Fiscal Federalism and Local Government Autonomy in Nigeria

Abstract

The paper attempts to interrogate the problem of fiscal federalism and local government autonomy in Nigeria. It examines the nature, conceptual and theoretical perspectives of fiscal federalism and local government autonomy; the fiscal jurisdiction and revenue rights accorded to local governments; the central-local fiscal relations and its implications for local government autonomy. In addressing the subject matter, the paper critically examines the issues from secondary sources (textbooks, journals, the internet, archives, and so on), using qualitative and documentary analyses as methodological approaches. Findings from the paper reveal that certain provisions in the 1999 constitution limits local government autonomy, especially Clause 15, section 162, that deals with direct payment from federation account to local governments' accounts., Again, there is inadequacy of fiscal jurisdiction and revenue rights that could guarantee local government autonomy. Furthermore, the state governments usurp the role of local governments and manipulate the Joint State-Local government account to their favour. The paper, therefore, argues that "fiscal decentralism" should be embraced as a way of accelerating socio-economic development, improving local government autonomy, and ensuring efficient service delivery to the people at the local level.