Rethinking the Practice of Separation of Powers in Nigeria: Between Historical Assumptions and Institutional Realities

Abstract

This article develops a theoretical framework for understanding the persistent distortions in the practice of separation of powers in Nigeria. Although the 1999 Constitution formally adopts the classical doctrine of separation of powers, its practical operation remains inconsistent and unstable. Existing scholarship often attributes this dysfunction to institutional weakness, corruption, or executive overreach. The article argues that three historically embedded assumptions offer a more coherent analytical lens: the authoritarian legacy assumption, the colonial administrative continuity assumption, and the judicial sanctification assumption. First, prolonged military rule normalized executive centralization and fostered a political culture that equates strong authority with effective governance, thereby weakening institutional autonomy. Second, the colonial administrative system emphasized bureaucratic command over balanced representation, leaving a legacy of centralized governance that continues to influence institutional behaviour. Third, the widespread perception of the judiciary as the ultimate sanctuary of justice has encouraged the over-judicialization of political disputes, overburdening the courts beyond their institutional capacity. Drawing on constitutional analysis, historical interpretation, and postcolonial state theory, the study examines how these deep-rooted assumptions shape inter-branch relations. Rather than claiming definitive causation, the article proposes an interpretive framework for understanding Nigeria’s constitutional practice. It concludes that meaningful reform requires engaging these underlying structural predispositions alongside formal institutional redesign.