and victims; legitimacy, as well as techniques and targets. However, the term is generally considered derogatory and implies disapproval. Labelling a group as terrorist typically has a negative impact on the public's perception of the group's legitimacy, legality, and how they should be dealt with. Therefore, it is crucial to differentiate a terrorist organization from any other group. In this study, terrorism is defined as the use or threat of violence by non-state actors to influence populations or governments in the pursuit of political or social change.

Rapoport (2004) categorized the history of terrorist groups into four waves, each defined by the global political climate of the time. He observed that nationalist and anti-colonialist movements gained strength after the First and Second World Wars, while anti-communist and anarchist movements proliferated during the Cold War. It is now suggested that a new, or fifth, wave of modern terrorist organizations has emerged, which is both a product of, and a challenge to core globalisation ideals, giving terrorism a transnational character. It is worth noting that in the past, some terrorist organizations had global aspirations but lacked the modern tools to expand and deepen their messages. Transnational terrorism is prevalent in numerous countries today, exploiting the "shadow globalization" flows of people, weapons, and information to advance their agenda. The emergence of this new form of terrorism reflects the globalization of human interconnectedness. Mandaville (2007) proposed in his article on Al-Qaeda, one of the first terrorist organizations to be classified as a "fifth wave," that their early success was due to their utilization of global technology, mythology, and ideology.

In West Africa, the phenomenon is complex with several underlying factors. Two of the primary causes are poverty and economic inequality, which are prevalent in West Africa, particularly in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. These countries also face other challenges, such as inadequate governance, corruption, and ethnic and religious tensions. These issues contribute to the proliferation of transnational terrorist groups, which exploit the grievances of marginalized communities to gain support and recruit members.
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is another underlying factor of transnational terrorism in West Africa. Weapons have flooded the region from various sources, such as arms dealers, rebels, and state actors. This has facilitated the acquisition of weapons by terrorist groups and enabled them to carry out attacks. Additionally, the proliferation of weapons has exacerbated community conflicts and contributed to the disintegration of law and order in many regions.

There is a notable gap in literature concerning the interrelationship between globalisation and the activities of ISWAP. This is noteworthy in the face of the fact that the agents of globalisation have done nothing less than increasing the level and ease of interconnectedness around the world, such that no part of the world is completely out of reach from other parts of the world. As ideas and people move and interact, so do terrorists and weapons and in this case members of ISWAP. This research aims to tackle the growing threat of transnational terrorism in West Africa, with a particular focus on the dangerous terrorist organization known as ISWAP. This group has carried out numerous deadly attacks in the region, posing a significant threat to the security and stability of the affected countries. Moreover, the group has taken advantage of the region's porous borders to move freely between countries, making it challenging for law enforcement agencies to track down and apprehend its members.

Given the significant threat that ISWAP poses to the region, it is crucial to develop effective strategies to counter its activities.

Methodology
The paper is exploratory in design and qualitative in method. The documentary method of data collection was adopted. This involves the review of academic journals, books, and online resources. Qualitative content analysis was used for the analysis of the data.

Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) was adopted as a theoretical framework for explanation. Regional Security Complex Theory was developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever and advanced in their book *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, which was published in 2003. The theory posits that the security of each state is interconnected with the security of other states within a defined geographical region. This theory is based on the premise that an identifiable set of states whose primary security concerns are so interconnected, their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.

The theory identifies three key features of a regional security complex: Anarchy pattern: The security of each state is primarily affected by neighbouring states. In West Africa, the security of states like Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon is interconnected given their proximity and shared borders. Security interdependence: The security of each state is intertwined with the security of other states in the region. The activities of ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin have destabilized the region and threatened the security of all states. No state can resolve this threat alone. Regional mechanisms: States develop mechanisms to manage their security interdependence. In West Africa, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was set up to address regional security threats. However, they have been largely ineffective against ISWAP due to lack of resources and coordination.

ISWAP, a splinter group of Boko Haram, has been active in the Lake Chad Basin, which includes Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The group's activities have not only destabilized these countries but have also threatened the security of the entire West African sub-region. The transnational nature of ISWAP's activities, facilitated by globalization, has made it difficult for individual states to combat the group effectively.

The anarchic pattern is evident in the inability of individual states to effectively combat ISWAP. The group exploits the porous borders and weak governance structures in the region to carry out its activities. This has led to security interdependence among the states, as the instability in one state can easily spill over into neighbouring states. The regional mechanisms to manage this security interdependence have been inadequate. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), established by the Lake Chad Basin countries to combat Boko Haram and ISWAP, has been hampered by a lack of resources and coordination. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has also been unable to effectively address the threat posed by ISWAP.

The RSCT provides a useful framework for understanding the security challenges posed by ISWAP in West Africa. It highlights the interconnectedness of the security of states in the region and the need for a coordinated regional response to effectively combat the group. However, the theory also underscores the challenges in achieving such a response, given the weak governance structures and resource constraints in the region.

Globalisation and Transnational Terrorism in West Africa
Globalization plays a significant role in the growth of international terrorism (Furedi, 2019). It has facilitated the dissemination of extremist beliefs and provided terrorists with modern communication technologies, enabling them to enlist new followers and orchestrate activities (Hafez, 2017). Additionally, globalization has generated new avenues for terrorists to take advantage to heightened cross-border movement of individuals and merchandise, along with a surge in global trade and investment (Acharya, 2018). Consequently, governments have struggled to address the issue of terrorism while preserving worldwide peace and security. Walther (2018) asserts that globalization has been a crucial factor in promoting the expansion of transnational terrorism in West Africa. Globalization has led to the development of transnational criminal networks involved in various illicit activities, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and arms smuggling (Nacos, 2017). These networks often have connections to terrorist groups, providing them with funding, weaponry, and other resources for executing attacks. Moreover, due to globalization, information and communication technology have become widespread, simplifying the planning and coordination of terrorist activities (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010). For instance, terrorists can utilize the internet to disseminate their beliefs, attract new followers, and communicate across international boundaries.

The global arms trade is another way that globalization has facilitated transnational terrorism in West Africa. Numerous terrorist organizations in the area have acquired weapons from external suppliers, including Russia, China, and the Middle East. The global arms trade has made it simpler for these groups to access advanced weaponry, which they employ in assaults on both civilian and military objectives. The increased availability of small arms and light weapons has intensified security concerns in West Africa and fuelled the emergence of groups like ISWAP (Small Arms Survey, 2020).

ISWAP
The Islamic State, West Africa Province (ISWAP) is a jihadist organization that arose in 2016 as a Boko Haram splinter group. Its activities have increased significantly in West Africa, particularly in Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, resulting in an increase in violence, insecurity, and human rights violations in the region. Boko Haram has conducted a series of lethal attacks on civilians, security forces, and government installations in Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, resulting in widespread fear, displacement, and a humanitarian crisis in the area. In 2015, a faction of Boko Haram pledged loyalty to the Islamic State (IS), a jihadist organization based in Syria and Iraq, and subsequently renamed itself the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) in 2016. ISWAP has since become the dominant jihadist group in the region, surpassing Boko Haram and other militant groups. Its leader, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, is the son of Boko Haram's founder, Mohammed Yusuf, and serves as the governor of IS's West African province. Al-Barnawi has demonstrated greater strategic thinking than his predecessor, Abubakar Shekau, in terms of tactics, recruitment, and ideology. He has placed greater emphasis on targeting military and government installations rather than civilians and has successfully recruited a significant number of fighters from the Fulani herdsmen community, which is largely impoverished in the region.

Activities of ISWAP
ISWAP has engaged in a range of activities in West Africa, including targeting military and government installations, abducting individuals for ransom, and conducting propaganda. These attacks have increased in frequency and severity in recent years, leading to significant casualties and displacement of civilians in the region. Poverty, marginalization, and political instability have played a crucial role in the proliferation of extremist ideology in West Africa (Zenn and Omeje, 2020). Pieri, (2018) notes that the jihadist insurgency in Nigeria is rooted in a complex interplay of social, economic, and political factors, including sectarianism, corruption, and underdevelopment.

Attacks on Military and Government Targets

ISWAP has carried out a series of attacks on military and government targets in Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, using a range of tactics such as suicide bombings, ambushes, and raids. In Nigeria, ISWAP has targeted military bases, police stations, and prisons, killing scores of soldiers and police officers and freeing hundreds of detainees. In Chad, ISWAP has attacked military convoys and bases, killing dozens of soldiers and capturing military equipment. In Niger, ISWAP has attacked military and police posts, killing civilians and soldiers. In Cameroon, ISWAP has attacked military and police posts, kidnapped civilians, and looted villages (Nwi Fru and Tayo, 2021).

Kidnapping for Ransom

ISWAP has also been involved in kidnapping for ransom, targeting foreigners, aid workers, and local civilians. Its most high-profile kidnapping was the abduction of over 270 schoolgirls from Chibok, Nigeria, in 2014, which drew international attention and condemnation. ISWAP has also kidnapped dozens of aid workers, journalists, and religious leaders, demanding ransom payments in exchange for their release. The group has used the proceeds from kidnapping to fund its operations and recruit new fighters.

ISWAP Propaganda

According to Rosand (2018), ISWAP's achievements in Nigeria can be credited to a blend of military expertise, strategic partnerships, and impactful propaganda. The group has been utilizing social media and propaganda videos to disseminate its ideology and attract fresh recruits. These videos showcase ISWAP fighters engaged in combat, conducting training exercises, and providing assistance to civilians.

ISWAP Strategies

ISWAP has been employing several strategies to expand its reach and influence in West Africa. These strategies include:

Territorial Control: ISWAP has been trying to establish a territorial base in the Lake Chad Basin region, particularly in Nigeria's Borno State. The group has been engaging in territorial battles with the Nigerian military, displacing civilians, and setting up its governance structures in some areas.

Exploitation of Local Grievances: Akyeampong and Schmidt (2019) assert that ISWAP has been successful in attracting new members by framing their actions as part of a broader struggle against Western influence and corruption. Additionally, the group has capitalized on the grievances of the lower class in their area of influence, who are often marginalized and neglected by the government. By offering economic incentives such as money, cattle, and weapons, ISWAP has been able to recruit a significant number of fighters from this community. Zenn and Omeje (2020) highlight the significance of poverty, marginalization, and political instability in promoting the spread of extremist ideology in West Africa.

Co-opting of Other Militant Groups: ISWAP has been trying to co-opt other militant groups in the region to expand its reach and influence. It has formed alliances with Ansaru, another jihadist group in Nigeria, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), a jihadist group operating in the Sahel region.

Internationalization ISWAP Operations: ISWAP has been trying to internationalize its operations by forging alliances with other jihadist groups and establishing links with IS in Syria and Iraq. It has also been trying to attract foreign fighters to join its ranks.

Impact of ISWAP's Activities on Security in West Africa

ISWAP's activities have had a significant impact on the security of West Africa, particularly in Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Its attacks have caused widespread fear, displacement, and humanitarian crisis in the region. Some of the impacts of ISWAP on the security of West Africa include:

Loss of lives: ISWAP's attacks have caused significant casualties among civilians, security forces, and government officials in the region. According to the Global Terrorism Index (2020), ISWAP was responsible for 1,311 deaths in 2019, making it the deadliest terrorist group in sub-Saharan Africa.

Displacement of Persons: ISWAP's attacks have caused the displacement of millions of people in West Africa. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] (2020), there were over 2.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria alone as of 2020.

Humanitarian Crisis: ISWAP's activities have caused a humanitarian crisis in the region, with millions of people facing food insecurity, lack of access to healthcare, and other basic needs. According to the UN, over 7.7 million people in the Lake Chad Basin region were in need of humanitarian assistance as of 2020.

Economic Impact: ISWAP's activities have also had an economic impact on the region, with businesses and markets being disrupted, and infrastructure being destroyed. According to the World Bank (2018), the economic impact of violent extremism in West Africa could cost up to $18 billion by 2030.

Agents of Globalisation and the Activities of ISWAP
Globalisation has aided the activities of ISWAP in West Africa as a result of technological advancements which have led to the bypassing of geographical borders and swift trans-border transactions. There are a number of agents of globalization that have aided the activities of ISWAP. These include:

Swift Transport Systems: ISWAP members are able to travel easily between countries thanks to the availability of swift transport systems, such as airplanes, speed boats, heavy duty trucks and Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs). This makes it difficult for law enforcement agencies to track and apprehend them. Research indicates that ISWAP is experimenting with using drones to transport explosive devices. They are testing how much weight different drones can carry, the maximum distance they can travel, and how long they can stay airborne. The potential threat from these drones goes beyond just military targets and could also disrupt the delivery of humanitarian aid (Institute of Security Studies [ISS], 2023).

Modern Sophisticated Information and Communication Technology: ISWAP uses telecommunication technologies, such as the internet and mobile phones, to communicate with each other and to spread their propaganda. This allows them to coordinate their activities and to recruit new members. ISWAP heavily depends on fast satellite internet for its communication with the Islamic State and other factions. According to ISS sources, ISWAP utilizes Thuraya Wi-Fi and spends around US$6,000 each month on data. Initially, Lagos was their primary source of supply, but due to supply issues, they had to shift to Chad. Despite the illegality of Thuraya satellite phone and internet services in Chad, they are being used covertly. Data on ISWAP's public communications suggests that they easily communicate data with Islamic State by employing data compression and archiving software. In addition to speed and encryption, the programme saves money on bandwidth (ISS, 2023).

Image 1.**Use of technology by ISWAP**   **Source: ISS 2023**

The image above depicts a wide range of communication technologies demonstrating ISWAP's sophisticated use of such tools. They have access to satellite and android phones, drones, social media platforms like Telegram and WhatsApp, high speed printers, laptops, digital cameras with high definition capabilities, WiFi networks, microphones, walkie talkies, and software for compressing and archiving data. ISWAP utilizes an extensive communication technology arsenal.

Illegal and Unregulated International Financial Systems: ISWAP terrorists depend on a cash economy which is a major factor sustaining their nefarious activities. They raise funds through illegal and unregulated trans-border finance systems, such as hawala networks, kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling, extortion, and protection levies, illegal money transmission to businesses and individuals, trans-border drugs and human trafficking. Sales and purchase of foreign currency notably the US Dollars in the country occur with limited oversight. A number of Bureau de Changes have been identified in TF relating to insurgency (Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit [NFIU], 2022). This makes it difficult for law enforcement agencies to track the flow of money to the group. Hawala is a traditional system of transferring money that has been used for centuries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. It is a system that operates outside of the formal banking system and is based on trust and personal relationships. Hawala networks are used to transfer money between individuals and businesses across borders, often without the need for physical movement of cash.

The hawala system is based on a network of brokers who act as intermediaries between the sender and the receiver of funds. The sender gives money to a hawala broker in one country, who then contacts a broker in the recipient's country to arrange for the transfer of funds. The recipient can then collect the

money from the local broker in their country. The brokers charge a commission for their services, which is usually lower than the fees charged by traditional banks.

One of the key features of the hawala system is its reliance on trust and personal relationships. The brokers in the network are often members of the same community or family, and they have built up a reputation for honesty and reliability over time. This trust allows the system to operate without the need for formal contracts or legal agreements.

Hawala networks have been used for a variety of purposes, including remittances, trade finance, and money laundering. The system is particularly popular for remittances, as it allows people to send money to their families in other countries quickly and cheaply. In some countries, hawala networks are also used to finance small businesses and trade transactions. ISWAP have been known to exploit the hawala system to transfer funds across borders. They use hawala brokers to move money from one country to another, often using false identities or aliases to avoid detection. The brokers charge a commission for their services, which is usually lower than the fees charged by traditional banks.

Fluid borders: The fluid borders in West Africa make it easy for ISWAP members to move freely between countries. This makes it difficult for law enforcement agencies to track and apprehend them.

The Impact of Swift Transport Systems on ISWAP Activities
1. **Facilitation of cross-border movement:** The development of modern transportation systems, such as highways, railways, and air travel, has enabled ISWAP to move its members and resources across borders with relative ease. This has allowed the group to establish a presence in multiple countries, expand its operational reach, and evade security forces. The porous nature of borders in West Africa further exacerbates this issue, as it becomes increasingly difficult for authorities to monitor and control the movement of people and goods.

2. Rapid Deployment of Resources and Personnel: Swift transport systems have also allowed ISWAP to quickly mobilize and deploy its fighters and resources to areas where they are needed most. This has enabled the group to respond rapidly to changing circumstances on the ground, launch surprise attacks, and maintain a high level of operational flexibility. The ability to move personnel and resources quickly has been a key factor in ISWAP's resilience and adaptability in the face of counter-terrorism efforts.

The role of modern telecommunication in ISWAP operations
1. Coordination and Communication of Members: Advances in telecommunication technologies, such as mobile phones and the internet, have provided ISWAP with the means to communicate and coordinate its activities across vast distances. This has allowed the group to maintain a decentralized organizational structure, making it more difficult for security forces to target its leadership and disrupt its operations. Encrypted messaging apps and other secure communication platforms have further enabled ISWAP to operate with a degree of secrecy and evade surveillance efforts.

2. Recruitment and propaganda: Telecommunication technologies have also played a crucial role in ISWAP's recruitment and propaganda efforts. The group has made extensive use of social media platforms, websites, and online forums to disseminate its message, attract new followers, and recruit fighters. By leveraging the global reach of the internet, ISWAP has been able to expand its support base and maintain a steady flow of recruits, ensuring the group's continued growth and operational capacity. Additionally, the use of online propaganda has allowed ISWAP to shape public opinion, instil fear, and create an environment conducive to its objectives.

The Influence of Illegal and Unregulated International Finance Systems on ISWAP Funding
1. Money laundering and Illicit Financial Flows: Unregulated financial systems, such as informal money transfer networks (hawala) and offshore financial centres, have provided ISWAP with the means to launder money and engage in illicit financial activities. These systems enable the group to move funds across borders without detection, obscuring the origin and destination of the money. This financial secrecy allows ISWAP to fund its activities, purchase weapons and supplies, and maintain its operational infrastructure without attracting the attention of law enforcement and regulatory authorities.

2. Access to Global Financial Networks: Unregulated financial systems also grant ISWAP access to global financial networks, enabling the group to tap into a wide range of funding sources. This includes donations from sympathizers, ransom payments from kidnappings, and proceeds from criminal activities such as drug trafficking and smuggling. By exploiting these unregulated financial channels, ISWAP can secure the resources it needs to sustain and expand its operations, while simultaneously evading the scrutiny of international counter-terrorism efforts.

The Consequences of Fluid Borders for ISWAP Activities
1. Ease of movement and infiltration: Fluid borders in West Africa, characterized by porous and poorly monitored boundaries, facilitate the ease of movement and infiltration for ISWAP members. These weak border controls enable the group to move freely between countries, establish new cells, and carry out cross-border attacks with relative impunity. This lack of effective border security undermines regional counter-terrorism efforts and allows ISWAP to maintain a persistent presence across West Africa.
2. Exploitation of Weak Border Security: ISWAP exploits weak border security to smuggle weapons, supplies, and personnel across international boundaries. The group takes advantage of corrupt officials, inadequate border infrastructure, and limited surveillance capabilities to move resources and fighters between countries undetected. This ability to exploit weak border security enables ISWAP to maintain a steady flow of resources and personnel, ensuring the group's continued operational capacity and resilience in the face of counter-terrorism efforts.

Findings
Findings shows that globalization has contributed to the emergence of international terrorism by aiding the spread of extremist ideology and providing terrorists with access to modern communication tools and new opportunities to exploit. ISWAP's ability to exploit globalization has been a significant factor in its growth and success. The interconnectedness created by globalization has enabled ISWAP to operate more effectively, making it easier for them to recruit members, raise funds, and acquire weapons. The group has used social media and other online platforms to spread its message and recruit new members, taking advantage of the ease of communication and information sharing that globalization has facilitated. Additionally, the group has been able to tap into global financial networks to raise funds, making it more difficult for authorities to track and disrupt its financial operations.

It is evident that information and communication technology, swift transport systems, illegal and unregulated international financial systems, and fluid international borders in the West African sub-region, have made it easier for terrorists to organize and coordinate operations across borders, as well as propagate their ideology, recruit new members, and communicate with its followers. ISWAP has access to satellite and android phones, drones, social media platforms like Telegram and WhatsApp, high speed printers, laptops, digital cameras with high definition capabilities, WiFi networks, microphones, walkie talkies, and software for compressing and archiving data. They utilize an extensive communication technology arsenal.

ISWAP's success in West Africa can be attributed to a combination of high fire power (which is a consequence of the indiscriminate small and light arms proliferation in the West African sub-region aided by fluid borders and weak border security), strategic alliances, and effective propaganda aided by modern

telecommunication systems, swift transport systems, and fluid borders, which are agents of globalisation. The group has also taken advantage of the region's weak governance and corruption to establish a foothold in many areas, exploiting the grievances of marginalized communities to gain support and recruits.

The paper also found out that the global arms trade has facilitated the acquisition of sophisticated weapons by terrorist groups, contributing to the rise of groups like ISWAP. The increased availability of small arms and light weapons has intensified security concerns in West Africa and fuelled the emergence of groups like ISWAP (Small Arms Survey, 2020).

Conclusion

The implications of globalisation on transnational terrorism in West Africa are far-reaching. Increased connectivity, advancements in communication technology and transportation, have facilitated the dissemination of extremist ideologies, recruitments, and the movement of fighters across international borders. Globalized economies have also provided opportunities for illicit financing and the smuggling of weapons, further exacerbating regional instability. Globalisation has created a complex network of interdependence across economic, political, and cultural domains. This interconnectedness has challenged the traditional concept of national sovereignty and has led to the rise of transnational terrorism. Islamic State in the West African Province is an example of a terrorist organisation that has taken advantage of the interconnectedness brought about by globalisation. They have used the flows of people, weapons, and information to further their cause and operate in many states. This new form of terrorism mirrors the globalization of human interconnectivity. It is clear that globalisation has had a profound impact on the world, and its effects, both positive and negative, will continue to be felt in the future. It is up to us as a global community to find ways to manage the negative consequences of globalisation, such as transnational terrorism, while still reaping the benefits of interconnectedness.

Recommendations

1. Addressing the root causes of terrorism, such as poverty and inequality, should be a top priority for governments and international organizations. This can be done through policies that promote economic growth and social development, address corruption, and promote good governance.

2. Strengthening Border Security: Terrorist groups in West Africa often move across borders, making it difficult for governments to track and apprehend them. Strengthening border security through the deployment of border patrols with serious stop and search protocol, intelligence sharing, and the use of technology such as drones can help to prevent the movement of terrorists across borders.

3. Enhancing Regional Cooperation: Regional cooperation among West African countries is crucial for effective counterterrorism efforts. Governments in West Africa should work together to share intelligence, coordinate their efforts, and develop joint strategies for combating terrorism.

4. Disrupting Terrorist Financing: Disrupting the financing of terrorist groups is a critical aspect of counterterrorism efforts. Governments and international organizations should work together to identify and freeze the assets of terrorist groups, and to prevent the flow of funds to these groups through illicit means such as unregulated hawala operations, drug trafficking and money laundering.

5. Entrenching Good Governance across Nations: One of the remote causes of terrorism is bad governance and the resultant stringent socio-economic and political conditions undergone by the people. When governance is illiberal citizens find themselves in tight socio-economic and

political situations. Resistance in form of terrorism is the reaction to such misrule particularly when is prolongs.

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