Civilian Joint Task Force as a Supplementary Force in the Boko Haram Conflict in the Lake Chad Region

Abstract

The Boko Haram insurgency has been raging since 2009. It has cost many lives, displaced many people and destroyed the sources of livelihoods of the inhabitants of the region and its environs. Several strategies were adopted individually by Nigeria, and collectively, by the Lake Chad Basin Commission member states and Benin Republic (LCBCs+Benin), in order to prosecute the war to its logical end and bring peace to the region. The people of Borno State of Nigeria, mostly youths, came up with the idea of a non-combatant, voluntary Civilian Joint Task Force to assist the military, first, with intelligence, and later assisting in operations and guarding the IDP Camps. However, the CJTF has been levelled with allegations of exploitation and molestation of girls and women in the camps and in regained territories. This paper looks at the role the CJTF plays in the fight against Boko Haram as well as its missing links. Using documentary analysis and anonymous interviews, this paper finds out that the CJTF assists troops in fishing out the Boko Haram fighters living within communities. It also finds out that the CJTF take advantage of their positions to ‘settle scores' with individuals. The paper also finds out that, in a post conflict, the CJTF will pose another important problem for the peace in the Lake Chad region. This is because these youths, the CJTF, are already hardened and exposed to combat. It is recommended that the CJTF be maintained but adequate arrangements must be put in place to either absorb them into the conventional military and paramilitary services, or be properly demobilized/disengaged and empowered with training to lead a successful post conflict life.